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Abstract
Since 1979, China embarked on an economic reform to modernize the country.
The reform was so successful that China was able to grow by an impressive rate of 9
percent per anum between 1979 and 1997. The rapid development of the economy
leads to a drastic increase in demand for energy. Since China has the largest population
in the world, its energy demand is nothing but huge. Each year, for example, China
needs to install as much as 10,000 MW of new electricity generation capacity, which
equals the curent capacity of Netherlands. This increase in demand for energy, which
is likely to continue, wil have implications for global energy markets, the world price
of energy and for the global environment as emissions of greenhouse gases grow
rapidly.
Against this background, there is an urgent need for the country to better manage
the energy sector so that the market can function in an orderly manner. To tackle this
issue, I single out three important energy problems to study. First, I wil examine the
current situation of the energy imbalance in China. Second, I wil forecast how rapid
the energy demand wil grow in future so that the deficit between the demand and
domestic supply can be identified. Lastly, I wil discuss some methods that can be used
to manage the demand.
My finding shows that energy-capital and energy-material inputs are
complementary, whereas the relationship of energy and labour is insignificant. In
addition, the simulation exercises also reveals that a high energy pricing policy might
not be effective in mitigating the demand and in encouraging firms to employ labour
intensive techniques. Also, rising energy prices may bring spiral inflation and
deterioration in the balance of payments and foreign resources. Therefore, government
should act cautiously when increasing energy prices.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background and Aims
Since the launch of economic reforms in 1979, China has successfully turned
itself into one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The rapid economic
expansion in turn has given rise to a steady rise in energy consumption!. The rise of
the energy consumption after the reform was so drastic that China has surpassed the
Russian Federation since 1994 and become the world's second largest consumer of
energy after the United States ( Sinton, 1996). In 1995, China produced 5,847.81
bilion yuan of GDP and consumed 1,311.76 milion tons of standard coal
equivalent (SCE) 2 of energy.3
The importance of the energy sector is noi limited only to the domestic
economy. As observed by Wu and Li (1995), China has to rely increasingly onthe
external energy market for meeting its rapidly growing demand. As a result,
China's energy imports soared 20-fold from only 2.61 milion ton SCE in 1980 to
54.56 in 1995, whereas energy exports increase almost twofold from only 30.58
milion ton SCE to 67.76. The rising gap between demand and indigenous supply
inevitably needs to be met by increasingly greater amounts of energy imports. As
! Note that the largest user of energy is industry. It accounted for about three-
quarters of both total commercial energy and coal use in 1990. Whereas, the typical
household consumes very little because most people are living in rural areas which
are very poor. Therefore, the residential sector consumes only 12% of the total
consumption in 1995.
2 One standard coal equivalent (SCE) is 7,000 kilo-calories per kilogram.
3 China Statistical Year Book (1996).
1
China's magnitude of energy trade (both exports and imports) is not small, the gap
wil invariably affect world energy trade and prices. Against such a backdrop, it is
therefore essential to study China's energy development.
In spite of the fact that energy is fundamental and essential to the growth of
the Chinese economy, not much research work have been devoted to the topic of
energy imbalance in China. Among the existing studies\ most are mainly
qualitative analyses. By contrast, I attempt to employ some quantitative techniques
to analyse China's energy consumption and pricing policies. One aim is to offer
guidance towards formulating policy.
1.2 Outlne of the Thesis
In order to achieve the above objectives, the thesis wil be divided into f~ur
parts. Part A employs a descriptive approach to assesses China's ability to manage
the energy sector. (Chapter 2). Part B and Part C are quantitative studies of energy
issues. Part B predicts the demand for energy utilsing a demand side approach
(Chapter 3 to 4). Part C adopts a supply side approach to evaluate the role of
government energy pricing policy in managing the energy industry (Chapter 5 to 7).
Part D is a summary of the findings in the previous sections (Chapter 8).
4 Such as Wu and Li (1995), Johnson (1995), China Statistical Information and
Consultancy Service Centre (1990), Sinton and Levine (1994), Kambarra (1992),
Nakajima (1992).
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Before discussing the outline of the thesis, it is necessary to compare the
demand side and supply side approaches. In the demand side set-up, the firm is
treated simply as a consumer of various inputs. The demand equation is often
specified by past experience and estimated by typical econometric techniques, such
as general to specific approach, cointegration and an error correction modeL. Under
this approach, specification and variables used in the model are freely chosen, and
then tested down to the final preferred modeL. As this approach simply specifies the
relationship between input demands and other exogenous variables, which normally
includes input prices, output level and structural variables etc., the relevant price
elasticities (i.e. price/cross price elasticities) are easily computed. For example, the
estimated coefficients of the price variables in a double log-linear demand function
are price elasticities, which can also be obtained from multiplying the ratio of
quantity demanded to price with the price coefficients of a linear demand equation.
Based on the estimated coefficients, one can forecast the future energy demand.
However, there are a number of problems associated with this approach. For
instance, one may question critically which variables should be included in the
demand equation. Furthermore, it is likely that too many explanatory variables
would be introduced which gives rise to the so-called "degrees of freedom lost"
problem. This problem is particularly serious when the sample size is relatively
small.
In the second approach, the firm is treated as a supplier of a final good or
service, so this kind of estimation is commonly referred to as the "supply side
approach". The starting point is to specify an indirect profit function (cost
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function) which has a number of well-known production features.5 After obtaining
this fuction, one can use Hotellng's Lemma (Shephard's Lemma) to derive the
output supply and input demand equations (conditional input demand equations),
and then estimate them using sample data. The explanatory variables used in this
model are therefore based on optimising theories and normally restricted to prices
of all inputs and outputs for cost minimisation (or instead, price of output and input
for profit maximisation). One obvious drawback of this approach is that it may
exclude some variables that have important bearing on the energy demand. Typical
examples are the structure of the economy - an economy that has a high
composition of heavy manufacturing, is likely to consume more energy than the one
with a small share of such industry. In addition, the price elasticities derived from
this approach are more complicated than those obtained under the "demand side
approach". Besides, different functional forms (such as translog and quadratic) and
assumptions of firm behaviour (either profit or cost equation) might result in
different input demand functions and price elasticity formulae. Hence, the first
approach is much easier and more flexible in term of specification of the input
demand functions and calculation of the elasticities, while the second approach has
a more solid theoretical basis.
Beyond this, there is one more important difference between these two
approaches. The first approach usually requires national time series data. On the
5 For example, an equi-proportionate change in output prices and all input prices does not
alter the input mix or encourage the firm to produce more output i.e. the producer does not
suffer from money ilusion. In addition, this theory also requires that the derivative of the
profit function with respect to the output and input price are homogenous of degree zero in
output and input price. We wil discuss the properties in later chapters.
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other hand, it is more appropriate to use a pooled firm data set for the second
approach, since it incorporates the rational choices of inputs by firm. Usually, these
kinds of data are available only at the micro-level only. As I am able to obtain a set
of surveys of firm data, the supply side approach becomes feasible as welL. Since
this data set was administrated by the State Statistical Bureau of China in 1989, it is
believed that the statistics are relatively accurate. Nonetheless, it should be
mentioned that this survey data set does not include energy consumption of each
firm, and so it cannot be used in estimating energy demand in the first approach.
Instead, I employ the national time series data from 1952 to 1994 to estimate energy
demand. On the contrary, the second approach can be employed with survey data
because it only needs the data 'share of the energy expenditure in profit', which is
available in the firm data set. Unfortunately, the observation period of this data set
is only 1985-88 and so the energy deficit period was not covered. Consequently,
this problem cannot be taken into account in this data set. However, the empirical
findings from the second approach stil can be projected to conduct energy policy
analysis on energy insuffcient problems. All in all, these two approaches have their
own relative strong points and so, both of them wil be used.
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1.2.1) Part A: Descriptive Approach to Energy Imbalance in China
In Chapter Two, I consider the problem of China's energy imbalance
problem. In the first part, I discuss what policies the governent has initiated to
overcome this problem in the past decade. Next, I try to find out the problems that
China stil needs to confront in the future and to evaluate the possible remedial
policies for the energy deficit. This chapter contains a general discussion on the
demand and supply of energy.
1.2.2) Part B: Demand Side Approach to the Prediction of Energy Insuffciency
Chapters Three and Four assess the severity of the energy imbalance.6 To do
this, it is necessary to specify an energy demand mQdel. Since energy is one of the
production factors, an energy demand function is commonly treated as one of the
input demand functions. The important relationships are those between the demand
for energy and prices of energy and other factors.
In Chapter Three, I use the vector error correction (VEC) model to forecast
China's future energy demand. Although there are other studies that have forecast
future demand for energy, they are flawed by the problem of spurious regressions,
which occurs when time-trend-driving variables may appear to be correlated in
finite sample regression, even though there is no true relationship among them.
6 Due to the availabilty of the data, it has not been easy to estimate and forecast
China's energy supply until now.
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Moreover, to perform forecasting, the traditional approach requires us to
predetermine the future values of the exogenous variables, which means that
forecast values are subject to the subjective assumptions about the future values of
the explanatory variables. However, VEC model can overcome these problems.
Hence, I employ this technique to analyse the energy consumption behaviour and
generate its ex-ante forecasts to the year 2000.
In Chapter Four, I model the demand for coaL. In contrast to developed
countries, coal is the major energy source of China.? My purpose is to identify the
major factors that determine coal demand. To achieve this, I apply the
cointegration and error-correction models to model Chinese coal consumption
data. Since the error correction approach is a single regression which is quite
different from the vector error correction approach employed in Chapter Three, it
requires us to make some assumptions about the future values of the exogenous
variables. Because of these particular characteristics, it is possible for us to assess
the impacts of how the changes in exogenous variables wil affect the energy
7 China's energy consumption depends on energy resource availabilty and production in
China. The production of high quality energy, such as petroleum, natural gas and
electricity, stil cannot meet the rapidly increasing demand. Although crude oil, natural gas
and hydropower contribute important shares of current energy components, coal stil
maintains the dominant position in primary energy supply and consumption of China. In
the 1950s, coal composed about 95% of commercial primary energy. Along with the
exploration of big oil fields like Daqing and Shengli from the beginning of 1960s, the share
of oil and gas have increased a lot, achieving around 28% in the middle of 1970s combined
with hydropower. While from 1980, the development of oil and natural gas became more
and more diffcult, coal has increased its share in the energy supply since then. The annual
growth rate of coal consumption was 5.6% in 1980s, higher than that of primary energy
consumption. Coal consumption was 1140 milion tons in 1995, accounting for 74.6% of
the total energy consumption. Coal is not only the dominant source of energy, but also is an
important raw material of the chemical industry.
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imbalance. The availabilty of this model would allow us to evaluate the
effectiveness of controllng those variables in managing the coal demand in China.
1.2.3) Part C: Supply Side Approach to the Evaluation of Energy Pricing Policy
The Forecasts by econometric techniques from Chapters Three and Four can
verify the qualitative analysis in Chapter Two whether China wil suffer from
energy shortfall in the next century. If so, it is necessary to implement energy
policies to alleviate this problem. Chapter Two has evaluated the effectiveness of
such policies. However, the analyses are mainly qualitative approaches and the
findings may be different if the studies are based on quantitative techniques. On the
other hand, increasing energy prices is currently the major instrument in China to
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mitigate demand. However, its impact on the economy and energy consumption is
controversiaL.
Therefore, in the following chapters, I evaluate the energy pricing policy in
managing the energy sector by the "supply side approach". Chapters Five, Six and
Seven regard the estimation of input demand functions and of own price and cross
price elasticities, aiming to investigate the complementarity/ substitutability among
energy and other input factors such as capital and labour, and hence evaluate
whether a high-energy pricing policy can solve energy insufficiency. The findings
are of strong interest to the Chinese energy sector. It is because the use of a high
price policy may lead to different possible outcomes. For instance, an increase in
energy price could result in declines in capital formulation and perhaps in lowering
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labour productivity growth. The economy may shrink as a result. In the alternative
situation, the high pricing regime could encourage more rapid capital formation and
so achieve the goal of energy conservation with more desirable and productive
outcomes. Therefore, the effects of rising energy prices on energy saving and output
growth are ambiguous. This ambiguity is hinged on the substitution/complementary
relationship among energy and other (non-energy)-input factors. The evaluation of
the effects of a higher pricing policy wil provide an important lesson, especially
when such policy is implemented to narrow the future energy insufficiency.
The input demand functions and relevant elasticities can be derived from
traditional translog profit models. However, the traditional methods ignore the
effect of rationing on such derivations. As rationing occurs frequently in Chinese
enterprises, applying rationing behaviour to Chinese data may therefore be strongly
desirable. In light of this, I modify the traditional method and derive the price
elasticities by introducing a virtual pricing approach. During the observation period
(1985-88), energy deficit has not emerged as an important constraint. However,
most Chinese firms were likely suffered from insufficient material inputs over this
period. Therefore, in order to take this problem into account, material inputs are
chosen ex ante as rationed input whereas energy is treated as a variable factor
without rationing. Nevertheless, for the period after 1992, energy has changed to
become a rationed input as energy deficit has become serious. Unfortunately, I
cannot find a data set that has 1990s information and hence cannot choose energy as
a rationing constraint in my modeL. Nevertheless, the exercise conducted in this
thesis ilustrates how rationing can be modelled and such useful information as
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price elasticities be derived. More importantly, the results also can be used to
project energy policy analysis in later period when energy imbalance occurs.
In Chapter Five, I begin by reviewing the literature on the controversy
between capital and energy. I then explain why rationing should also be an
important factor. After that, I review and compare different methods that can be
used to derive input demand functions. From the review, I argue why the dual
approach and translog profit function is suitable for this study. In this chapter, the
advantages and drawbacks of this approach wil be presented in detaiL.
In Chapter Six, I explain how the elasticites are derived from a translog
profit function. In the first section, the elasticities are derived in the traditional
way which is under the assumption that there is no rationing in the economy. As
rationing is currently occurring in China, I incorporate the rationing behaviour in
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deriving the elasticities. Following this argument, I explain and compare how the
two approaches i.e. the auxiliary constraint and the virtual pricing approaches-can
deal with the rationing. After this comparison, I conclude that the virtual pricing
approach is more appropriate to derive the elasticities under rationing. The
derivation of the elasticities is presented in the last section.
Chapter Seven adopts the translog profit function to the firm data set to
derive relevant price elasticities. At the beginning, I introduce the survey data and
explain how the translog profit function can be formulated in my energy modeL.
After that, I discuss the adopted econometric technique. The estimates of the
translog profit equation then are substituted into the formulae derived in Chapter
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Six so as to obtain the elasticities with rationing and without rationing. From the
signs of the elasticities, I can examine the relationship between energy and other
inputs and hence evaluate the effects of raising the energy price policy on the
economy. With the figures of energy forecasts obtained in Chapter Two and
Three, different policy options are evaluated and their findings provide more
understandings on the effect of a high price policy towards managing energy
insuffciency.
1.2.4) Part D: Conclusion
Chapter Eight summarises this study under the three aspects which are
mentioned above, i.e., to assess the ability to manage the energy sector, to predict
1
the size of the imbalance between supply and demand, and to evaluate the role of
governent's energy pricing policies in China.
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Chapter 2: An Overview of Energy Market in China1
2.1 Introduction
After many years of hard effort to manage the rapid growth of energy
demand, energy remains a major input constraint in China. The most severe
imbalance began to occur in some sectors after the early ,90s resulting in
considerable disruption to the economy as factories in many cities had to be closed
several days a week in order to mitigate the electricity shortfall. At present, although
the imbalance is apparently less severe than several years ago, it is far too early to
conclude that the problem is totally solved as the economy is expected to continue
to grow at a relentless rate into the foreseeable future. Against this backdrop, the
problem of energy constraint wil inevitably remain a dominating issue in the
formulation of the energy policy. In view of this, this chapter wil attempt to
examine this particular issue. First, in the next section, I wil evaluate the experience
of the country in handling this problem. Despite some important achievements
towards overcoming the energy imbalance, China stil needs to face a number of
formidable problems in the years to come. In section three, therefore, I wil attempt
to point out some of the important issues that remain to be solved. Based on this
discussion, I attempt in section four to propose some policy prescriptions for
managing the problems. The final section draws out the major points ofthis chapter.
1 This chapter is to a large extent based on the paper in Energy Policy (Chan and
Lee, forthcoming)
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In order to better understand the major issues facing China, it is beneficial to
start by examining the future energy balance of the country. As China approaches
the end of this century, the planned output targets laid down by the governent for
coal, oil, gas, hydro-electricity and nuclear energy in the year 2000 are summarised
in Table 2.1. Aggregating them into a common unit, namely milion tons of standard
coal equivalent (Mtce, hereafter), implies that the Chinese energy producers are
planning to supply a total of 1,380 Mtce by the year 2000. According to one official
estimate, China wil need around 1,500 Mtce at the same year. Consequently, a
deficit of 120 Mtce is expected to occur as the country approaches the end of this
century. Among all the major fuels, the shortfall of oil wil be the most severe. In
order to close this gap, 43 Mtce of oil is needed to be imported. At the current
international price of US$20 per barrel, this would amount to US$4.2 bilion. In
order to secure external supply, the governent plans to procure about 22 Mtce of
oil through bilateral agreements with such countries as Kazakhtsan and
Turkmenistan. The remaining shortfall of 20 Mtce to 25 Mtce wil be made up by
conventional imports.2 In 1996, China recorded a trade surplus ofUS$ 16.6 bilion.
Therefore, the deficit of energy balance wil be kept at a manageable level over the
next few years.
2 Source: South China Morning Post, 6th April 1997, Money Section, p.2.
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Table 2.1: . China's energy supply and demand in the year 2000 and 2010
Energy supply Energy demand Energy supply Energy demand
in the year in the year in the year in the year 2010
2000 (Mtce)l 2000 (Mtce)2 2010 (Mtce) (Mtce)
Coal 1,000 1,064 1,2853 1,373
Oil 241 284 2764 358
Gas 33 40 935 80
Hydro- 100 97 1426 143
electricity
Nuclear 4 307
electricity
Others 7 47
Total 1,377 1,495 2,001
Sources: 1) People's Daily, 20th March 1996 and Yan (1994), p.II-12. 2) The
demand estimates for both 2000 and 2010 are from Zhou Fengqui (1996). 3) Yan
(1994), p. 66. 4) Zhou Yongkang (1996).5) Same as 4.6) Wu and Wang (1995).7)
Same as 4.
2.2 The experience of mitigating the Energy Constraint
To maintain China's energy imbalance at a manageable level is by no means
an easy task, as the country's GDP experiences a phenomenal growth rate of 9.6
percent between the start of reform in 1979 and 1995. Such growth rate puts
enormous pressure on energy supply. In order to overcome the energy insuffciency,
the Chinese government has initiated a number of policies, some of which have
been quite successful in narrowing down the deficit.
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2.2.1) The Rapid Rise of Small Coal Mines
One of the key energy policies that the government has undertaken after the
reform is to encourage the local initiative to expand coal supply. The governent
adopts this policy because the mine ownership is very diverse in China. In 1979, 55
per cent of output came from the state-owned coal mines. A furher 31 per cent of
production came from state mines owned locally at provincial, prefectural and
county levels. The remaining 14 per cent of output was obtained from vilage-
owned coal mines. In comparison, the national coal mines tend to be larger and
more highly mechanised than small rural coal mines in the vilages. However, the
rural mines grew at a spectacular rate after the reform. In 1993, for example, vilage
coal mines account for 35 percent of the total coal output, while the national and
local state own mines produce around 40 and 25 percent respectively. To sum up,
the emergence of the small coal mines enables thelcountry to achieve the goal of
producing 1.4 milion tons of raw coal by the year 2000, which many considered
unattainable when the governent first announced this target in the 1980s.
The development of small coal mines helps not only to increase the supply
of coal, but also alleviates the transport bottleneck which caused severe energy
constraint in the late 1980s. The country is vulnerable to such bottlenecks because
the distribution of coal deposits is geographically very unequal in China; nearly 80
percent of them are concentrated in three provinces: Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner
Mongolia, which locate in the north and north-west of the country. However, the
major consuming centres are in the east and south. As a result, large amount of coals
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have to be transported long distances before reaching their consumers. This situation
has resulted in a significant strain on the coal-carring capacity of the rail system. In
the worst years, many businesses around the country were idle due to lack of
electricity, while large piles of coal sat unused outside the mines. Transport
bottlenecks have been alleviated in part by the proliferation of small coal mines
which scatter more evenly around the country. As a result, the largest three coal
abundant provinces accounted only 34.3 percent of total coal output in 1993. The
rise of local coal suppliers therefore significantly reduces the demand for coal from
large coal mines.
2.2.2) Relieving the Capacity Constraint
The second major factor which has contributed significantly to narrowing
down the energy imbalance is the rapid build up of, electricity generation capacity.
This relieves considerably the energy constraint because China has not only
experienced deficit of energy inputs, but also insufficiency of electricity generation
capacity. In order to alleviate this gap, the government sets the development of
power industry as a first priority. As a result of the rapid development of small coal
mines, this allows the governent to shift greater proportions of investment from
the coal to power industry. In 1995, for example, almost 60 percent of the
government's investment in the energy industry went to the power industry, while
only 13.6 percent was given to the coal extraction industry (State Statistical Bureau,
1996). In comparison, the power and coal extraction industries absorbed 29.8 and
48.3 percents of all the energy investment in 1985, respectively. The commitment to
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the power industry is undoubtedly strong. Currently, the governent aims to
upgrade the power system. For example, the governent plans to increase power
capacity to 290 Gigawatt (GW) by the year 2000. To achieve this target, 16 GW of
new capacity is expected to be added each year in the present ninth Five-year Plan
(1996-2000). In terms of growth rate, the power industry wil rise by 7 percent
annually; this is almost twice the growth rate of the entire energy sector. Equally
important for handling the energy imbalance, the governent plans to join up the
existing six cross-provincial transmission grids into a single system so that surplus
electricity can be transferred readily to deficit areas. Among the first to be connected
are the northern and northeast regional grids. By the year 2003, when the first part
of the Three Gorges hydroelectricity project in central China wil be completed, the
transmission grids wil allow 100 bilion K wh of electricity be transmitted each year
from the Three Gorges to the consuming centres in the eastern provinces along the
coast. It is planned that a national grid wil be completely formed around 2020.3
2.2.3) Getting Prices Right
Price changes have been one of the most significant results of the reform. In
the centrally planing system before the reform, the prices of fuel were treated as an
accounting unit with no direct bearing to the cost of providing the resources. Such
practices have given rise to a great deal of problems after the reform. First, since the
price signals are distorted, consumers are unlikely to make correct decisions. This is
3 Source: Tai Kung Pao, 4th April 1997, p.C7.
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paricularly worse when the prices of energy are significantly fixed below their
opportunity costs.
In view of this, the authority began to rectify energy prices. For example, a
two tiered system was introduced in 1985 under which oil producers were allowed
to sell their above quota output at a price higher than the state-administered price.
As shown in Table 2.2, the above quota price of crude oil remained substantially
higher than the governent-administered price, although the gap started to narow
in the early 1990s. Later on, the governent took another major reform step by
introducing a market price to the second tier in 1993. Although the two-tiered price
structure remains intact, the market price has not since departed significantly from
the international price.
Table 2.2: The domestic oil price structure of China.
Plan Market
Low High
1985 100 555
1990 167 555
1991 201 589
1992 201 589
1993 205 535 1000
1994 700 1232
1995 700 1250
Source: Bi (1994) and Chao (1996).
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The long-term objective of the governent is to raise planned prices to
international market levels before the end of the century. In moving towards this
goal, the price for the first tier, which is normally sold to government-subsidised
sectors, was raised to between 880 yuan and 964 yuan per ton in early 1997.4 The
second-tier crude, which. is sold at market prices, remains at an average of 1,200
yuan per ton. Following this, the authority plans to introduce an additional price
increase of 200 yuan per ton to the first-tier crude oil in 1998, effectively ending the
two-tiered system. Since the first tier crude oil represents about 80% of onshore
production, a great majority of oil consumers wil increasingly need to face
international prices. The determination to rectify the previous pricing policy wil
minimise the inefficiency of consumption caused by the arbitrarily held down
energy prices.
In addition to causing consumption ineffciency, the adverse impacts of
arbitrarily held down prices are particularly notable for the national coal mines.
Table 2.3 shows the amount of economic losses that state coal mines suffered over
the last eight years. The implementation of the price increase has reversed the trend
of the losses suffered by the coal industry. From a loss of 6.2 bilion yuans in 1991,
the loss in profit of the national coal mines fell to 1.0 bilion yuan in 1995.
Table 2.3 Economic losses (bilion yuans) of state coal mines in China.
Year 1988
-1.8
1989
-3.7
1990 1991
-6.1 -6.2
1992
-5.3
1993
-3.3
1994
-2.0
1995
-1.0Loss
Sources: China's Statistical Yearbook and China's Economic Yearbook, various
issues.
4 Source: Asian Wall Street Journal, 2nd April, 1997, p. 25.
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2.2.4) Improving energy consumption efficiency
Another major factor which helps reduce the energy imbalance is the
improvement in energy consumption efficiency. In contrast to the pre-reform period
during which the energy intensity (energy consumed per unit of output produced)
climbed steadily, it declined consistently after the reform, which enables the country
to save a substantial amount of energy. For example, during th~ recently elapsed
Eighth Five Year Plan (1991-1995), the economy grew at an annual rate of 12
percent, while energy consumption increased by a mere 5.5 percent. As a result, the
demand elasticity ratio fell to as low as 0.46 (5.5%/12%) in these five years. In
comparison with the elasticity ratio of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980), which
equals 1.0, it is clear that the energy intensity has been greatly improved after the
reform.
This remarkable performance can be attributed to the following changes.
First, under the reform, firms are given greater incentives to be more cost sensitive.
For example, they are allowed to retain part of their profits after the reform. Also,
firms' investment has to derive from bank borrowing instead of governent
allocations. These types of new policies naturally lead most firms to place a greater
emphasis on cutting cost which includes energy expense. Second, the emergence of
township enterprises (TVP) also helps reduce the demand for energy. One of the
most spectacular changes after the reform is the rapid growth of the non-state sector.
Between 1984 and 1994, for example, the growth of industrial output in non-state
enterprises was double that of state-owned enterprises. In the non-state sector, about
20
4/5 ofthe output was produced by TVP. More important, not only have TVP grown
faster than the state-owned enterprises, they are also more efficient; the total factor
productivity for SOEs is estimated to be only one third to one half the
corresponding rate for non-state enterprises (Broadman, 1995, p.13). As a result,
TVP represents a major source of energy saving. Third, the introduction of energy
price reform also plays a significant part in increasing energy efficiency. Subsequent
to the energy price rise, the amount spent on energy inputs has become more
important. As Chinese firms have become more market oriented at the same time,
price reform would help stimulate the consumers to be more effcient in using
energy.
2.3 Remaining Problems Ahead
2.3.1) The Growing Oil Deficit
The energy balance looks much less optimistic when the forecast is extended
to the next decade. Several problems deserve policy-makers' attention. In particular,
the total energy supply is expected to grow at a rate significantly smaller than
demand. This is paricularly noticeable in the oil sector because the forecast for oil
supply in 2010 is 276 Mtce which is nine percent more than that of 2000. At the
same time, however, the demand for oil wil rise to 358 Mtce, exceeding the supply
by 30 percent. This wil imply that China wil need approximately 82 Mtce of
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imports (or 2.3 milion barrels a day), which more than doubles the estimated
imports for the year 2000.
Several reasons contributed to this acute imbalance. The most important one
is that, in contrast with natural gas production, almost two-third of the entire
country's oil output comes from the three largest oil fields: Daiqing, Shengli and
Liaohe. Unfortunately, all these fields have passed their groWth periods. For
example, Daiqing and Shengli were first discovered in 1959 and 1961, respectively.
Because of these discoveries, China was able to achieve self-sufficiency in oil in
1965. However, Daqing's oil production reached its peak in 1976 and since then its
output was restricted to 50 milion tons per year. So far, Daiqing has discovered 5
bilion tons of oil-in-place from which 1.4 billon tons have been extracted. In 1997,
Daiqing's management anticipates extracting another 2 bilion tons from the oil field
so that the existing annual output of 50 milion tons1 can be more or less achieved at
least through to the year 2010.5 This wil mean that oil developers could get about
one third of their oil-in-place. Shengli, the number two oil field in the country, has
experienced a similar development history. Its output rose steadily until 1988 when
it reached a yearly output of 33 milion tons. After reaching the peak, its output
stabilises at the 30 milion tons leveL.
5 See Tai Kung Pao, Hong Kong, 4th March, 1997, p.C3.
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Table 2.4: Oil and natural gas production of major Chinese oil fields in 1995.
Oil output As percentage of Natural Gas As percentage of
(milion ton) total oil output (bilion metre) total gas output
Daiqing 56.0 36.6% 2.29 13.1%
Shengli 30.0 19.6% 1.29 7.4%
Liaohe 15.5 10.1% 1.75 10.0%
Xinjiang 7.9 5.2% 0.88 5.0%
Huabei 4.7 3.1% 0.31 1.8%
Zhongyan 4.1 2.7% 1.10 6.3%
Henan 1.9 1.2% 0.04 0.2%
Zhongyuan 4.1 2.7% 1.10 6.3%
Jilin 3.4 2.2% 0.18 1.0%
Tarim 2.5 1.6% 0.14 0.8%
Changqing 2.2 1.4% 0.10 0.6%
Source: China Petroleum News, 10 January, 1996.
As the country was unable to find new large oil fields in the past decade, oil
producers have been struggling to maintain their current levels of oil production.
However, the demand for oil has been growing relentlessly due to a combination of
increased plastics and fibre demand which is estimated to consume roughly 7% of
total crude supplies, and a sharply higher consumption of refined products,
especially in the transport sector (e.g. autos, trucks and aircrafts) which is the largest
consumers of crude oiL. As a result, China is confronting a sharly increasing
demand for crude oil against a flat to gradually rising domestic crude supply. To
accommodate the deficit, industry has depressed the reserve-to-production to a
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historically low level for acquiring additional oiL. 6 This leads to the allegation that
the Chinese oil producers have been over-producing to meet their domestic needs at
the risk of depleting their reserves and causing serious damage to their oil wells'
reservoirs. 
7 Unless the country discovers new oil basins to replenish the existing
large oil fields, the prospect of a rising oil deficit gap wil become increasingly
likely as the country enters the next century.
2.3.2) The Uncertainty of Coal Supply
Since, 1990, China has surpassed the US and become the largest coal
producer in the world. From then on, coal output continued to rise by about 4 to 5
percent per year. In 1995, China produced 10.5 Mtce of coaL. As the governent
sets the target for the economy to grow annually by 8 percent before 2000 and 7
percent in the following ten years, the demand for Goal is expected to rise by 4 to 5
percent annually if the present income elasticity of demand ratios remain
unchanged. By 2010, demand wil rise fuher to 18 Mtce. Concerns can be raised
about the advisability of an existing strategy that relies heavily on the supplies of
small coal mines. The most important one is related to the sustainability of small
coal mines, whose importance is expected to decline in the twenty-first centur. As
shown in Table 2.5, analysts in China predict that the relative contribution of the
small coal mines wil significantly reduce as time goes on. This is not surprising
since most small mines tend to exploit comparatively small, shallow basins with
6 As reported in Lu et al. (1995), p.5, the reserve-to-production ratio has dropped
considerably from 15.2 in 1986 to 13.6 in 1992.
7 See, for example, Mamdouh (1995).
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limited scope of expansion over the long run. Most of the existing small mines
operated before the 1990s would be exhausted soon after 2000. (Ma, Zhu and Sheng
(1996), p. 16). Unless more investments are forthcoming in the state sector, the
fading out of small coal mines may weaken the supply ability of the coal industry in
China.
Table 2.5: The relative shares of different types of coal mines in China.
Year national state local state coal vilage-owned
coal mines mines coal mines
1979 56% 29% 15%
1985 46% 26% 27%
1990 44% 28% 27%
1993 41% 25% 35%
2000 50% 25% 25%
2010 55% 25% 20%
Source: Rural Statistical Yearbook of China, Energy of China and Statistical
Yearbook of China, various issues. The forecast figures are obtained from Nie
(1994), p. 63.
How did the state investment change over the last several years? As shown
in Table 2.6, the shares of state investment in both the energy sector and coal
industry have been declining quite drastically. For example, in 1995, the energy
sector accounts only for 18.6 percent of total governent investment, which is
almost 34 percent smaller than that of 1990. In comparison, the reduction to the coal
industry is even more notable; the share of coal industry drops by more than one
half, from 5.8 percent in 1990 to 2.6 percent in 1995.
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Table 2.6: The share of state investment in the energy and coal industries. (%)
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Energy 23.1 23.7 27.8 28.3 26.3 22.0 19.6 18.2 18.6
Coal 4.3 3.9 4.8 5.8 5.4 4.1 3.2 2.4 2.6
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, various issues.
Clearly, the rapid rise of small coal mines allows China to have a breathing
space, but there is little room for complacency as the country has become the world
largest producer. In particular, many of these small coal mines have never been
prospected. In addition, the recovery rates of many of these mines are as low as 10
to 15 percent, resulting in massive wastage. As a result, their potentials are not
clearly known. As demand for coal continues to grow relentlessly, relying on small
coal mines is clearly not a sustainable policy.
2.3.3) Little Progress In Reforming State-Owned Enterprises
Taking the above two points together implies that the country must require
considerable investment for meeting future demand. However, it is questionable
whether the governent could find sufficient fuding if moribund state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) remain unable to improve their unsatisfactory performance,
which are manifested in a variety of indicators. For example, although the SOEs
currently account for over one-third industrial output, they consume nearly three-
quarters of the industrial investment. Although this could be the result of a higher
concentration of capital intensive industrial in SOE sector, the value added per
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worker is about half of the non-state industrial sector. If the stock of unsold
inventories- which stands at the level of US$ 60 bilion or 8% of China's GDP in
19968- was removed from the valuation of output, value added per worker in SOEs
would be much lower.
In view of their unsatisfactory performance, the governent has tried to
reform SOEs by adopting a "contract responsibility system" in thç late 1980s. This
involved a system of contracts whereby enterprises agreed to turn over a set level of
profits to the state. After completing this requirement, the enterprise was to be given
certain autonomy. Since these contracts typically lasted only for three years but
many management decisions need many years to be felt, there is no guarantee that
managements wil work for the long-term interest of firms. Probably because of this,
China decided to phase out the contract responsibility system and replace it by a
shareholding system in late 1993. The obstaclelì have been far greater than
anticipated, however. Since the state remains as a dominant shareholder in the new
system, the incorporation does not change to a significant extent the working
relationship between managers and owners, i.e., the state.9 Thus far, the enterprise
reform remains one major part of the reforms that has met with little success.
The adverse impacts of this failure are far-reaching to energy sector. The
World Bank estimates that the governent needed to subsidise as much as 4 % of
China's GDP to its SOEs in 1995 (The World Bank, 1996, p.18). Also, the number
8 Source: Asian Wall Street Journal, 9th April 1997, p.8.
9 Interested readers can refer to Chan (1996) who discuses why the shareholding
system does not work very well for those Chinese SOEs listed in the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange.
27
of loss-making enterprises has grown steadily from 26 percent of SOEs in 1992 to
44 percent in 1995. Unless the governent is able to find a solution, the need to
continue the subsidisation of the state sector on a large scale wil hamper
considerably the governent's ability to provide funding for many desirable energy
projects.
2.3.4) Intensifying regional deficits
The fourth factor that may worsen the energy deficit is associated with the
unbalanced regional development pattern of the country. Prior to 1978, Chinese
development strategy was dominated by preferential development of heavy industry.
After 1978, however, the strategy was shifted to an emphasis on the development of
the coastal regions so that they can serve as the, growth poles for stimulating
1
economic growth in the interior provinces. In pursuing this policy, the government
has deliberately increased investment in the coastal regions at the expense of the
interior. For example, Chai (1996) reports that in the years between 1979 and 1992
the coastal region's investment in fixed assets rose by almost 10 percentage points
whereas that of the western region actually declined.lo As a consequence, the
growth rates of most of the coastal provinces are often among the highest in the
country. Such a development has far-reaching implications to the energy balance of
the country. As mentioned before, the geographical distribution of coal mines is
highly uneven in China: nearly 80 per cent of large coal mines are concentrated in
10 One can refer to Chai (1996) for detaiL.
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the north and north-west, while the major consuming centres locate along the coast.
The unbalanced development which favours the coastal regions inevitably increases
the strain on the coal -carring capacity of the rail system.
This problem is further aggravated by the newly adopted investment policy
of the governent. As a result of decentralisation which took place after the reform,
the tax revenue of the central governent as a percentage of GDP has been
significantly reduced. The central governent finds it increasingly diffcult to fud
all the new electricity generation projects. In order to attract other sources of
funding, the governent has adopted what is commonly known as the "high-in,
high-out" investment policy. The main principle of this policy, as stipulated in the
recently promulgated "Electricity Law", is to allow domestic and foreign investors
1
to charge prices higher than the government-administered prices for recovering their
investment costs. The consequence of this policy is clear; nearly 86 per cent newly
approved coal-fired electricity plants in 1996 are planed to be built in the coastal
regions.11 This is not surprising as they are the regions which are able to afford
higher prices. However, the unbalanced development pattern of growth, if not
mitigated in the near future, wil increase the traffic congestion and hence intensify
the regional energy imbalance.
11 Source: South China Morning Post, 6th April, 1997, Business Section, p.2.
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2.4 Some Policy Prescriptions
In order to handle the energy imbalance, both supply and demand policies
are necessary. On the supply side, for example, China must intensify its efforts to
discover new oil fields. At present, China has two major unexplored oil basins that
may have large potential reserves. One of these is the South China Sea which is
believed to have deposits equivalent to 8 Daqing oilfields, although recent offshore
discoveries have been modest. However, since this is also the area where the border
disputes are most intense, the uncertainty about its future potential is substantiaL.
Another potential source is the Tarim Basin, which locates in the westernost
province, Xinjiang. The latest geological survey indicates that Tarim wil be one of
the most important sources of oil and gas for China. In 1996, the five operating oil
fields in Tarim allows China to produce 3.15 milion tons of crude oil, making
Xinjiang the eighth largest oil producing provinc~ in the country. Although the
output of Tarim basin is stil moderate, its potential of becoming one of the major
oil producer is great as the Chinese governent estimates that the oil reserves in the
basin may be as large as 11 bilion tons of oil and 8.4 trilion cubic meters of natural
gas. So far, only 1.4 bilion tons of oil and gas have been verified. In spite of the fact
that Tarim basin is the largest under-explored oil basin in the world, its location
makes it extremely harsh for exploration. Part of the diffculty of oil exploration and
development in Tarim is that oil deposits tend to be found very deep, and wells there
have to be driled up to an average depth of 4,000 meters. In addition, Tarim is a
notoriously difficult area to work in. For example, work normally needs to stop for
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about three months every year, from late spring, because of shifting sands and
sandstorms.
Because of these particular geographical conditions, the exploration
programme in the Tarim Basin wil be the largest and most expensive in China's
history. The involvement of foreign investment would lessen the risk and cost
involved. On the surface, the Chinese government has made a lot of efforts to attract
foreign investment. For example, the area available for foreign exploration has
increased to 960 milion square kilometres, representing almost one-quarer of its
entire territory. By the end of 1996, 0.15 milion square kilometres have been
contracted to foreign oil companies. Despite this, foreign companies made little
headway in the exploration work of Tarim since it has been opened to outsiders in
1994. Up til now, most foreign companies have been confined to the fringes of the
region and have failed in their search for oiL. For the1'4.3 milion tons of oil extracted
in 1996 from the region, virtually all have been produced by Chinese companies.
The inability to find oil in Tarim frustrates many foreign companies. As a
consequence, British Petroleum stopped work in early 1995. This was followed by
an Amoco-led consortium which dropped out of third-round bidding for the Tarim
in the middle of 1996. The reluctance displayed by foreign companies can be
ascribed to the lack of a clear policy framework for attracting foreign investment.
Two examples serve to clarify this point. The first one is related to the pricing
policy of oiL. Before the recent price reform, the entire price making process was
highly opaque. It was not clear at all how the authority determined its oil prices.
Such a practice increased the risk of investment and thus reduced the interest of
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foreign companies. Another more recent example is related to the provision of
information and data that associate with Tarim. Until very recently, virtually all of
data are provided by the China National Petroleum Corporation. However, very few
data have been released to outsiders so far.12 Clearly, this policy is anything but
conducive to attract foreign investment.
In addition to above supply policy, the governent should f'lso strengthen its
role in the coal industry, as the existing policy of relying on the small coal mines
may not be sustainable. To do that, it is necessary for the governent to increase its
investment in state mines. Unfortunately, for a developing country, capital is always
one of the most limiting constraints. In theory, this constraint can be partially
relieved by using capital effciently. In reality, however, producers in China often do
not use their capital in such a desirable manner. For example, it is reported that, out
of the existing 210 milion tons of oil-refining capapity in 1996,30 milion tons are
idled due to excess capacity.13 This problem occurs frequently after the central
governent has decentralised part of the investment decision-making power to
lower-level governents, whose investment behaviour are expected to be optimised
by the introduction of a financial market. Since the reform of the financial sector
remains at an early stage, duplication of investment often occurs. To increase of the
efficiency of capital utilisation, the continuation of the financial reform ought to
deserve top priority in the reform agenda.
12 For detail, see Murhy and Seidlitz (1997).
13 Source: People's Daily, 10th March 1997, p.2.
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Apart from the supply side, demand side management is equally important
in the context of China. This is because energy consumption per unit output in
China is 3 to 4 times that in developed countries. In particular, energy consumption
for major manufacturing industrial products is 40 percent higher than those in
industrial countries (Zhou, 1996). Since the industrial and transport sectors consume
about 70 per cent of total energy in recent years, there is a great potential for energy
conservation in China, particularly within manufacturing industry. Chinese energy
consumption can be conserved in the following ways. First, demand can be reduced
by changing the economic structure. Before the reform, the development of tertiary
industry had been arbitrarily held back because the government adopted a forced
industrialisation strategy. Until now, the low-consumption service sector constitutes
only a small proportion of the economy, whereas the high-energy consumption
sector makes up the largest proportion. By removing, those policies that discriminate
against the service sector, the demand for energy would reduce and the well-being
of the society would be increased. Second, energy demand can be reduced by
increasing the effciency of consumption, particularly of heavy energy users.
Typical examples are fans and pumps which currently use over one third of
electricity. In addition, upgrading the small, old coal-fired plants can also save
significant amounts of energy. Third, in some energy intensive industries where the
small enterprises produce a significant share of output, it is possible to conserve
energy by raising the scale of production of these small firms. This type of saving
wil be most significant in the cement industry where small township enterprises
account for almost one-fourh of the total output.
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2.5 Conclusion
The Chinese economy has grown spectacularly since the economic reform in
1979. As a result of this, the economy has begun to be plagued by energy deficit, to
varying degrees. In order to overcome this problem, the governent has initiated a
number of policies, some of which have been quite successful in narrowing the
energy deficit. For example, as many energy projects need.many years for
construction, careful planning is essential for handling the deficit problem. In
addition, the commitment to pay more attention to the economic incentives of both
consumers and producers, such as price reform, also plays potentially important part
in solving the problem.
Although the energy gap has been reduced to a manageable level in recent
years, China stil faces a multitude of challenges. In particular, since the economy is
expected to grow robustly, the government must ~ontinue to expand the energy
supply. Inevitably, the investment needs arising from the oil, coal and electricity
sectors are huge. To generate enough funding, the governent needs to reform its
existing polices on such sectors as state-owned enterprises, financial markets and
foreign investment. These investment needs can be reduced by spending more effort
on energy saving. Rationalising the economic structure, upgrading the obsolete
heavy energy users and raising the scale of production of small enterprises could
improve the energy efficiency substantially.
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Chapter 3: Forecasting the Demand for Energy in China!
3.1 Introduction
China has engaged in economic reforms since 1979, the general
aim of which has been to quadruple its 1980's national income by the
year 2000. Experience shows that one of the major obstacles to
achieving this objective is the frequent occurrence of energy
imbalance. Probably as a consequence of the increasing importance of
this sector in the national economy, great effort has been spent in
China on the study of energy demand. An earlier report on these
efforts comes from Smil (1989, Chapter 4), who documented seven
separate forecasts that had been conducted by economists. Their
1
estimates differed quite widely, ranging from a maximum of 2.40
billion tons of standard coal equivalent (SCE) to a minimum of 1.39
billion tons to be demanded by the year 2000.2 These studies largely
followed two main types of approaches: Intensity analysis and
regression modeL. Invariably, the high estimates came from those
which used intensity approach in the early 1980s. This is not
surprising as the country's energy intensity was relatively high before
the reform and saw a drastic fall in the subsequent years. Early
intensity analysis which did not foresee this change would naturally
1 This chapter is to a large extent based on the paper in The Energy
Journal (Chan and Lee, 1996)
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produce particularly high estimates. A later forecast conducted by Cai
(1990, Chapter 2), who combined both regression and intensity
approaches, has produced a more moderate increase. Cai forecast that
the Chinese energy demand will rise to 1.45-1.68 billion tons of SCE
by the end of this century, depending on different assumptions about
the efficiency gains on energy consumption. In view of the importance
of the energy forecast towards making investment plans, this chapter
attempts to throw some light on how the Chinese energy demand will
change as the country's development process continues.
In contrast to the previous papers, my analysis is based on two
increasingly popularised econometric techniques, co integration and
vector error correction modeL. This popularity is due to the pioneering
works of Granger (1983, 1986, and 19881) and Engle and Granger
(1987) on cointegration. The reasons for adopting these approaches in
estimating energy demand are twofold. First, earlier econometric
studies have been subj ect to the potentially serious econometric
problem of spurious regression, which arises when variables that are
driven by time trends may appear to be correlated In finite sample
regression, even though there is no true relationship existing among
them. The problem arises In many previous studies as it has always
been assumed that economic variables are stationary, in terms of
having constant unconditional means and variances. But, in reality,
2 The heat content of standard coal equivalent is 7,000 kilo-calorie per
kilogram.
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many economic variables are typically driven by trends that are
varying stochastically over time. Regressing variables of this nature
are therefore likely to produce unreliable outcome, i.e., spurious
result.3
A more acceptable methodology is the use of cointegration.
Granger and Engle (1987) and Granger (1983) argue' that although
trend-driven variables do not exhibit stationarity, one or more of their
linear combinations may be stationary or cointegrated, which implies
a long-run equilibrium relationship. Furthermore, Engle and Granger
(1987) suggest using error correction models when the regression
variables are cointegrated. In making the present forecasting, I adopt
the VEC model as it can provide some unparalleled advantages. First,
it is possible to combine the long-run equilibrium and the short-run
error-correction dynamics within a single modeL. Second, since most
of the economic variables employed in energy demand estimation,
such as income and price, are likely to be endogenous, estimating
energy demand by single equation may produce simultaneity bias and
hence lead to unreliable forecasts. This problem can be overcome with
the help of the VEC model, which models data in a system form and
hence does not require assumptions about the exogenous variables.
3 An excellent survey on this can be found In Bentzen and Engsted
(1993).
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3.2 Methodology and Model Specification
The important characteristics of the VEC model can be
illustrated through its described formulator, which normally starts
with a vector autoregressive (V AR) model of the form given below:
p
Xt = .L II¡Xt_i + et
1=1 (3.2.1)
where Xt is a vector of stochastic variables, p is the number of
lags that will generate a white noise process, II¡ is a parameter matrix
that measures the long-run effect of the respective lag levels of X on
its current level, and et is a column vector of a long-run random
disturbance term assumed to be idd~ N(O,L). An error-correction
mechanism (ECM) can be introduced to 1 (3 .2.1) by re-writing the
equation into the following form:
p-I
L\Xt = IIXt_p + Ir¡L\Xt_¡ + et
i=1
(3.2.2)
where L\ is the first difference operator. The coefficients II and
r¡ for i = 1,2,...,p-l in (3.2.2) are determined from the coefficients II¡
, 1= 1, 2,...,p of the VAR in (3.2.1). More explicitly
II=-I+III +II2 +...+IIp
and
r¡ =-I+III +...+II¡ (i = 1,...,p-l)
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where I is an unit matrix. Clearly, the error-correction model in
(3.2.2) is expressed as a traditional first differenced V AR model
except for the term ITXI_P' Normally, XI_P is referred to as the error-
correction term while IT is the error correction coefficient matrix.
Intuitively, the presence of XI_P in the equation reflects the correction
of the short-run disequilibrium of the variables by their long-run
relationship. In equation (3.2.2), the information of the long-run co-
movement of the variables is summarised in IT, the long-run
parameter matrix. Whether the variables do move together in the long-
run, Le., whether a long-run equilibrium path exists among the
variables, can be investigated by the Johansen's multivariate
cointegration test, (Johansen, 1991). The number of cointegration
vectors (or long-run relationships) is determined by the rank of the
1
long-run impact matrix. Three distinct cases of interest may occur.
First, if the rank of IT is equal to n, where n is the number of
variables in Xl' the vector process Xl is stationary. Second, in a
situation where IT is a null matrix, its rank is zero. This implies no
long-run relationship among the variables and the whole system will
reduce to a first-differenced modeL. Third, for the more general cases
where the rank of IT, say r -( n, there exists a representation of n
such that the following restriction will hold:
IT =u.ß' (3.2.3)
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where ß is the nxr matrix of cointegration vectors, a is an nxr
matrix. The elements of a measure the speed of adjustment of the
variables with which they attach. Quite appropriately, the matrix a is
called the adjustment matrix.
When the cointegrating restrictions (3.2.3) are imposed, (3.2.2)
becomes
p-I
ilXi = aß'XI_p + .2: r¡ilXI_i + ei,
1=1
(3.2.4)
The matrix ß'Xi_P constitutes a set of r error correction
mechanisms separating out the long and short-run responses in the
modeL. Although, the error-correction representation is not the only
possible parameterisation of a dynamic 1 model with co integrated
variables, it has the advantage that all of the variables (dependent and
independent) in the representation are stationary. This means that the
standard asymptotic theory can be used to conduct statistical
inference.
In my study, the vector Xl comprises four variables, Qp ~, Pi
and Mp where Qi is energy consumption in year t, ~ is national
Income, Pi is the price of energy, Mi is an indicator of structural
variation. In this model, the structural variation is represented by the
share of the heavy industry in national income.
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In formulating a model for analysing the demand behaviour of
the Chinese energy industry, there are some methodology issues that
need to be dealt with. For example, in the literature, there are two
major methods by which different energy sources are aggregated: Btu
and Divisia approaches. Each of them has its own merits.4 Since China
does not publish its price statistics for its individual energy inputs,
the Divisia approach has not been adopted in the present study.
Following the conventional analysis, I include national income
and energy price in the vector Xt' Similar to other socialist countries,
China uses the concept of national income to measure its aggregate
economic activities. This is defined as the total income earned in the
production of material goods. Normally, it comprises five maJor
sectors: industry, agriculture, construction, commerce and
transportation. Non-material services, such as passenger
transportation and government administrative services, are excluded
from this accounting device. Viewed in this light, GDP is a better
variable to reflect the level of economic activity. However, since GDP
is only available after the mid-1980s, I use national income instead. In
addition to these two independent variables, I include the variable Mt
on the grounds that heavy industry has long been one of the maJor
energy consumers of the country. For example, during the years
between 1985 and 1993, heavy industry consumed around 53 per cent
4 For a detailed comparison on how these two methods affect the
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of total energy. This arises because China followed Stalinist forced-
industrialisation strategy before the reform, by emphasising the
development of heavy industry. Although the share of heavy industry
in the national income has been declining since the reform, it started
to rise again in the latter part of the 1980s. This arises because
resources had not been adequately allocated to heavy industries,
especially the materials and energy industries, In the early stage of
reform. As a result, this led to the shortfall of producer goods such as
basic materials, steel, and electricity. 5 Consequently, the heavy
industry began to receive more investment at the end of 1980s. In
view of its importance, I include the variable Mt in the estimation.6
3.3 Data Sources
All of the data used in the analysis are obtainable from the
Statistical Yearbook of China. The variable national income is taken
directly from the Statistical Yearbook of China. For the remaining
variables, I have undertaken the following procedures. The total
energy consumption comprises four major energy inputs consumed in
energy elasticities, see Nguyen (1987).
5 For a detail analysis, see Zhou and Chen (1993).
6 In addition to the above variables, I have also tried other variables.
They are, for example, weather, population, size of urban areas
proxied by the urban population, share of industrial output in the
national income. All of these variables are not, however, significant
or in correct sign.
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China: Coal, petroleum, electricity and natural gas. In order to apply
the Btu aggregation method, I have converted the physical quantities
into thermal unit by using conversion factors provided by the World
Bank (1984, p. 159). For example, Chinese coal on average has around
5,000 kilo-calories per kilogram. In terms of standard coal equivalent,
a ton of average coal is equivalent to 0.715 ton of standard coal
equivalent. To calculate the price for Btu aggregation approach, I
follow Nguyen (1987)'s approach in which he divided the sales value
by total heat content. Since China does not have the figures of sales
values, I use the output value of the energy sector instead by assuming
that these two sets of data differ by a constant proportion. The data of
Mt are obtained from the following procedures. In the composition of
the total national income series, I can obti;in the share of industrial
output in the national income and in the ratio of gross output value of
industry series I can have the share of heavy industry's output in the
total output. By multiplying these two sets of figures, it is possible to
derive the share of heavy industry output in the national income.
3.4 Model estimation
To examIne the time series property of the data, I conduct the
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests on the stationarity of
the levels and then first differences of the four variables. In essence,
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testing whether a variable Zt is integrated is equivalent to test for the
significance of G2, i.e., Ho: G2= 0, in the following regression:
k
/)Zt =Go +G1t+G2Zt_1 + IÕ¡/)Zt-i +et
ì=1
(3.4.1)
where t is a linear time trend. The result of this test is reported in
Table 3.1. Note that the t-statistics cannot be referred,to the critical
values in the standard" t" table since under the null hypothesis the Z
variable is non-stationary. Instead, the Mackinnon (1991 )'s critical
values have to be applied in this occasion. The use of linear time
trend in the equation depends on the resulting statistical significance.
Only the series log(Qt) has not been introduced with the trend.
Table 3.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on levels and first
differences of the lags of the energy consumption, national income,
real energy price and structural variation.
series level first difference
log(Qt) -1.76 -5.06* *
log(Yt) -1.85 -5.16**
log(Pt) - 1.86 -3.61 *
log(Mt) -2.73 -4.28**
Notes: (1) */** denote rejection of hypothesis of a unit root at 5%/1 %
significant level respectively.
(2)The value of k is determined by using the Akaike's
criterion.
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The ADF tests indicate that the null hypothesis that the level of
each series is generated by a random walk process should not be
rejected, whereas the hypothesis of a random walk in the first
difference of each series is rej ected. This means that all of the series
are integrated of order one and so the model cannot be estimated by
standard regression technique. Viewed in this light, the VEC model is
a better alternative. However, since the VEC specification only
applies to cointegrated series, I need to perform cointegration tests
before applying the VEC model to the Chinese energy data. To
investigate his, I apply the maximum likelihood approach developed
by Johansen (1991). The result of this test is reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Cointegration Test Series: log(Qi)' log(Yi), log(Pi) log(Mi)
Eigenvalue Likelihood 5% 1% ' Hypothesised
1Number Ratio Critical Critical of Cointegrated
Value Value Equations(s)
0.50787 53.426 47.21 54.46 None*
0.34903 26.483 29.68 35.65 At most 1
0.23479 10.190 15.41 20.04 At most 2
0.00001 0.0005 3.76 6.65 At most 3
Note: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% significance leveL.
As shown in Table 3.2, there is at most one cointegration
equation at 5% significance leveL. Having established this result, I can
estimate the long-run demand relationship with the help of Johansen's
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maximum likelihood approach (Johansen, 1991), the result of which is
given in the following equation:
log(Qt) = 7.127 + 0.706Iog(Yt) - 0.9083Iog(Pt) + 1.2079Iog(Mt) + Ut
(3.6) (12.30) (-2.10) (12.13)
(3.4.2)
Years 1953-1993. t-statistics are in parenthesis. As shown in
equation (3.4.2), all the coefficients are significant with correct signs.
The long run elasticity of income, price and structural variation are
0.706, -0.908 and 1.208 respectively. As compared to other countries'
estimates, we have relatively low income elasticity in the Chinese
energy sector. 7 However, this may not be ,surprising because before
the reform took place in 1979, the energy price was arbitrarily held
down by the Chinese government so as to stimulate industrial
development. This policy was partially rectified during the reform as
the government could not continue to subsidise the profit-losing
energy industries. Probably due to the price changes and other reform
policies which stimulates the incentive of energy consumers to be
more cost conscious, the energy consumption efficiency has been
greatly improved after the reform. This leads to a drastic fall in
7 As documented by Bentzen and Engsted (1993), many energy
studies show long-run elasticities about unity, or above.
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energy intensity8 and may also explain the low value of income
elasticity.
To proceed further, I compute the error term Ut of equation
(3.4.2), which together with the differenced variables can be fed into
equation (3.2.2) for the estimation of the VEC modeL. Table 3.3 shows
the result:
Table 3.3: Estimated Vector Error-Correction Model: 1953-1993
Equation 1
~Qt
constant
Ut-
~Qt-I
~Qt-2
~Y;-I
~Pt-I
~Pt-
~Mt_1
~Mt_2
R2
LM(2)
ARCH(2)
C.F .(1980)
-0.762**
Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
~Y; ~Pt ~Mt
0.038*
-0.462** 0.067 -0.882**
-0.224 0.064
-0.208
0.839** 0.343
1.159** 0.603 * * 1.437**
-1.074* 0.608 * * -1.269
-0.100 0.461 **
0.175 -0.109**
0.467 0.581 0.479
2.055 0.250 0.225
0.232 0.099 0.063
0.681 7.306** 0.831
0.716**
1.870* *
-2.497* *
0.387**
0.233
0.447
0.540
0.451
2.020
Notes:
1. Ut is the error-correction term of equation (3.4.2).
2. * * /* denotes that the parameter is statistically significant at
1 %/5% significance level respectively.
3. R2 is the coefficient of determination adjusted for the degrees of
freedom. LM (2) and ARCH (2) are Lagrangian multiplier tests for
second order autocorrelation9 and second order autoregressive
8 For more detail on this point, see Lin (1992).
9 The result shows that the null hypothesis of the LM test in this study
is not rejected, i.e., there is no serial correlation up to lag order 2.
Unlike the Durbin- Watson statistics for AR( 1) errors, the LM test may
be used to test for higher order ARMA errors, and is applicable
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conditional heteroscedasticity(ARCH)lO respectively. The multiplier
test is set at second order because the highest lag order of the
above model is equal to two. C.F. (1980) is Chow forecast
tese1with break point setting at year 1980. All statistics are F-
values.
In formulating the error-correction mechanism, the lag length of
Ut corresponds to the length of response (adjustment) to a deviation
from the long run path. To be compatible with economic theory, the
lag length of the disequilibrium error has to be set at a low value. In
estimating the above model I fix the lag length of Ut equal to 1.12 On
the other hand, the random errors et have to be free from
autocorrelation, the usual practice is to allow for relatively long lags
for the differenced variables, since these might approximate the
possible autocorrelation structure of the error terms. However,
imposing long lags will reduce degrees of freedom. In reconciling
these opposing demands, I set the value of p equal 2. In selecting the
whether or not there are lagged dependent variables. Therefore, it is
recommended to use whenever we are concerned with the possibility
that the errors exhibit autocorrelation. See Godfrey (1988) for detailed
discussion.
10 The test statistics reveals that the conditional variance of the error
term is not serially correlated with the past squared values of the error
term, i.e, the null hypothesis that there is no autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals is not rejected.
See Engle (1982) for detaiL.
11 The test shows that there is no large difference between the actual
and predicted values, which implies that the estimated relation over
the estimation and prediction periods is stable.12 See Thomas (1994) for details.
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final form of the model, all those variables that have relatively small
t-values (less than one) are then discarded.
3.5 Energy Forecast
Before applying the above model to forecast the energy demand,
it is important to check its stability. Since a parametric econometric
model is completely described by its parameters, model stability is
equivalent to parameter stability. The CUSUM of squares test (Brown,
Durbin, and Evans, 1975) can be conducted to investigate the stability
of the model's parameters. In general, if the CUSUM of squares test
statistic moves outside the critical values of 5% significance, the null
hypothesis would have to be rejected, thereby implying parameter or
variance instability. In addition, I may plot the feasible recursive
estimates of all the coefficients to test for their stability. If the
coefficient displays significant variation as more data are added to the
estimating equation, it is also a clear indication of instability. The
above two tests indicate that, in general, the model in Table 3.3 is
stable.
Having established the stability, the VEC model in Table 3.3 is
then applied to estimate the energy changes until the end of this
century. Because the change in any variable is assumed to be a
function of its own past changes as well as past changes in other
variables, a VEC system is a natural vehicle for generating ex ante
forecasts that use only information available prior to the forecast
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period. In other words, the use of the VEC model does not require me
to make any assumptions about the values of exogenous variables. The
outcome of the forecast is reported in Figure 3.1. In presenting this
figure, I have used the standard coal equivalent as the unit for
measuring the heat content. By so doing, it is possible to compare
with the planned supply target of the government.
Figure 3.1: Forecast of energy demand In China: 1994-2000
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As shown in the above figure, Chinese energy demand will
continue its prevailing uprising trend as it approaches the end of this
century. My model forecasts that the energy demand will rise to 1.42
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billion tons of SCE at the year 2000, which roughly equals the
government planned supply target of 1.4 billion tons.13
3.6 Conclusion
As the economic variables used in my model are not stationary,
I choose the cointegration method to model the consumption
behaviour of the energy sector in China. The results indicate that not
only price and income are important, the share of heavy industry's
output is also a significant demand determinant. My estimation also
reveals that China has relatively high price elasticity but a low income
elasticity. In addition, the vector error correction model shows no sign
of instability. In the light of this, I empl(ly the estimated model to
forecast the change in energy demand for the period of 1994-2000.
The model predicts that the energy demand displays a steady increase
as the country approaches the end of this century, reaching the level
of 1.42 billion tons of standard coal equivalent at the year 2000. This
roughly equals the supply target of the country.
13 The official supply target is revealed in Li (1991).
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Chapter 4: Forecasting Coal Demand in Chinal
4.1 Introduction
In contrast to many developed countries where petroleum is the
maj or source of energy supply, coal has remained the dominant source
of energy input in China and accounted for more than seventy per cent
of the total energy consumption in the early 1990s. Therefore, I will
model and forecast the demand for coaL. Unlike Chapter Three, this
chapter concentrates on single regression models, which allow us to
evaluate the effectiveness of controlling the explanatory variable In
managing the coal demand in China.
In the literature, there have been a number of single equation
studies on aggregate U.S. petroleum consu~ption.2 As pointed out by
J ones (1993), these studies of the US petroleum industries typically
employ an arbitrarily pre-determined specification, such as a partial
adjustment model or some kind of a distributed lag structure on price
alone. This initial specification is rarely justified, except possibly to
cite its previous success in similar work. In view of this, Jones
advocated the use of Hendry's general-to-specific modelling approach
as it is free of the prior subjective prejudices of the researcher for a
1 This chapter is to a large extent based on the paper in Energy
Economics (Chan and Lee, 1997)
2 Single equation studies of aggregate U.S. petroleum consumption
includes, for example, Brown (1983), Bopp (1984), Gately and
Rappoport (1988) and Brown and Phillips (1989), (1991).
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particular specification. In substantiating his claim, Jones employed a
set of US petroleum consumption data to examine the extent to which
the general-to-specific approach would differ from other commonly
used models, including the partial adjustment model, a single static
model and the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) on price. By
comparing the forecast errors of these models, he concluded that
Hendry's general-to-specific modelling approach is seen to provide a
data-acceptable restricted model that out-performs the alternatives.
On the surface, the general-to-specific approach has the merit of
avoiding the mis-specification error. However, an alternative method
of employing the single equation Error Correction Model (ECM)
(Bentzen and Engsted, 1993) has two advantages. First, in comparison
to general-to-specific approaches, the variables in a typical ECM
representation will normally be far less highly correlated. This
facilitates the testing-down procedure because, with low standard
errors, the normal t-statistics in an estimated ECM will provide a
good guide to which differenced variables should be eliminated. Thus
ECM is easier than Hendry's general-to-specific approach arriving at a
sufficiently parsimonious final preferred equation. Second, in contrast
to such conventional dynamic model as the partial adjustment model,
the ECM does not impose restrictions that require the ratio of the
short-run and long-run price elasticities be identical to the ratio of the
short-run and long-run income elasticities (Johnson, 1992).
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As revealed in Table 4.1, all variables employed in this chapter
are nonstationary. Hence, to avoid spurious results, I will attempt to
model the coal demand of China by using the cointegration analysis
and ECM. There are, however, two approaches to estimating the ECM:
They are the Engle-Granger two step procedure and Hendry's type of
testing down. Asymptotically both methods should yield a valid ECM
and hence arrive at the same estimated model (Granger, 1986).
However, in small samples, an ECM obtained from the Engle-Granger
procedure may not necessarily correspond to the type of model
derived from the Hendry's testing down. In view of this, one cannot
say, a priori, which method is preferable. As a result, both of these
methods will be employed in this study and their forecastibility will
be compared in order to differentiate their 'performance in modelling
coal consumption behaviour in China. In addition to these two
approaches, I have also included the general-to-specific approach for
forecastibility comparisons. These alternative estimates over the same
sample period provide some indication of how the cointegration
analysis differs from those of the general-to-specific approach.
This chapter is arranged in the following manner. In the next
section, the method of single equation ECM will be presented. This
will be followed by the application of these methods to the Chinese
coal consumption data in the third section. In addition, an ex post
forecast comparison analysis will be carried out in order to
discriminate the performances of the three chosen models. The best
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performing model will be used for making forecast of Chinese coal
demand by year 2000 in the fourth section.
4.2 Single Equation Error Correction Model(ECM)
To illustrate an ECM, let us use the following simple
equilibrium equation:
Yt = a + ßxt, (4.2.1)
where Yt is a dependent variable and xt is a vector of independent
variables. If Yt and xt were in equilibrium, then the balance
Yt - a - ßXt will equal zero. However, Yt - a - ßXt will be non-zero
when disequilibrium occurs. In fact, this qU,antity measures the extent
of disequilibrium between Yt and xt and hence is known as the
disequilibrium error. In case where disequilibrium occurs, Yt can be
assumed to be related to values of xt and the lagged values of Yt and
xt ' one simplest form of which is
Yt = Y + 80xt + 8lxt_1 + 'tYt_1 + Ut ' ( 4.2.2)
where Ut is the disturbance term. Subtracting Yt-I from both sides of
equation (4.2.2) and regrouping the resulting equation yields
i1Yt = 80Axt - ¡.(Yt-1 - a - ßxt_J + Ut' (4.2.3 )
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where ¡., a and ß assume the values of 1-'t, y/(I-'t) and (Õo +Õ1)/(l-'t);
A represents the first difference. Equation (4.2.3) shows that the
changes in Yt depend on the change in Xl and the lagged values of the
disequilibrium error, which implies that when Yt-l is greater than its
equilibrium value, the value of Yt will be decreased in the subsequent
period. The model thus measures how the value of Yt i~ corrected for
the disequilibrium error. From (4.2.3), it is clear that 80 and ß
measure the short-run and long-run parameters while ¡. measures the
speed of adjustment towards long run equilibrium. We have assumed a
simple relationship in (4.2.2) but in practice, this equation contains
higher lag-orders as explanatory variables so as to make Ut white
noise. When higher order lagged variables are introduced, equation
(4.2.3) is required to be modified into the following form:
k-I k-I
~Yt = L \I j~Yt-j + L 80Axt_j - ¡.(Yt-k - a - ßxt-k) + Ut.j;1 j;O (4.2.4 )
4.3 Data Sources.
The variables coal consumption qt and national income Yt are
directly obtainable from the Statistical Yearbook of China (various
issues), the latest version of which is 1995. Pt is the retail price of
coal deflated by the overall retail price index. The construction of the
share of the heavy industry output in the national income has been
mentioned in Section 3.3.
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4.4 Empirical Results
The energy demand equation to be estimated in our study is as
follows:
qt = ßo + ßiYt + ßiPt + ß3mt + Ut' (4.4.1)
where qt = coal consumption in year t;
Yt = national income;
Pt = real retail price of coal;
mt = a variable proxy for structural variation. In this model, mt
is the share of heavy industry's output in the national
Income;
Ut = the disturbance which is assumed to have the conventional
properties.
Lower case letters denote the natural logarithm of variables so that
each coefficient estimated is an elasticity. In order to compare the
forecastibility, all the three models are run between the years 1953-
90, leaving the last four observations (1990-94) for carrying out the
post-sample forecast error comparison.
4.4.1) Engle-Granger's type ECM
As stated in Chapter Three, before conducting the Engle-
Granger's type ECM analysis, it is necessary to conduct the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests on the stationarity of
levels and the first differences of the four variables. The results in
Table 4.1 indicate that the variables under examination are integrated
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of order one. This supports our earlier conjecture that they form a
non-stationary time series. Next, we test whether the variables are
co integrated by using J ohansen (1991 )'s co integration test. Table 4.2
reports the result of this test.
Table 4.1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for yearsd 953-1990
Series Level First difference
qt -1.7015 -3.4 764*
Yt -2.9602 -4.7787* *
Pt -2.4428 -6.3186* *
mt -3.3329 -4.1685*
Notes: (1) * and * * represent
root at 5 and
respectively.
(2) As the model is based on annual data, the estimation
therefore starts from k = 1. Also, since there is no
sign of serial correlation in the residuals after
introducing one lag to the independent variables, the
estimation terminates at k = 1.
(3) The t-statistics cannot be referred to the critical value
in the standard "t" table since under the null
hypothesis the dependent variable is non-stationary.
Instead, the Mackinnon(1991)' s critical values have
to be applied in this occasion.
(4) The use of linear time trend depends on the resulting
statistical significance. Only the series qt has not
been introduced with a trend.
1
rejection of hypothesis of a unit
1 per cent significant level
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Table 4.2: Cointegration tests of the series qt' Pt' Yt and mt.
Eigenvalue Likelihood 5 Percent 1 Percent Hypothesised
Of Ratio Critical Critical Number
Cointegration Value Value Equation
0.565562 54.88650 47.21 54.46 None**
0.353074 24.87325 29.68 35.65 At most 1
0.214122 9.194432 15.41 20.04 At most 2
0.014343 0.520099 3.76 6.65 At most 3
Notes: */** denote rejection of the hypothesis at 5%/1 %
significance levels respectively. The likelìhood ratio test
indicates there is only 1 co integrating equation at the 5
% significance leveL.
The Johansen tests for co integration indicate that there exists a
long-run relationship among the four variables. Having established
this result, we can begin the first step of Engle-Granger's method by
using Johansen (1991 )'s maximum likelihood approach to estimate the
long-run parameters of the demand equation. The result is summarised
in the following equation:
qt = 5.988 - 0.802Pt + 0.854Yt + 0.838mt + Ut' ( 4.4.2)
(-5.52) (30.07) (24.93)
where et is random error and (.) contains t-statistics.3 All the three
coefficients have significant correct signs. The long-run elasticities of
price, income and structural shift are respectively:
3 The intercept of the above equation does not have at-statistic
simply because this is a normalised value. For detail, see Johansen
(1991).
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8;R = -0.817, 8;R = 0.842, 8~R = 0.860.
Having obtained the values of long-run parameters, we can
proceed to the second step of Engle-Granger's ECM by feeding those
values into the disequilibrium error of equation (4.2.4). The equåtion
to be estimated will be:
k-I k-I k-I k-I
I!qt = ¿ a/1qt_j + ¿ bl~.pt_j + ¿ cjl!Yt_j + ¿ djl!mt_jj=1 j=O j=O j=O
- !Jtqt-k - 5.694 + 0.817 Pt-k - 0.842Yt_k - 0.860mt_kJ + Ut'
(4.4.3)
where ~ denotes the first-difference operator and t. ~ represents the
1
disequilibrium error. In estimating the above equation, the initial step
is to set the value of k and then successively delete the most
insignificant differenced variables. We have tried different values of k
in estimating the above equation, the maximum k we have used is 3.
After testing downing procedure, the best model performance is shown
as follows:
60
Table 4.3: The estimated results of the Engle-Granger ECM, 1954-
1990
Coefficient value t-statistics
ho
Co
do
~
R2 = 0.909
DW = 1.86
SSR = 0.074
LM(4) = 0.000 (X2(4) = 9.488)
LARCH(4) = 2.310 (X2(4) = 9.488)
CF (break point = 1980) = 0.252 (FO.05(l1,23) = 2.24)
-0.220
0.763
0.514
0.671
-1.97
7.77
6.38
7.11
Table 4.3 shows the results of estimating Equation (4.4.3) for
the period of 1954-1990. From a statistical point of view, the results
depicted in Table 4.3 are satisfactory, R2 is reasonably high and there
are no signs of residual serial correlation or auto-regressive
conditional heteroscedasticity in the modeL. Since the model passes all
the diagnostic tests we have conducted, this indicates that our choice
of k is acceptable. Finally, the break point of the Chow forecast test is
1980, the year when the economic reform began to take place. The test
statistic shows the statistical parameter constancy holds when the data
extend over the period of reform. The short-run elasticities of price,
income and structural shift are given by the estimated coefficients on
the zero- lag terms. They are given by, respectively:
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E~R = -0.220, E~R = 0.763, E~R = 0.514.
All of them are lower than their long-run parameters. Also, the
value of the adjustment parameter is 0.671 which means that if the
demand is 1 per cent out of its equilibrium, 67.1 per cent of
adjustment towards its equilibrium will take place within the first
year.
4.4.2) Hendry's Type ECM
Instead of applying equation (4.2.4) directly, Hendry's ECM
normally starts with a unrestricted version of the ECM (see, e.g.,
Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan, 1984) as given by the following equation:4
k-I k-I k-I k-I
I1Qt = I a¡I1Qt- + I b/~Pt_¡ + I c¡I1Yt_¡ + I d¡l1mt_¡¡=I ¡=o ¡=o ¡=o
-JlQt-k + YPt-k + ÖYt-k + ~mt-k + Ut' (4.4.4)
This is then followed by a testing down procedure in search of a
suitably parsimonious final modeL. In contrast to the last model, both
long-run and short-run elasticities are estimated together in this
approach. Since equation (4.4.4) can be seen as a nested equation with
the higher lagged order equation being nested within the lower order
4 In fact, equation (4.4.4) is the unrestricted version of equation
(4.4.3) because if we do not write the t-k variables of the latter
equation into the disequilibrium error form, it will give us equation
(4.4.4 ).
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one, we can perform a restriction test to determine the value of k. In
our model, we test for k=1 against k=2 and the resulting F statistic
equals 1.810, falling short of the critical value of F 0.05( 4,23) which
equals 2.80. Clearly, the restrictions are not rejected by the data. We
therefore prefer the first order ECM and the result of the estimation of
the model is:
¡1qt = 3.876 - 0.255~t + 0.707¡1Yt + 0.514¡1mt
(6.04) (-1.78) (4.15) (4.46)
- 0.646Qt_i - 0.591Pi- + 0.549 Yt-i + 0.552mi- + et (4.4.5)
(-6.45) (-3.58) (6.65) (5.72)
Estimation is undertaken for 1954 and 1990 with the following
diagnostic statistics: R2 = 0.906, DW = 2.15, RSS = 0.067, LM(4) =
1
3.828 (X2(4)=9.488), LARCH(4) = 7.1947 (x2(4) = 9.488), CF (break
point = 1980) = 0.1955 (FO.05(11,17) = 2.41), (.) = t-statistics, (.) =
critical values.
Similar to those of the Engle-Granger's type ECM, the
evaluative statistics obtained from the Hendry's ECM have passed all
the diagnostic tests, at 5 per cent significance leveL. The long-run
elasticities of price, income and structural shift are obtained by
transforming the t-l lagged independent variables of equation (4.4.5)
into the disequilibrium error form. By so doing the long-run
elasticities of price, income and structural shift can be calculated as:
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E~R = Y/IJ= -0.915, E~R = õ/IJ = 0.850, E~R = ~/IJ =0.854,
while the short-run elasticities of these variables are given by the
estimated coefficients on the zero- lag term:
E~R = -0.255, E:R = 0.707, E~R = 0.514.
Furthermore, the coefficient of the disequilibrium error in this
case is 0.646, more or less the same as that derived from the Engle-
Granger's approach (0.671). Thus both equations imply that roughly
sixty per cent of any disequilibrium between actual and equilibrium
coal demand in anyone year is made up within the next year. It is
interesting to note that the coefficients estimated from Hendry's ECM
does not deviate significantly from those of the Engle-Granger's ECM.
The estimated long- and short-run elasticities obtained from the two
equations are of the same (first) order of magnitude, and the
elasticities and adjustment coefficients are roughly the same. More
importantly, both approaches lead to equations with similar lag
structures, with approximately sixty per cent of the long-run effects
being achieved after one year.
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4.4.3) General-to-Specific Approach
The use of Hendry's general-to-specific approach to study the
Chinese coal consumption normally commences with the general form
of autoregressive distributed lag model (denoted ADL) as shown
below5:
ni ~ ~ ~
qt = a + ¿aiqt-i + ¿biPt-i + ¿CiYt-i + ¿difft_i + Ut,i=1 i=O i=O i=O (4.4.7)
where the four lag lengths (n l' n2, n3, n 4) are initially set at
the same maximum value. The selection of the maximum lag length is
inevitably arbitrary as theory does not provide us with any restrictive
guidelines (Beenstock and Willocks, 1981). In practice, the choice of
the maximum lag length is made by use or F tests. In my case, the
following F -test has been carried out in which the null is ADL(2,2,2)
against the alternative that the maximum lag length is of order three,
Le., ADL(3,3,3). The test yields a F statistic of 0.863
(F 0.05( 4,19)=2.90) implying that the null hypothesis is not to be
rejected. The maximum lag length is thus set at 2.
Following this, the procedure progressively simplifies the
general model by imposing data-instigated restrictions on the set of
5 Although Table 4.1 shows that the variables are 1(1), Table 4.2
reveals that all the variables are cointegrated with a unique
co integrating relationship. The OLS estimates of short-run and long-
run parameters are therefore consistent and have normal asymptotic
distribution, such that the t, F tests on these parameters are valid. See
Pesaran and Shin (1995) for detaiL.
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coefficients. Potential restrictions are usually identified by inspecting
the magnitudes of individual parameter estimates, as well as their
standard errors. For more practical details on how these potential
restrictions are identified and verified, interested readers can refer to
Hendry (1984) and, for a more updated example, to Jones (1993). The
final restricted model in our case is as follows:
(qt - ilt) = 4.837 - 0.064(qt- - 3qt_l) + OA05(2Yt + Yt-2)
(-14.61) (-2.74) (7.43)
-OA91yt- - 0.317(pt + Pt-I) + 0.260( ilt_1 - 2ilt) + et
(-2.67) (-5.73) (7.05)
(4.4.8)
The estimation period is between 1955 and 1990. The diagnostic
statistics are R2 = 0.991, SSR = 0.056, DW = 1.50, LM(4) = 5.570
(x2(4) = 9.488), LARCH(4) = 2.578 (x2(4) = 9.488), CF (break point
= 1980) = 0.540 (FO.05(11,15) = 2.51). In order to obtain the above
model, the following six restrictions have been applied:
°1 = -302' ho = 2h2, Co = Cl' C2 = 0, do = -2dl and d2 = O.
A restriction test has been carried out in order to conform to these
restrictions. The resulting statistic is equal to 0.363, which is
distributed as F(6,24), falling short of its critical value of 2.51 at the
5 per cent significance leveL. The evaluative statistics of equation
(4.4.8) show that the restricted ADL model displays no evidence of
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serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in its residuals. It is also
stable over the reform period. To calculate the elasticities of demand,
we need to derive the unscrambled coefficients of equation (4.4.8).
The result is presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Unscrambled coefficients for restricted ADL model
Number of lags
0 1 2 L
1955-90
qt 0 0.192 -0.064 0.128
Pt -0.317 -0.317 0 -0.634
Yt 0.810 -0.491 0.405 0.724
mt 0.480 0.260 0 0.740
The short-run and long-run demand elasticities can be determined
from Table 4.4 respectively. The long-run p~rameters are:
E~R = ¿b¡ /(1- ¿aJ = -0.727,
E~R = ¿e; / (1- ¿aJ = 0.830,
E~R = ¿d; / (1- ¿aJ = 0.849.
while the short-run price, income and structural shift elasticities are
given by the estimated coefficients on the zero-lag terms:
E~R = -0.317, E~R = 0.810, E~R = 0.480.
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4.4.4) Models Comparison
In order to discriminate among the performances of the three
chosen models we looked at their ex post forecasting abilities over the
periods of 1991-1994. Table 4.5 reports five commonly used measures
of forecast error; (1) root mean squared error (RMSE); (2) root mean
squared percentage error (RMSPE); (3) mean absolute error (MAE);
(4) mean absolute percent error (MAPE); (5) Theil's inequality
coefficient (U)
Table 5.5: Ex Post Forecast Errors for Chosen Models, 1991-1994
Model
Engle-Granger's ECM
Hendry's ECM
Restricted ADL model
RMSE
0.0986
0.1180
0.1101
RMS'PE
1
0.8642
1.0342
0.9667
MAE
0.0750
0.0931
0.0958
MAPE
0.6627
0.8180
0.8430
U
0.0044
0.0052
0.0049
From Table 4.5, it is clear that over this brief period the Engle-
Granger's ECM performs best in producing the smallest forecast errors
as measured by the five forecast error indicators, while the other two
models performed more or less the same. On this basis we conclude
that Engle-Granger's ECM fits best to the Chinese coal consumption
data. Overall, however, all three models perform quite satisfactorily
in these tests.
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4.5 Forecasting the Coal Demand in China
Having established Engle-Granger's ECM as being the most
preferred approach, we can apply it to forecast the changes in future
coal consumption. Accordingly, using the data to 1994, I obtain the
following result by using the Johansen (1991 )'s maximum likelihood
approach:
qt = 5.146 - 0.588Pt + O.821Yt + O.842mt + et' (4.5.1)
(-6.39) (35.70) (25.52)
Tne second step of Engle-Granger approach can then be
followed, the result of which is reported in the following equation:
!1qt = O.675!1Yt - 0.168!1Pt + 0.552!1mt - O.693~qt_1 - 5.146
(6.81) (-1.92) (6.82) (-7.3)
-O.821Yt_1 + 0.588Pt_1 - O.842mt_iJ + et' (4.5.2)
Sample years = 1954-1994, R2 = 0.884, SSR = 0.0967, DW = 1.86,
LM(4) = 0.003 (X\4) = 9.488), LARCH(4) = 4.229 (X\4) = 9.488),
CF (break point = 1980) = 0.540 (FO.05(15,23) = 2.13).
Before using the above equations to obtain a forecast, it is
necessary to check the stability of the model as represented by
equation (4.5.2). The presence of model instability will make it
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difficult to interpret regression results and to forecast accurately. This
is particularly important for China since the country has engaged in
economic reforms after i 979 that may have significantly altered
consumption behaviour. Therefore, I conduct CUSUM of squares test
and plot the recursive estimates of each coefficient in the equation.
The results are reported in Figure 4.1 and 4.2 indicating that the
chosen model is largely stable over the examination periods.
Figure 4.1: The CUSUM of squares test for equation (4.14)
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Figure 4.2: Recursive Estimates of Coefficients In Equation
(4.5.2).
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The final part of this section is to forecast the coal demand of
the country. In doing that, I need to make some reasonable
assumptions about how the exogenous variables will change in the
forecast period. In the first scenario I assume the economy will grow
by 10 percent and the real price of coal rise by 2 percent annually
during the forecast period, while the structure of the economy remains
unchanged. The economic growth rate is fixed at 10 per cent because
the economy grew approximately at this rate over the years 1990 to
1994. As shown in Figure 4.3 (a), the demand will reach 1.76 billion
tons by the year 2000. Since the government has already planned the
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production target of 1.40 billion tons for year 2000,6 the demand will
exceed the official target by 25.7 per cent. In order to narrow this gap,
one possibility is to raise the price of coaL. As shown by Figure 4.3
(b), if the real price of coal rises by 8 per cent annually, the demand
will reach 1.49 billion ton, significantly closer to the official output
target than under scenario 1. However, the impact of such a large
increase of coal prices on inflation will be considerable. For a country
which currently experiences chronic inflation, this is unlikely to be an
acceptable solution. Probably as a consequence of the energy
constraint, the central government has decided recently to scale down
the economic growth rate during the 9th five-year plan (1996-2000) to
eight per cent per year. Based on this new figure and a 4 per cent
annual increase in the real coal price, ,coal demand will reach
approximately 1.53 billion tons in 2000, as reported in Figure 4.3 (c).
Further, if the share of heavy industry's output in national income
drops by 1 percentage point over the forecast period, the coal demand
will fall to a more manageable level of 14.8 billion tons as presented
in Figure 4.3 (d), exceeding the official output target by 5 per cent at
the end of century.
6 Source: The People's Daily, "The Central Communist Party's
Proposal for the Forumlation of the Coming Ten Years' Social and
Economic Development Strategy and the Eighth Five Year Plan," 29th
January, 1991.
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Figure 4.3 (c) Forecast of Coal Demand in China: Scenario 3
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Figure 4.3 (d) Forecast of Coal Demand in China: Scenario 4
billion ton
1.6
1.2
"
......"
--
--
--'
....,....
...._..--_....
1.4
1.0
.
0.8
0.6
0.4
19801982198419861988
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
74
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have applied Engle-Granger's type ECM,
Hendry's type ECM and general-to-specific approach to analyse the
consumption behaviour of the coal industry. It is found that, in all
these cases, not only income and price are important in determining
demand but also the relative size of heavy industry. This probably
reflects the importance of this sector in the consumption of coaL. By
comparing the forecast error, it is possible to conclude that the Engle-
Granger's type ECM performs most satisfactorily. This model is then
used to capture the demand behaviour of the industry. In the stability
tests we have conducted, no evidence is found of a structural change
in energy demand following the economic reform in 1979. When the
estimated model is used to forecast coal demand, it is found that the
energy constraint will require the economy to grow at a rate lower
than ten per cent annually. Further, the øptimistic scenario of our
estimates indicates that as much as a 5 per cent of shortfall in coal
consumption will arise at the end of this century. This highlights the
need of an effective management policy in handling the country's
largest energy sector as China moves toward the new century.
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Chapter 5: Factor Demand
5.1 Introduction
In reviewing the energy balance situation in Chapter Two, I found that China
still needs to confront a number of problems over the future although the imbalance
has largely been kept to a manageable level over the last few years. In order to
quantify the imbalance, I have carried out two forecast exercises in Chapters 3 and
4. My forecasts of energy consumption by econometric methods show that the
predicted energy demand wil be more than its supply in 2000 and 2010. This
finding highlights the need for an effective management policy in handling the
country's largest energy sector. The relevant polices have been discussed in Chapter
Two. However, the analyses are mainly qualitative and the findings may be different
from the ones obtained in quantitative studies. In, the following chapters, I wil
1
mainly emphasise on evaluating China's energy pricing policy which is
controversial and has become a hot issue in China.
Energy prices, like most commodity prices, have been predominately
determined by governent decisions rather than market forces. In general, they are
lower than their production costs. This occurs because the Chinese system has
generally excluded capital costs in establishing prices. In addition, the authority
attempts to provide low energy cost for industrial use so as to stimulate the country's
potential output and productivity. However, such a low pricing policy induces low
returns on investment in energy and so reduces the financial ability to develop
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energy industries 
1 . This became a particularly serious problem after the reform.
China has been experiencing large budget deficits resulting from, among other
reasons, increased pressure for greater investment in infrastructural construction.
Moreover, many economists believe that this kind of pricing policy has led to a
pervasive wastage of energy as the price does not reflect the opportunity cose. With
a view to generating budget revenues and alleviating the adverse impacts of the low
energy price policy on energy utilisation, various Chinese economists and policy-
makers have suggested the government should reform the energy price system by
gradually raising energy prices up to market levels 3.
It is, therefore, important to investigate the complementarity/substitutability
between energy and capital so that we can better understand the effects of energy
price adjustments. In turn, this enables an evaluation of the effect of energy price1 .
changes on output and energy use. If, for example, energy and capital are found to
be complements, other things being constant, higher energy prices wil reduce
capital investment and so less capital wil be employed for production. This would
1 See Clarke and Winters (1995).
2 Besides, under the rigid price system, some industrial raw materials and far
products were sold at such artificial low prices that many state-owned enterprises
producing basic industrial goods were unable to cover their production costs. The
deficit had to be made up by state subsidies, which was a big drain on the state
budget. Although this rigid price control system ensured the satisfaction of the basic
needs of the people for subsistence and stabilised prices, it discouraged the
producers from boosting output and improving the quality of their products for lack
of a profit incentive. As a result, the economy stagnated and those goods which
were in short supply had to be rationed (Wang, 1992).
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result in a decrease in labour productivity growth and reduce future output.
Therefore, a price increase policy may be counter productive. Alternatively, if a
substitution relationship exists between energy and capital, higher energy prices wil
encourage capital investment and thus increase potential GNP. Therefore, a high
pricing regime is predicted to have the desirable effect of conserving the scarce
energy resources and relieve the energy bottlenecks to growth. However, it should
be noted that the above mentioned effects of the energy prices on output occur only
in the short run. Over the long run, if energy prices keep increasing and cause
capital inputs to rise continuously, the effect on total output can not last forever
even if energy and capital are substitute. This is because if other factor inputs
remained fixed, the retur of capitals wil diminish and output wil deteriorate
eventually.Therefore, the effects of energy price changes on output hinge not only
on the substitutability /complementary between energy and capital but also on the
time horizon.
In section 2, I wil review the relationship between capital and energy from
previous studies. Since it is needed to derive input demand fuctions and relevant
elasticities for examining the relationships among various factors, section 3 wil
explain how to derive the input demands and discuss which approach is particularly
appropriate for China's situation4. Section 4 wil conclude the findings in this
chapter.
3 For discussion of price reform, please see Wang (1992), Clarke and Winters (1995)
and Nakijima (1992).
4 The derivation of relevant elasticities wil be discussed in Chapter Six.
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5.2 Capital-Energy Controversy
In reviewing the literature, the available econometric evidence of Capital-
Energy (K-E) relationship is contradictory, in the sense that the support of both K-E
substitutability and K-E complementarity can be found. Controversies over K-E
possibilities stem from the following five considerations.
5.2.1) Data Set
Griffin and Gregory (1976) and Baltagi and Griffin (1984) argue that
different data sets may reveal different results of the K-E relationship. Time series
(single country) data reflect short-term relationships only, because they do not
necessarily accommodate the assumption of instantaneous adjustment of some
inputs (e.g. capital) in response to changes in their input prices (Wk), especially
given a cost/profit function does not possess a dynamic mechanism. In contrast,
cross section data set have wider variation in the relative input prices, and so can
capture the long run effects. Moreover, pooled cross-section data also give a higher
range of energy price variability over time and individual units; the estimation of the
cost/profit fuctions, therefore, can also capture long run behaviour. As mentioned
in Apostolakis(1989)5, time-series data are likely to classify K-E as complements,
5 Apostolakis(1989) explains in a different way why cross-sections typically reflects
long-run adjustments whereas annual time-series tends to reflect short-ru reactions.
This is because disequilibrium among firms tends to be synchronized in response to
common market forces and the business cycle. Many disequilibrium effects wash
out so that the higher cross section slope estimates can be interpreted as long-run
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whereas pooled cross-section studies normally conclude that the two inputs are
substitutes.
5.2.2) Fixty of Certain Inputs
Mcfadden (1978) and Diewert and Wales (1987) develop the short run
variable cost functions (expenditure on variable inputs, rather than total costs) which
are dependent on variable input prices, the level of output and quantity of fixed
factors (instead of the prices of fixed factors). Similarly, the short run profit
functions are defined as total revenue minus total variable costs (not total costs).
These short run functions are expressed in terms of the quantity of fixed factors and
the prices of various inputs and outputs. These short run models are modified from
the traditional long ru models in which all input factors, including fixed inputs in
short run, are classified as variable factors and thus all the prices are treated as
explanatory variables. According to Berndt, Morrison and Watkins (1981), these
two types of functional forms may get opposite results of K-E relationship. This is
because in the short run, for a given capital stock, energy input per unit of capital is
constant, i.e. capital and energy must be used in certain fixed proportions, so K-E
may be complementary in the short run. However, the capital-energy ratio is flexible
in the long run, and thus their relationship may change.
coefficients. Thus, dynamic specification errors that bias time series estimates wil
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5.2.3) Types of Capital Input Employed
Field and Grebenstein (1980) argue that different types of capital employed
in the study may also lead to contradictory results of the K-E relationships.
Disaggregating capital into reproducible physical (structures, machinery and
equipment) and working capital (cash, governent securities, inventories) in their
study, they find the reproducible physical capital and energy are complements,
whereas working capital and energy are substitutes.
5.2.4) Types of Labour Input Employed
Berndt and White (1979) disaggregate labour into non-productive (unskiled)
and productive (skiled) workers. They find that under this approach, capital and
energy are highly complementary. On the other hand, capital and unskiled labour
are substitutes, whereas capital and skiled labour are complements. Therefore, an
increase in energy price wil increase the demand for unskiled labour and reduce
the demand for skiled labour. This implies that rising energy prices wil have a
positive redistribution effects.
5.2.5) Gross and Net effect
Berndt and Wood (1979 and 1981) mention that excluding the scale effect
when measuring the effects on factor prices changes may produce different results
of the total effects on K-E relationships. Kintis and Panas, (1989) find that the price
be less observable in cross sections.
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elasticities derived from profit fuctions measure the total effect, whereas the price
elasticities derived from cost functions capture substitution effects only and exclude
the scale effects. Therefore, the two types of measurements may give two different
results.
In addition to endogenous pricing under the imperfectly competitive market,
there are studies which introduce the effects of technical progress O:l factor demands,
rational expectations, dynamic specifications (i.e. derive analytically the optimal
transition path from SR to LR: cointegration, ECM (Friesen, 1992), time varying
parameter approaches, various functional forms, specification of multiple outputs and
relaxing the assumption of constant retur to scale. (i.e. variable RTS (Kim, 1992)).
There were almost no relevant studies that look into the K-E relationship in
the Chinese Manufacturing Industry. Moreover, a fe~ studies employ only aggregate
data; they study either certain manufacturing industries or the total manufacturing
industry. Hence, it seems that there is really a need for a more disaggregated
approach, if only to verify the aggregate results. My study is based on a pooled firm
level data.
My own view is that K-E relationship in China can only be understood in the
context of rationing. Rationing is always present due to such factors as import
licensing, foreign exchange control, exogenous factor supply shocks (energy crisis,
bad harvest, etc.). As China has been transiting from a centrally planned to a market
economy, it is not unusual for Chinese enterprises to face shortfall of some inputs.
Thus, quantity controls and rationing of inputs allocates the limited available inputs
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to individual firms and may regulate production levels beyond the socially optimum
levels. Given this background, the above traditional studies which ignore the effect
of rationing appear to be far from being fruitfuL. My study, therefore, tries to fill the
gap by taking quantity controls and rationing of inputs into account when deriving
input demand fuctions and their relevant input price elasticities.
To achieve this, I wil follow the concept of virtual pricing from Near and
Roberts (1980) and Squires (1994).6 It is clear from the subsequent formulae that the
price elasticities under no rationing may be opposite in sign to that with rationing.
This may serve as an alternative explanation of the K-E controversy which is quite
different from the previous studies.
5.3 Derivation of Factor Demand Function
To determine the capital - energy (K-E) relationship, the first step is to
derive the input demand functions. In this section, I wil start by explaining how the
input demand functions can be derived from the primal and dual approach and then
discuss the usefulness and the drawbacks of the two approaches. After that, I wil
explain why a translog profit function, rather than a translog cost function, is
employed in my study to derive the price elasticities of the demand.
6 The two approaches wil be discussed in Section 6.2 and the elasticities under
virtual pricing approach wil be derived in Section 6.3.
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5.3.1) The Primal and Dual Approach for Deriving Input Demand Function
Under Profit Maximisation and Cost Minimisation.
To derive the input demand function, let us firstly consider a competitive
firm that produces output q using input vector x = (xi,.... ..,xn), where output price P
ER\+ and the input price W = (Wi,.... ..,Wn) are given to the firm. For the
production plans to be feasible, it is assumed that the firm is subject to a production
constraint
q ~ f(x) (5.1)
Here, f: R\.¿R is known as the firm's production fuction. f(x) is the maximum
attainable output from the input vector, x and q is a scalar denoting the quantities
that the firm can produce. The objective of rationed; firm is profit maximisation or
cost minimisation.
5.3.L.A) Profit Maximisation:
The maximisation profit function problem is defined as
Max
xeR:+
n
7t(P,W) = P'q - IW¡x¡
i=1
subject to q ~ f(x) (5.2)
The Lagrangian is written as
n
L(q,x,À;P,W)=p.q- IWix¡ +À(f(x)-q)
i=1
(5.3)
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5.3. 1. A. a) The Primal Approach
Here, the input demand functions can be derived by solving the Lagragean
function - which specifies either a profit maximisation or a cost minimisation
problem subject to the production constraint. The procedures are just to find the
partial derivatives of the Lagragean function with respect to an the endogenous
variables and solve the Kuhn- Tucker condition.
Based on (5.3), the Kuhn- Tucker conditions therefore are::: Â, M such that
(i) :~ = P - Â, M = 0 ;
8f
where f¡(xM) =-
ôx¡
8L M M .
- = - W¡ + À f¡ (x ) = 0, I = 1... n
ôx¡
(ii) Â,M :; 0
(III)(qM,xM) E R~:I andf(xM)-qM =0
From (1), it is clear that Â, M:;O and so (II) is redundant. Substituting Â, M=p into (1)
gives
(a) p. f¡ (xM) = W¡ ; i=I,....,n and xM ERn
++
(b) qM = f(xM) (with Â,M = P) (5.4)
Solving (5.4a) and (5.4b) simultaneously, we can obtain input demand and
output supply functions: xM(P,W) and qM(p,W). This means that all the profit-
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maximising firms (with exogenous pricing) produce the quantities that must fulfil
the conditions (5.4a) & (5.4b).7
However, it may be diffcult to obtain the derivations f¡(xM) for some
complicated production functions and so the solutions qM(p,W) & xM(P,W) are not
easy to derive. Alternatively, we may use the dual approach.
5.3.1.A.b) The Dual Approach
This approach involves deriving output supply and input demand equations
from an indirect profit function. An indirect profit function is defined as the
maximum profit that can be derived from a given set of input and output prices. It
may be obtained by substituting the profit-maximising input demand and output
supply equations derived in the primal approach (i.e., xM(P,W) and qM(p,W)) into
the direct profit function (5.2) so that
n
n,M =p.qM(p,W)_ IW¡ .x~(P,W)
Î=! (5.5)
= n'M(p, W)
7 To maximise profit, condition (b) tells us that the firm produces 'on the production
function' whereas condition (a) tells us that the value of marginal product of input i,
P.f¡(xM) equal the price of input i (W¡) for all i = 1,.. ...,n at the chosen production
plan. If this were not so and p.f¡(xM)? W¡ for some i = 1,.....,n, a small increase in
the use of input i (and hence in output to satisfy (b)) would lead to a rate of increase
in additional revenue of and a rate of increase in costs of Wi; since p.f¡(xM) ? W¡,
and profits would be increased. Similarly a small reduction in xM when p.f¡(xM) -(
W¡, leads to increased profits, we should have P.f¡(xM) = W¡ for all i = 1,.. ...,n for a
profit maximum. Madden(1996) gives detailed discussion on this issue.
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where the notation 7t,M is used to indicate maximum profit while 7t,M (P, W)
represents the relationship between 7t,M and prices. Actually, there is no need to
derive such an indirect profit function, because a principal advantage of this
approach is the avoidance of having to use the primal approach. In practice, we need
only to specify an indirect profit function which has a number of special properties8.
From this indirect profit function, we can use Hotelling's Lemma to derive the
output supply and input demand equations, qM(p,W) and XiM(P,W) and then estimate
the equations (5.6a) and (5.6b) using sample data. According to the Hotelling's
Lemma, the first partial derivatives of the indirect profit function with respect to
each of the input prices defines the negative of the input demand functions (5.6a)
and the indirect profit function with respect to output price provides the output
supply equation (5.6b). That is,
8 An indirect profit function that is consistent with the assumed optimising
behaviour should have the following properties:
1) 7t,M(p, W)~O, for (P, W) ~ 0 implying that negative profit is not occurred if the
firm can produce nothing and achieve a zero profit.
2) 7tIM(pl,W)~ 7t,M(p2,W), for pl~ p2 and 7t,M(p,W1) ~ 7t,M(p,W2), for W2~ W1.
These mean that the profit function is monotonically increasing.
3) 7t,M(p,W) is homogenous of degree one in all prices implies that double all
prices results in double profit. This follows the definition of profit.
4) 87t'M (P, W) and 87t'M (P, W) are homogenous of degree zero in all prices. This8P 8W.i
implies that a proportional increase in all prices does not alter the input mix nor
encourage the firm to produce more output meaning that the producer does not
suffer from money ilusion.
5) 7t,M(p,W) is convex in all prices if the production function, q = f(x), is strictly
concave. It is necessary for the indirect function have a maximum. If the production
function does not eventually exhibit decreasing returs to scale, the producer could
indefinitely increase the scale of operations and hence to have no limit to profit.
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8n,M M
-=-x¡ (P,W)-:O;
8W¡
(5.6a)
8n,Mand, - = qM(p,W))o 0,
8P
Vi = 1,..... .,n (5.6b)
where the profit fuction n 'M (P, W) is assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable and its Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite.
5.3.1.B) Cost Minimisation
Other than maximising profit, there is another issue in the theory of the firm
which is of economic interest but which is separate from (although related to) the
behaviour of profit maximising firms. This is the analysis of the so-called cost-
minimisation problem for a firm. In this problem, a firm may want to choose the
1
inputs that lead to the minimum cost of production of a given output level q , given
a set of input prices W.
5.3.1.B.a) The Primal Approach
The typical cost minimisation problem becomes
H nMip C (q,W) ="W.x. subiect to q ~ fì(x)XER++ L. 1 i J
i=1
(5.7)
The Lagrangean function for equation (5.7) therefore is
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nL(x,A;P,q) = - ¿W¡x¡ +A(f(x)-q)
¡=I
(5.8)
and Kuh- Tucker are : :: A H such that
(I) -Pi + AHf¡ (xH) = 0 i = 1.........n
(II) A H ;: 0 and
(Ill) xH E R:+ and f(xH) = q (5.9)
From (I), A H = Pi / fi (xH) ;: 0 and (II) is redundant,
Eliminating A h from (I) we get, equivalently to (I)-(III)
(a) f¡(xH)f/xH)
= W. for all i,j
Wj 1...n
(b) f(xH) = q. (5.10)
Solving (5.l0a) and (5.10b) simultaneously for Xi, the conditional input demand
functions can be obtained:
x~ = x~(q, W) for all i = 1.......n (5.11)
where x~ denotes the cost-minimising level of the i-th input and x~ (q,W) is known
as conditional input demand function. x~ (q, W) represents the functional
relationship that exists between x~ and the input prices and output. The main
difference between these conditional input demand functions and the demand
functions under profit maximisation (refer to equation (5.6a) & (5.1l)) and (5.6a) is
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that the output quantity (q), instead of output price (P), appears as an argument in
the demand function.
The optimal value function, known as the firm's indirect cost function, is
defined as the minimum cost of producing a particular output with given input
prices. It may be obtained by substituting the cost-minimising input demand
equations derived in the primal approach (i.e. equation(5.l 1)) into the direct cost
function i.e.
n
CH = IWiX~(q,WJ
i=l
(5.12)
H
= C (q,W¡) (5.13)
where the notation CH is used to indicate minimum cost while CH( q, W¡) represents
the relationship between CH and the exogenous variables W¡ and q.
5.3.l.B.b) The Dual Approach
Similar to the case of profit-maximisation, we are unlikely to be able to
derive an indirect cost function in practice. Instead, we estimate the cost function9
9 Also, the cost function under dual approach has to fulfil the following properties
(the explanations are similar to the profit case above):
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and then derive x~ (q, W) by using Shepherd's lemma which is also derived from
the Envelope Theorem, which states that the first partial derivative of the indirect
cost function with respect to each of the input prices defines the conditional input
demand functions (i.e. conditional upon the output level, q). That is,
BCH
BWi = x~(q, Wi)
Vi = 1......n (5.14)
Similar to the profit function, the cost function CH(q,W¡) is also assumed to
be twice continuously differentiable.
According to Chambers(1988), if x~ (P, W) is the unique profit-maximising
demand, it must equal the cost minimising derived demand. That is
x~(P, W) = x~(q(P, W), W) , V i = l.......n (5.15)
5.3.2) The Usefulness Of The Dual Approach:
In summary, the dual approach is to obtain the input demands and output
supply by differentiating the profit function or to obtain the conditional demand
1) CH(q, W) ~ 0, for W ~ 0 and q ~ O.
2) CH(q, W1) ~ CH(q, W2), for W1 ~ W .
3) CH (q, W) is homogenous of degree one in all prices.
4) BCH (q, W) is homogenous of degree zero in all prices.
BW¡
5)CH (q, W) is weakly concave in input prices if the production function, q = f(x), is strictly
quasi - concave. For example, the traditional 3 - stage S - shaped production function is strictly
quasi - concave.
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functions by differentiating the cost function, and then estimating the relevant
parameters by econometric methods, with no other algebraic manipulations
required. In other words, there is no need to construct a Lagrangean function and the
associated first order condition as given by (5.4) or (5.10). The dual approach
provides us with an easier method of deriving input demand equations (as discussed
above).
If I employ the primal approach, I need to directly estimate the production
function and treat the quantities of factor inputs (x¡) as exogenous and quantity of
output (q) as endogenouslo. As mentioned in Berndt (1991, p.460), at a highly
aggregate level, quantities of inputs may be exogenous but for a more disaggregate
level, prices are more likely to be exogenous than quantities because individual
firms choose the quantities of factor inputs (Xi) subject to their prices. Since I wil
employ the firm level (disaggregate) data set, the input quantities are unlikely to be
exogenous to the optimisation decision. Therefore, direct econometric estimation of
a production function may suffer from simultaneous equation bias, and so the primal
approach is not appropriate from a statistical perspective.11
10 For more details, please refer to Berndt (1991) and Kintis and Panas (1989).
ii Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze (1966) show that direct estimation of a production
function is acceptable if one assumes the producer is attempting to maximise
expected rather than actual profit. Their arguments are often used to justify the
direct econometric estimation of production functions.
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5.3.3) Why the Profit Function Has Certain Advantages Over Cost Function
The advantage of dual approach mentioned above cannot be applied to the
case of cost function. A cost minimising firm attempts to select the input quantities
(x) with a particular output (q) and given input prices (W). In other words, the
solutions x(q,W) are functions of q and W. As q is unlikely to be exogenous, single
estimation of the cost equation may suffer from simultaneous equation bias.
Although the Chinese economy is not fully marketised, the assumption of
exogenous prices is also valid in my study because a state-owned enterprise under
the economy administered by central authorities can be viewed as a price takerl2.
The factor prices in such economy sometimes are likely to be more exogenous than
that under a non-competitive market in the Western economy13. Therefore, the
estimation of an indirect profit function which has the exogenous prices on the right
1
hand side may be more appropriate from a statistical perspective.
Besides, the effect of the change in factor price on the cost minimising input
demands, x~ (q (P, W), W) , only reflect net substitution effect, whereas the effect on
12 A state-owned enterprise sells goods and services according to the prices
determined by the governent.
13 See Brada and Kutan (1994).
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profit maximising input demands, x~ (P, W) , includes both net substitution effect
and scale effect. That isl4
ax~(P,W)
BWj
ax~(q(P, W), W)
=
BWj
ax~(q(P, W), W) . Bq(P, W)
Bq BWj (5.16)
where ax~(q(P, W), W) is the partial derivative of cosVminimising (i.e.
BWj
Hicksian) demand for input Xi with respect to Wj. This expression denotes the net
14 See Sakai (1973) or Chambers (1988) for proof. Moreover, note that the
decomposition of the total effect into substitution and scale effect is quite analogous
to the substitution and income effect in the Slutsky decomposition familar from
consumer theory. However, they are not exactly the same. Firstly, consumption
theory considers two commodities (e.g. x,y) that can be considered as being similar
but for the firm behaviour, we have two different kinds of commodities to consider-
inputs and outputs. Therefore, their mutual relation~' and their cross relations take a
little more disentangling.
Secondly, to the case of own price effect, as proved by Sakai (1973), the net
substitution and scale effects always move in the same direction i.e. the own price
elasticity of derived demand under profit maximisation (total effect) must be greater
than that under cost minimisation (net substitution effect). This contrasts markedly
with the total own price effect in consumption theory since the latter, the net
substitution and income effect may go in the opposite direction.
Thirdly, taking partial derivative of (5.6a) and according to Young's
Theorem, a second partial derivative should be invariant to the order of the
differentiation,
ax~(P, W)
BWj
B27t(P, W)
BWjBW¡
B27t (P, W) _ axr (P, W)
BW¡BWj BW¡ (5.17)
From that, the total effect is symmetrical between two inputs, i.e. if i is said a gross
substitute for the input j then j must also be a gross substitute of i. Therefore, the
scale effect, as the difference of the total and substitution effect, is symmetrical too.
This contracts markedly with the income effect in consumer theory since the latter
may not be symmetricaL.
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substitution effect which measures the effect of the change in input price ratio on
technical substitution among the inputs along the original frontier.
ÒX~ (q (r, W), W) . ~ is known as the scale effect which captures the
õq õWj
induced changes in all outputs along the new expansion path associated with input
prices, contributing the additional variation in input i. òx~ (P, W) is the partial
õWj,
derivative of profit maximising (Marshallan) demand for input Xi with respect to
Wj. This expression denotes the (total or gross) effect measuring the total changes in
profit maximising demand resulting in altering Wj.
Expression (5.16) may relate to one of the reasons why there are K-E
controversy in the former studies. To explain this, let us firstly consider the cost
minimisation approach; inputs are defined as net substitutes if the cross price partial
derivatives of the conditional demand functions are positivel5, i.e., the net
substitution effect (for cost minimising demand) is,
ÒX~(q(P, W), W)
õW.
J
ÒXjH(q(P, W), W)
;: 0
õW¡
(5.18)
15 That is, the first item of (5.16)
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On the other hand, as revealed in (5.16), if the scale effect,
8x~ (q(P, W), W) . oq(P, W) ~ 0 16 and its magnitude outweight the net substitution
oq oWj
effect, the cross price effect under profit maximisation (for profit maximising
demand) may show that the two inputs are gross complements,
8x~(P,W)Le. ~ 0
oWj
Therefore, a pair of inputs can be complements for "cost minimising
demand", whereas the corresponding "profit maximising" measure could be
classified as substitutes. Hence, the result of K-E relationship from the profit
function may be different from that of the cost fuction. This may be one of the
reasons exploring why K-E controversy occurs in the literature. Moreover, by
H
definition, an input is called normal (inferior) if 8x¡ (q,(P, W), W) is non-negative
oq
(non-positive). Whereas, the output is classified as regressive (non-regressive) of
W. if oq(P, W) ~ 0 (or;; 0). Therefore, the sign of the scale effect depends onJ oW.
J
the signs of 8x~ (q, (P, W)) and oq (P, W) and so the K - E controversy may beoq oWj
arisen from inferior/normal factors and/or regressive/non-regressive output.
16 That is, the second item of(5.16).
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5.3.4) Choice of Functional Forms
The above discussion so far suggests that we should employ the dual method
to specify and estimate the factor demand functions from some sort of profit
functions. Unfortunately, there is no clear prior criteria for choosing a fuctional
form. Indeed, a variety of functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas, Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES), Zellner-Revankar, Quadratic and transcendental
logarithmic (Translog) have been used to derive input demand functions. Although
there are some theoretical studies (e.g. Caves and Christensen, 1980; Barnett and
Lee, 1985; Lau, 1986; Diewert and Wales, 1987; and Chambers 1988), addressing
the properties of various functional forms across sample space, it is stil confusing to
ascertain which is best suited for use in empirical application17.
It is generally agreed that an appropriate functional form should be:
1. suffciently flexible that it can accommodate various production
structures; and
2. satisfy the properties mentioned above or permit the imposition of these
properties through the application of appropriate constraints. 18
17 Recently, some economists such as Gordon (1996) who uses the Bayesian
methods and argues that there is in fact no need to choose the functional forms; the
optimal strategy is just to use a mixture of functional forms to estimate the
parameters of interest.
18 Unfortunately, these two objectives are often in conflict. The imposition of
constraints upon a flexible fuctional form to achieve appropriate theoretical
properties can subsequently reduce the flexibility of many popular flexible
functional forms (see Diewert and Wales, 1987).
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In my study, I specify the profit function by the translog form because it is
flexiblel9. That is, the translog model has no prior restrictions on elasticities. This
model has the advantage over the less-flexible functional forms such as the Cobb-
Douglas (CD), and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. The CD
function requires its elasticity of substitution (ES) always and everywhere equal to
one and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function assume its ES must be
the same everywhere. There is a further important consideration, if I employ another
popular functional form, quadratic form, I need the data of energy consumption.
However, in the survey that I obtained, most of the enterprises in China recorded the
prices, expenditures and profits only, instead of the quantity of energy inputs. This
explains why translog function is more appropriate to derive input demands (by
using the dual approach) for the data set of Chinese state enterprises.
The tranlog functional form has a number of 
Id 
raw backs, however.
(1) Like other flexible functional forms, the translog model has no prior restrictions
on elasticities, but this flexibility is achieved at the cost of giving up the global
imposition of some theoretical requirements. Therefore, it limits the range of
technologies that can be characterised. On the contrast, the CD and CES
19 It is because translog can be viewed as a functional form by itself or a second
order Taylor series expansion that wil approximate any functional form at a single
base point. (Diewert (1974)). Other flexible functional forms such as the Normalised
Quadratic, the Generalised Leontief, and the Generalised Mcfadden can also be
applied in dual analyses of production. For more on their properties, please refer to
Diewert and Wales (1987).
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globally impose theoretical requirements at the cost of giving up local
flexibility.
(II) Burgess (1975) points out that the translog function is not self-duafo, except at
the actual point of approximation, whereas the CD and CES specification are
both self-duaL. That is, we can not derive the production function implied by the
indirect translog cost or translog profit functions, although the production
fuction does exist. This is due to the fact the mathematical derivation of its form
is intractable. Fortunately, it is not a great problem, since the estimates of key
measures such as substitution elasticities and the total elasticity of production can
stil be derived.
(Ill) Kuh (1976) argues that the translog production and cost fuctions do not
necessarily describe the same technology, and the two approaches often yield
quite different estimates of the elasticities of substitution. The inherent
discrepancy between the theoretical and the empirical results is one of the
weakness of translog functional form.
(IV) Since the translog function is a second-order approximation, the differentiation
process transforms the system of value-share equations into a first-order
approximations only. Hence the quality of the approximation wil deteriorate
overall. Moreover, it may suffer from statistical problems such as
multicollnearity (Theil, 1980).
20 Indeed, most of the flexible functional forms appear to not be self-dual except the
normalised quadratic, as noted in Squires (1994).
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(V) Just like the other generalised quadratic forms, the translog form is very
inflexible in that it represents separable technologies. It cannot model
nonhomothetic weakly separable fuctions (Chambers 1988 and Blackorby,
Primont and Russel ,1977).
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I found the form of the relationship between energy and
capital is controversial issue, which results in opposing energy pricing policies for
narrowing the energy deficit. It is believed that these arguments are raised by
different estimations or techniques employed in the studies, such as different data
sets, functional forms and various dynamic specifications. Nevertheless, rationing,
especially usual in China, may provide an alternativ~ explanation for the arguments.
Thus, I decided to incorporate rationing behaviour in this study.
To examine the relationships among various factors, it is needed to derive
input demand functions and relevant elasticities21 for use. Having reviewed the
literature, I found the dual approach to derive the input demand function from the
translog profit fuction has arguable greater net advantage compared to other
alternatives, especially given data limitations.
21 The derivation of relevant elasticities from the translog profit function wil be
discussed in Chapter Six.
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Chapter 6: Derivation of Various ElastiCIties WithlWithout Rationing
Following the discussion in Chapter Five, I now derive the input demand
functions and their relevant price elasticities from the translog profit function by
using the dual approach. In Section 6.1, I wil use the traditional approach to derive
the input demand functions and elasticities of unregulated inputs.,. In section two I
wil compare the two possible approaches, the auxilary constraint and virtual price
approach, for modellng the firmconsumer behaviour under rationing. After that, in
section 6.3, I wil explain how this rationing is incorporated into the derivation of
input demand fuctions.
6.1 Derivation of Various Elasticities without Rationing
This section mainly follows the theoretical framework developed by Lau
(1976), Diewert (1973) and Sidhu and Baanante (1981). Firstly, let us consider the
relevant function, n :
n= new, F) (6.1.1)
Where n is the normalised restricted profit function (i.e. n' I P) which is defined as
total revenue minus total costs of variable inputs normalised by prices of output (P).
w is a vector of variable inputs prices, normalised by P (i.e., w = W1/P,
W 2/P" . . . . . .. W nIP) and F is a vector of fixed inputs.
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The normalised restricted translog profit function for a given output is
defined as
12 n inn n
Inn = 0.0 +StT +-Srr T + ¿ai Inwi +- ¿¿Sih Inw¡ In wh + ¿SiT Tlnw¡2 i=1 2 i=1 h=1 i=1m imm nm M
+ ¿Pk InFk +- ¿¿Pkj InFk InFj + ¿¿Òik In w¡ InFk + ¿tpkT TlnFkk=1 . 2 k=1 j=1 i=1 k=1 k=1
(6.1.2)
Note that the time trend variable T and its square (T2) are included in the translog
function. 1 They are used to allow the possibility of technical change.2 The parial
derivative of profit function with respect to T (a In n/ aT) wil then measure the rate
of movement of the profit fuction over time. For technological progress to occur,
the sign of (a In n/ aT) value should be positive indicating the profit function is
shifting up over time (and the cost function is fallng and production function is
rising over time.)
If the coeffcients of the terms TIn w i (i.e. SiT) and of TIn Fk (i.e. tp kT) are
zero, the inclusion of the time variables wil account for the Hicks-neutral
technological change. This means that when the isoquants and production
possibility curves (PPCs) shift up and down, their slopes (marginal rate of technical
substitution and marginal rate of transformation) remain unchanged (i.e. parallel
shifts). On the other hand, non-neutral technical change can be also accounted for by
21 The T term is included to provide consistency with the second order
approximation notion of the translog form.
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including those terms which involve the interactions of the other regressors and
time. This occurs when SiT and (( kT, result in non-parallel shifts in the isoquants and
PPCs. Note that the non-neutral technical change is also called biased technological
change, because the movement in the production/cost/profit functions are biased in
favour of certain input(s) and/or output(s) at the expense of the other inputs.
By using Young's Theorem, we have S ij = S ji and Pkj = P jk 'so that symmetry
restrictions are ensured. Since the normalised restricted translog profit function is
restricted to be linearly homogeneous in variable inputs prices (w¡) and in fixed
input (Fk), this requires the following restrictions to be imposed on the parameter
estimates (Diewert, 1982):
!Ui = 1,!Sih = 0 for all h = 1,.....,n
i=1 i=1
!SiT = O,!Õjj = 0 for all j = 1,.....,n
j=1 t j=1
!Pk = 1,!Pkj = 0 for all j = 1,.....,n
k=1 k=1
!((kT = O,!Õij = 0 for all i = 1,.....,nk=1 T j=1
(6.1.3)
In addition to monotonicity, the estimated parameters are required to be
correctly signed. This means that the estimated shares for fixed inputs must be
positive, while for the variable input case (i.e. input prices) must be negative.
Besides, the convexity condition of the profit fuction implies that the Hessian
matrix must be positive definite. If these regular conditions are satisfied, there is
2 Under constant returns to scale the effects of technical progress are manifested
either in increased output or in reduced factor demands and costs.
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suffcient information describing completely the well-behaved production function
which are completely specified3.
Before going to derive the input demand equations and the relevant price
elasticities, let us use the Hotellng's Lemma allow me to derive the profit share and
elasticity functions:
an
-=-x.
Bw. 1I (6.1.4)
and so,
an . (wi) = aln n - w.x.= I I = Si :s 0Bwi n aln wi n (6.1.5)
Where the XiS are the optimised quantities of the variable inputs and Si is defined as
profit share. Applying this lemma to Equation (6.1.2), we can obtain the profit share
fuctions:
a In n ~ "t
Si = a = Ui + L8ih In wh + LÕik InFk + 8iTTIn wi h=1 k=1 (6.1.6)
Where Si = -wi Xi In
3 Although it is difficult to obtain suffcient conditions on the parameters of the
translog profit function, which wil ensure that it is globally consistent with the
properties mentioned above, this may not be a very serious defect in empirical
applications. (Diewert, 1974).
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From (6.1.5) the input demand equations for the ith variable input can be
written as
X; = :; (- ~::J (6.1.7)
and
( Bin7t)
lnx¡ = ln7t-lnw¡ +In - Blnw¡ . (6.1.8)
Based on (6.1.8), we can derive various elasticities:
6.1.1) The own-price elasticity of demand for Xi (i;¡¡):
1
To obtain I;¡I' differentiating (6.1.8) with respect to lnwi" that is,
Blnxi Bln7t BIn ( Bin7t)1;.. = = -1 + -11 Blnw¡ Blnw¡ Blnw¡ Blnw¡' (6.1.9a)
Substituting (6.1.5) into (6.1.9a), I;¡¡ becomes:
BIn 7t Bln(-S¡) 41;..= -1+ .11 Blnw¡ Blnwi (6.1.9b)
. Bln(-S¡) B(-S¡)/(-S¡) B(-S¡)IBlnw¡
Since BI = Bl = -S ) , (6.1.9b) becomes,nw¡ nw¡ ( i
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B( -SJ / BIn wi
~ii = Si -1 + (-SJ (6.1.9c)
Where BS ¡j BIn w i can be obtained by differentiating (6.1. 6) with respect to In w i ,
8ii 5
and so, ~ii = Si -1 +-,
Si (6.1.10)
6.1.2) The cross-price elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the price of
the hth input ( ~ ih) :
Similarly, by differentiating (6.1.8) with respect to In w h , we can get ~ih as follows:
~'h = Blnxi = Blnn + BIn ( Binn)i Blnwh Blnwh Blnwh Blnwi, (6.1. 11 a)
BIn n Bln( -SJ= +
Blnwh Blnwh (6. 
1. 11 b)
= S + B( -S J / BIn w hh -SJ (6.1.11c)
As Blnwi =8.Bl ih,nWh
8ih
~ih =Sh +-, i=I,...n,h=I,...n,Si
(6.1.12)
-w.x.4 Since Si (= I I) is negative, (-Si) is positive. Therefore, taking logarithm of
n
(-Si) becomes valid.
5 This result is similar to equation (6) in Sidhu and Baanante (1981)
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- WhXh BS. .Where Sh = and Bl i = 8ih, i:;h,n nWh
6.1.3 ) The elasticity of demand for input i with respect to output price, P (E,iq) :
Also,E,iq' can be obtained from differentiating (6.1.8) with respect to lnP:
E, = Blnxi = Blnn _ Blnwi + BIn (_ Binn)iq BlnP P B nP l P w.'
i
(6. L. 13 a)
.. Blnn Blnwi Bln(-S¡)
=LJ . -(-1)+i=1 BIn wi BlnP BlnP (6. 1. 13b)6
= t -So + 1 + t Bln(-S¡) . Blnwhi=1 i h=1 BIn w h BlnP
(6. L. 13 c)
n n 8
= I - Sï+ 1 + I --( -1),i=1 h=1 Si (6.1.14)
Where i =1, . . . , n,
n n 8ih 7
E,iq = I -Si + 1- I -,i=1 h=1 Si (6.1.15)
6.1.4 ) The elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the kth fixed factor
Fk (Eik)
Similarly, differentiating (6.1.8) with respect to lnFk, I obtain
S. Wi Blnwi 16 ince w. =- -=-i p' BlnP
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alnXiEik = alnF =
k
alnn
alnFk
aln wi aln ( aln n )
alnFk + alnFk - alnw¡ . (6.1.16a)
Since
alnw¡
alnFk = 0, substituting the differentiation of (6.1.2) with respect to lnFk,
(6.1.16) becomes
ID n Bln(-S¡)
Eik = Pk + tPkjlnFj + tt8iklnw¡ +~kTT+ alnFk (6.1.l6b)
ID n a(-s¡)/ alnFk
= Pk + ¿Pkj lnFj + ¿8ik In wi + ~kT +j=1 ¡=I (-S¡) (6.1.16c)
as.
As I 1 = 8ik, (6.1.16C) can be modified as follows,
a nFk
_ 't ~ 8¡kEik - Pk + ¿Pk)nFj + ¿8iklnwi +~ktT+-,j=1 i=1 W Si (6.1.17)8
6.1.5) The output (supply) elasticity with respect to input prices (ç qi)
Firstly, consider the nominal profit function of the following form:
n
n' = P'q - ¿W¡xi
i=1
(6.1.18)
Normalising (6.1.18) by P gives us the normalised profit fuction:
7 This result is similar to equation (11) in Sidhu and Baanante (1981)
8 This result is similar to equation (13) in Sidhu and Baanante (1981)
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n7t = q - ¿w¡x¡
¡=I
(6.1.19)
After rearranging, it wil give us:
n
q =7t+ ¿w¡x¡
¡=I
(6.1.20)
With the help of (6. 1.7), (6.1.20) becomes
~ 7t( ain7tJq=7t+LJw¡- -
¡=I w¡ aln w¡
- (1 :t a In 7t J
- 7t - i~1 a In w ¡ (6.1.21)
Taking log of (6.1.21) wil result in:
( ~ aln7t J
lnq =ln7t+ln 1- LJ
¡=I aln w¡
(6.1.22)
Since the elasticity of output (supply) with respect to price of the ith input is given
by E,q¡ = a In q , I can differentiate (6.1.22) with respect to w ¡ to obtain E,q¡' given
alnw¡
as below:
E,. = aln7t +~(1-:t aln7t )qi alnw¡ alnw¡ h=1 a In wh (6.1.23)
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Referring to (6.1.5), (6.1.23) becomes
ôln nŠq¡ = S¡ + (1- ISh)'
ôln W¡ h=1
From the result of (6.1.6), fuher modification can be made to (6.1.24)7
n
I8hi
Šqi =S¡ - h=ln ,wherei=I,...,n.
1- ISh
h=1
6.1.6) The output supply price elasticity (Š qq)
Similarly, differentiating (6.1.22) with respect to In P
Š = ôlnq = ôlnn + ôln (1- t ôlnn).
qq ôlnP ôlnP ôlnP ¡=I ôlnw¡
Using (6.1.5), (6.1.26) is equivalent to
n
ôln(1- ISJ
_ ôlnn + i=1
Šqq - ôlnP ôlnP
n
ôln(1- ISh)
_ ôlnn h=1
--+
ôlnP ôlnP
(6.1.24)
(6.1.25)
(6.1.26)
(6.1.27)
(6.1.28)
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Where i, h = 1..... .n. By using the Chain rule, we establish
n
aln(l- ¿Sh)
Šqq = t alnn alnw¡ + t h=1i=1 aln wi alnP i=1 aln w¡
alnwi
alnP (6.1.29a)
n n
n ¿¿8hi(-1)
= ¿Si(-I)- i=1 h=1 ni~1 1- ¿Sh
h=1
(6.1.29b)
n n
n ¿¿8ih
= " -So + i=1 h=1L. 1 ni=1 1- ¿Sh
h=1
(6.1.30)9
Where 8ih = 8hi.
6.1.7) The elasticity for a change in the quantity of output with a change in fixed
factor ( E qk )
Differentiating (6.1.22) with respect to Fk, E qk is obtained as follows:
9 Similar result as equation (21) in Sidhu and Baanate (1981)
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alnq
E qk= alnFk
= aln 7t 1 (:t aSi )
alnFk + 1- ÏSi - i=1 alnFk
i=1
(6.1.31)
nil n ¿Oik
= Pk + ¿Pkj lnFj + ¿Oik In wi + ((kT T - i=1 nj=1 i=1 1- ¿Si
i=1
(6.1.32)
Where i=I,.....,n.
6.2 Firm Behaviour under Rationing
Before deriving the elasticities under rationing, I wil discuss how the
auxiliary constraint and the virtual pricing approach can be used to derive the input
demands under rationing.
6.2.1) Auxiliary Constraint
Tobin and Houthakker (1950-51) presented the first paper to investigate how
the consumer behavioural functions under rationing are related to the corresponding
functions in unestricted market by using Samuelson's concept of auxilary
constraints (1947). This concept can also be used in the profit maximising behaviour
of a firm by introducing one more constraint in the profit function. To ilustrate this
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approach, let us partition the input vector x, (Xl, X2,.....,xn) into rationed inputs x~ 10
and freely chosen inputs Xh, where Xh=(X2,.....,Xn). The variable input prices for
rationed x~ and unationed Xh are W1 and Wh, respectively. When an economy faces
rationing, the profit maximising problem of the economy, which is modified from
(5.2), can be defined as:
n
Max1t'(P, W,F)=P.q - ¿W¡x¡XER~+ i:=l Subject to q s: f(x) and Xl s: x~ (6.2.1)
When (6.2.1) is normalised by P, I obtain
Max1t(w,F)=q - ¿w¡x¡ subjecttoqS:f(x)andxl S:x~
XER~+
(6.2.2)
The Lagrangean function is written as
n
L(q,x,Â; w,F) = P.q - ¿ w¡x¡ + Âi (f(x) - q) + Â2 (x~ - Xl)
¡~i
(6.2.3)
Solving the Kuh- Tucker conditions, we obtain the following solutions:
x~ (w, x~ ,F), x~ (w, x~ ,F),qM(w, x~ ,F) and 1tM(w, x~ ,F), respectively.
If the free market equilbrium is at x~(w,x~,F),x~(w,x~,F) and the
constraint is at x~ = x~ (w, x~, F), the constraint would be auxiliary or non-biting
at the prevailing prices, i.e.,
10 Because there is only one input that needs to be rationed in my data, only the
first input is assigned as rationed good.
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nn - (w, x ~ , F) = Max (q - W i x~ - LW h X h); x~ , X hER:+q,xh ER~:I h=2 (6.2.4)
and nM (w, F) = n- (w, x~, F) (6.2.5)
The use of the auxiliary constraint begs several questions. First, this optimum under
auxiliary constraint canot deviate from the free market optimum. Second, this
-
auxilary constraint is subject to the limitation that the price of the rationed input xi
(i.e. Wl) has to remain constant. In contrast, the virtual pricing approach can make
such comparisons between the case of rationing and non-rationing in the more
general condition.11
6.2.2) Virtual Pricing Approach
Using Neary and Roberts' (1980) concept,12 I define virtual prices, w~, as
those prices which would induce an unconstrained firm to demand for the ration
level of x~ . By adopting such a definition, the virtual prices w~ can be defined as
implicit function of Wh and, x~, i.e., w~ = few h' x~, F). Thus, even if a constraint
on the profit function is not imposed, Xi = x~ also can be achieved by altering
the rationed input price vector Wl at the virtual price w~. In this situation, the
11 For detailed discussion on this issue, please refer to Coddington, Johannson and
Lofgren (1984).
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constrained (with rationing) and the unconstrained profit function can be linked
h 13 .toget er , Le.,
n-(w, x~,F)= n(w~,wh"F) ifw1 = w~ (6.2.6)14
n- (w, x~, F) = n( w~, wh,F) + (w~ -W1) x~ ifw1"* w~ (6.2.7)
Profits under the rationing regime cannot be higher than unationed profits when W1
"* w ~ and the second term on the right is monetary measure of an 'effciency cost'
of rationing input use. Furthermore, at the point where the virtual and actual price
coincide, the ration level equals the unconstrained Xi' i.e. when wi = w~ , X1=X~ .15
12 Although this concept was used originally for commodity demand, it is also valid
for the input demand of firms.
13 For derivations, please see Squires (1994), p.239
14 It is important to note that rationed inputs are different from fixed inputs. The
case of fixed inputs involves a time horizon. In the short run, some factors restricted
to be fixed are denoted as F. Hence, the input demand functions, output supply
function and the profit function are the same as mentioned above except w ~ is no
longer the dependent variable and F is introduced in the model as explanatory
variables, Le. x~ (wh, F), xt (wh,F ), qM (wh ,F) and nM(wh,F). Moreover, there
are no optimal values of FK because they are fixed in the short ru. However, in the
long run, FK vary and become endogenous just like x and so the solution functions
are no longer dependent on F but on their prices ( w F ) instead i.e.
x~ (w h' W F)' xt(wh, wF), qM (wh, wF) and nM (wh, wF). Of course, the optimal
values of F(i.e. FM (w h , W F) ) can be found in the long run. Unlike the case of fixed
inputs, the inputs rationed are affected by policy makers. This means that the
rationed inputs can change from time to time under the control of the policy makers.
15 For detailed discussion on this issue, please refer to Quiroga, Fernandez-Cornejo
and Vasavada (1995).
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Figure 6.1: The auxiliary constraint approach and the virtual price approach for
utility maximisation.
6.1A: The auxiliary approach
xh
A
11
li
i,
i.
x; =x; B xi
6.1B: The virtual price approach
Xh
c 1
. 'Virtual price' budget line
-+--.__._._--.~---_._-------
A
Eo
, '
Auxilar constraint budget line
..........................
10
o x; D B
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Figure 6.2: The auxiliary constraint approach and the virtual price approach for
profit maximisation.
6.2A: The auxilary constraint approach
xh
Max n=nM(w,x-i)
o
xM =x.i i xi
6.2B: The virtual price approach
xh \
n=nM(w,x-¡)
(auxilar constraint approach)
nM(w-¡,Wh)
(virtual price approach)
o x-i xi
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6.2.3) Difference Between Auxiliar Constraints and Virtual Pricing Approach
To depict the differences between auxiliary constraints and virtual pricing
approach graphically; one may start with the consumer theory for simplification.
The indifference map is shown in Figure 6.1A, where x~ denotes the quantity of
rationed goods and Xh is the quantity of free market goods. The budget line is AB.
The free market equilibrium (no rationing) Ei is located at the tangency point at
which the indifference cure 11 cuts the budget line AB. If the ration x~, equals the
optimum quantity of Xl at Ei (i.e. x; ),16 the constraint (or rationing) would be
auxiliary or non-biting at the prevailng prices. However, as mentioned above, it is
unreasonable to assume that optimum always coincides with the constraints.
Moreover, the use of a sticky price is too restrictive an assUmption. Indeed, if x; is
not equal to x~, the story wil be much more different. We can ilustrate this
phenomenon by using Figure 6.1B.
In Figure 6.1B, suppose the original free market equilibrium now becomes
Eo, which may lie to the left or right ofx~ . If it lies to the left ofx~ , rationing does
not alter the consumer's choice and the rationing is ineffective. However, if it lies to
the right to x~ , rationing wil distort the previous equilbrium and the 'purchasing
possibility line' becomes AE1 x~ . Then the new indifference curve 11 does not cut
the kinked budget line, AE1 x~, but passes through the new equilibrium point Ei.
16 x* is a short form of the profit maximising input demands, x~ (w, F).
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The slope of this indifference curve at Ei measures the marginal valuation of XI.
which is greater than the price OfX1.17
Suppose that a new budget line CD is tangent to 11 at Ei at which the
equilibrium quantity equals x~ , then the consumer is better off as if the price had
risen to that indicated by CD and his income wil be increased enough to buy more
quantity ofxh, CA. This new price is referred to the concept of the 'virtual pricingl8.
Although the final position of the two approaches is the same, i.e. at Ei,
which associated with the vector of goods equals quantity constraints x~, the
adjustment process and the staring point of the two approaches are different. The
auxiliary constraint is unrealistically assumed to be naturally set at the optimum
level and Ei (in Figure 6.1A) is at the budget line AB. Whereas the virtual pricing
equilibrium starts with Eo via price adjustment (for 1 the optimum is not equal to the
constraint) and reached at the tangency point to the new budget line CD. Under this
approach, even the auxiliary constraint x~ (in Figure 6.lB) corresponds to Ei but
this point is only at where the original budget line AB touches but is not tangential
to the indifference curve 11, In this sense, the consumer does not attain maximum
utility with the budget line AB, whereas the consumer does attain maximum level
with the new budget line CD under virtual-pricing-equilibrium.
17 This means that, under this situation, the consumer's utility is not at the
maximum leveL.
18 This is also the idea of the marginal value of a coupon, which is essential to an
understanding of the effects of rationing, and leads directly to the determinants of
the Black market rate for coupons.
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Similarly, these differences can also be applied to a firm's behaviour, but the
above figures (6.1A and 6.2B) are not valid for this case because corresponding to
the indifference curve in the case of firm is an isoquant which only refers to output
level, rather than profit. However, a firm's objective in my study is neither
maximising output nor minimising cost but maximising profit. Because of this, we
employ the ellptical isoprofit curve for a firml9. The differences between the two
approaches are presented in Figure 6.2A and 6.2B, respectively. In Figure 6.2A, the
free market optimum is the peak at X1M(W) which equals the auxilary constraintx~.
The highlighted isoprofit cures in Figure 6.2B are the isoprofit curves under virtual
prices. Note that even the level of the profit and the point Ei under the two
approaches are the same but the Ei is at the peak (maximum) of the 'virtual profit'
hypersurface after price adjustment whereas Ei under auxiliary constraint is not at
the peak of the 'auxiliary profit'(solid curves) hypersurface without any price
adjustment under auxiliary constraint 20.
6.2.4) The Advantage of Virtual Pricing Approach
Near and Roberts (1980) show that all the properties of the rationed
demand and supply functions can be expressed in terms of the properties of the
unrationed functions, provided the latter are evaluated at virtual prices. Besides, the
derivatives of the rationed demand functions may be decomposed into income and
19 However, this curve can also be interpreted as indifference curve based on the
Utilty function where the usual budget restriction has been substituted into the
"argument set" by solving for the possible consumption of say, commodity xi in
terms of commodity ~. In other words, the budget line is not needed. See
Cuddington, Johansson and Lofgren (1984).
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expansion effects which may in tur be related to the derivatives of the
corresponding unconstrained demand functions. These imply that the behaviour of
the firm under rationing can be fully predicted from the knowledge of its
unconstrained demand functions. Thus, the virtual pricing approach has the
advantage that it allows the parameters of the constrained profit function to be
recovered from the unconstrained profit function; i.e. only the knowledge of the
unconstrained profit function is needed. In other words, there is no need to specify
and estimate a constrained function.21 Instead, I only need to estimate the
unconstrained fuction and the rationed inputs x 1 and their derivatives can also be
obtained. Furhermore, under the virtual pricing approach, I can use some stringent
tests of hypotheses in conducting empirical demand analysis.
6.3 The Input Demand Functions and ElasticIties under Rationing
Following the above discussion, it is possible to use the virtual pricing
concept to derive the input demand functions and elasticites, by employing the
20 In the auxiliary constraint approach, the peak is at Eo as in figure 6.1B, which is
under the original price leveL.
21 Lee and Pitt (1987) have analysed firm behaviour when the firm already faces
rationing or does not use a particular input. However, this approach requires the
knowledge of the firm's responses to changes in constraint levels and market
conditions under the rationed regime and the relationship of the properties of the
rationed and unrationed production technology. Moreover, it does not discuss the
effects of the opposite case that input quantity constraints may be removed in a
market economy (Squires 1994). Indeed, if the data generating process is consistent
with unconstrained behaviour, estimating parameters under rationing wil result in
biased estimates. This is because a false restriction is imposed on the data when in
fact the data are generated by an unconstrained modeL. (Quiroga, Fernandez-Cornejo
and Vasavada, 1995).
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translog modeL. To do that, I just separate w~ from the w vector and treat w~ as a
function of prices of unrationed inputs, quantity of fixed factor and regulated inputs.
Then recallng (6.1.6), I have
òlnn n m
S¡ = =U¡ + ¿S¡hlnwh + ¿ù¡klnFk +S¡TTÒ In w ¡ h"l k"1 (6.3.1)
-w.x.
where S. = i ii n (6.3.2)
As mentioned before, the rationed input is indexed as 1 and the remaining
variable inputs are indexed 2,.....,n. Under the quantity controls,
_ _ - Wi xi 22
xi = xi and so (6.1.5) becomes Si = . Taking logarithm, it is modified as
n
In w1 = Inn + In(-SJ -lnx~ (6.3.3)
As x~, nand S; depend on wi and Fk, we can establish the following
equation:
lnw~ = f(wh,F,x;) k = 1,......, m (6.3.4)
On the other hand, for unregulated input (wh), the following equation can be
established:
22 When doing estimation, S~ is treated as Si which is calculated from the
observed variables, w i' Xi' and n. The "" here is only for denoting that the
economy is under rationing.
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xJw,F,x~) = x¡(w,F )andS¡(wh,F ,x~) = S¡(w,F)
Taking out the term lnw1 from (6.3.1) allows us to get:
n il
Si(w,Fk,x~)=ai +8il lnwi + I8h lnwh + IÒ¡k lnFk +8¡TTh=2 k=1 (6.3.5)
Similarly, the profit share equation for the regulated input Xl is:
S~ =a¡ +8iilnw¡ + !8¡¡lnw¡ + ~)iklnFk +8iTTi=2 k=l (6.3.6)
Substituting (6.3.4) into (6.3.5) gives us the profit share function for the
unegulated inputs ( w h) so that
n il'
Si =a¡ +8ilf(wh,F,xi)+ I8ih lnwh + ~Ò¡k lnFk +8¡TTh=2 k=1 (6.3.7)
Based on (6.3.7), I can derive various elasticities under rationing.
6.3.1) The own price elasticities for the unrationed good i (E,:)(indexed 2,...,n)
For the economy without (or pnor to) rationing, all factors are freely
adjustable. As mentioned in Section 6.1, the own price elasticities of the partial
equilibrium Marshallian demand (under profit maximisation) for all factors are
derived from the share equation (6.3.1) of the translog profit function (6.1.2) and has
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as.
the general formulae (6.1.9c), where the term 1 i is obtained by differentiating
a nw¡
(6.3.1) with respect to In w¡ (i.e.8¡) and so the own price elasticitiest¡¡ are the same
as the ones given by (6.1.10), i.e. t¡¡ = S¡ -1 + 8¡¡, i = l.....n
S¡
In the case of rationing, although the own price elasticities with rationing of
Xl for the unrationed goods i (indexed 2, ...n) are stil based on the formula
aSï
(6.1.9c), The term ai is now obtained by differentiating the modified profitnw¡
share function (6.3.7), instead of (6.3.1), with respect to In w¡,' The result is
t::=S:-_I+aS~/alnw¡. . 2
~1l i s:-' 1= ...n,
i
(6.3.8)
From (6.3.7),
as:-i
alnw¡
af8.1 +8..i ai 1l
nw¡ (6.3.9)
From (6.3.3 & 6.3.4) :
af aln w~
=
aln w¡ aln w¡
a In 1t a In( -s~ )= +
aln w¡ aln w¡ (6.3.10)
= s:- + a( -S~ ) / a In w ¡i S~) (6.3.11)
Differentiating (6.3.6) with respect to In W¡, (6.3.11) becomes
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Bf
Blnw¡
8 BIn w~11
=S:- + BIn w¡1 s-
I
+ 8li
(6.3.12)
Since from (6.3.4) I have Bf
Blnw¡
BIn w- .i , I can apply this result to (6.3.12) to
Blnw¡
obtain:
Bf
Blnw¡
-
Si +
Bf
8 11 BIn w.
1
Si
+ 8li
(6.3.13)
Rearanging (6.3.13), I get
Bf
Blnw¡
(S¡SI +81J
(S¡-8ii)
- -
Si+(8li/SI)
1-(811 ISi)
(6.3.14)
Substituting (6.3.14) into (6.3.9) and putting the new result of BS/Bln w¡ into
(6.3.8), the own price elasticities for umegulated goods with rationing of x~ (E~) can
be obtained as follows:
8'iS~ +(8li /S~)J+8..1i 1-(8 IS-) 11
E- - S- -1 11 i.. -, +11 i S:-
1
i=2...n (6.3.15)
Wh 8. =81,ere ii i'
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6.3.2) The cross-price elasticities for input i with respect to the price of the hth
input (E,~):
Similarly, as mentioned above, for the economy under rationing, the general
formulae are basically the same as without rationing (i.e. 6.1.llc and 6.1. 13c).
However, the partial derivatives are obtained from (6.3.7) instead of (6.3.1).
Thus, the Marshallan cross price elasticities E,~ can be derived as follows: First, I
know from (6.1.11 C) that
t:-h = S-h + a(S~)1 aIn wh, i,h = 2,...,n,
~, (S~) (6.3.16)
Where as~ = 8.1 I af J + 8.h, i,h = 2,..,n.alnwh 'lalnwh i (6.3.17)
Similar to the steps of (6.3.10 - 6.3.14), I can also have
af (S~ + (81h / S~ )J
=
alnwh (1-(811 IS~)J ' (6.3.18)
8JS: + (81h iS;)) + 8.
1-(8 IS-) ih
and so t ~ = S - + II i
~ih h S~
i
i,h = 2,.....,n (6.3.19)
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6.3.3) The elasticity of demand for unregulated input i with respect to changes in
output price ( ~ ~ ) is :
Recalling (6 .1.13c )
J::- = ~ -S:- 1 ~ Bln(-Si) . Blnwh
~~ ~ 1 + +~ .i=2 h=1 BIn w h BP (6.3.20)
=! -S; +1+ B(-S;)/~lnwi .(-1)+! B(-S;)/~lnwh .(-1). (6.3.21);=2 (-Si) h=2 (-Si)
Based on (6.3.17) and (6.3.18), I obtain
BSi 8il(S~+(8Ih/S~))
= _ +8ih.BIn w h 1- (811 I Si ) (6.3.22)
Differentiating (6.3.5) with respectto In Wi , and substituting the result and
(6.3.22) into (6.3.20), I can get
n 8 n
~~ =-¿S~+I----¿iq i=l 1 s~ h=2
i
8JS~ + 8¡)S;) + 8.
1- (8 IS-) ih11 ¡
S~i
Where i,h= 2,.....,n.
(6.3.23)
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6.3.4) The elasticity for a change in the quantity of unegulated inputs with respect
to change in fixed factor (8 ~ ):
Referring to (6.1.8), I get the In Xi function under rationing for unrationed inputs,
lnxi = In ~ - In wi + In(-S~), i=2,.....,n (6.3.24)
Differentiating (6.3.24) with respect to lnFk gives me the following elasticity
aln Xi aln 1C aln( -S~)8ik = alnFk = alnFk + alnPk ' i=2........n (6.3.25)
= aln 1C + a( -S~)/ alnFk
alnFk (-S~) , i=2,.....,n (6.3.26)
where aln1C is the partial derivative of (6.1.2) witH'respect to Fk i. e.,lnFk
alnw~ ~8 1 alnw~ 8 Talnw~
ui + L, Ih n wh + IT
alnFk alnFk h=1 alnFk alnFk
~ alnwi
+ L,Ôlk lnFk + G'kT Tk~1 alnFk
aln1C ID n
+ Pk + ¿Pkj lnFj + ¿Ôik In w¡j=1 i=1
(6.3.27)
_ alnw;- (n ID)
- ui + ¿81h In wh + 8IT T + ¿Ôlk lnFk + PkalnFk h=1 k=1ID n
+ ¿Pkj lnFj + ¿Ôik In wi + G'kT Tj=1 i=1
(6.2.28)
= alnw~ (a) 
+ b
alnFk (6.3.29)
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n m
wherea=ui + ¿8lhlnwh +8ITT+ ¿õiklnFkh=1 k=1 (6.3.30)
and
m n
b=Pk + ¿PkjlnFj + ¿õiklnwi +8kTT.h=1 i=1 (6.3.31)
Differentiating (6.3.3) with respect to Fk,I get
alnw~ alnn aln(-S~) alnn a(-S~)/alnFk= + = +
alnFk alnFk alnFk alnFk (-S~) (6.3.32)
As from (6.3.6), I can establish
as~ -8 alnw~ Õ
alnFk - 11 alnFk + ik (6.3.33)
Substituting (6.3.33) into (6.3.32), I have
alnw~
alnFk
8 alnwi Õ
a In n 11 a In Fk + ik
+
alnFk S~ (6.3.34)
Substituting (6.3.29) into (6.3.34), I get
129
8 alnw~ s:II +uikaln w~ aln w~ b alnFk
a+ +alnFk alnFk S~
- alnw; ( 811 J b °ik
- a+- + +-
alnFk S~ S~
b °ik+-
S;
8111-a--
S;
bS; + 0ik
S~
S~ - aS~ -811
S~
bS; + 0ik
S~ (1- a) - 811
Substituting (6.3.35) into (6.3.29), I obtain
aln TC = bS~ + 0ik (a) + b = abS~+ aOi~ + bS~ - abS~ - b8ii
alnFk S~(1-a)-8ii S~(1-a)-8ii
_ aOik + bS~ - b8ii
S~ (1- a) - 811
(6.3.35)
(6.3.36)
On the other hand, differentiating (6.3.7) with respect to lnFk, I get:
as~ -8 af(wh,F,x~) °
alnFk - il alnFk + ik'
From (6.3.4), I know
af(wh,F,x~)
alnFk
alnw~
=
alnFk
wh =(w2'''wn), (6.3.37)
(6.3.38)
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Substituting (6.3.38) into (6.3.37) enables us to obtain:
as~1
alnFk
alnw~8.1 +Ù.k,1 alnFk i i=2,.....,n (6.3.39)
Substituting (6.3.35) into (6.3.39), we get
as~ = 8~I(bS~ +Ùik) +Ùik.
alnFk Si (1- a) - 811 (6.3.40)
Substituting (6.3.36) and (6.3.40) into (6.3.26), we derive the following elasticities
8il(bS~ +Ùik) +ù.
_ aÙ¡k +bS~ -b8ii S~(1-a)-8ii ikE¡k = _ + _Si(l-a)-8ii Si
= aÙ¡k + b(S~ -8¡J + 8¡iCbS~ +ùik) +~
S~(1-a)-8ii S~(S~(1-a)-8ii S~'
i=2,.....,n (6.3.41)
Similarly, the output supply elasticities with respect to input price i (çqJand
the output price(çqq)can also be obtained from the base formula (6.1.23) and
a~ n Wn n(6.1.29a). But the derivatives (1- ¿S~) and -(1- ¿S~)do not refer to
aln wh i=1 alnP i=1
(6.3.1), but (6.3.7).
131
6.3.5) The output (supply) elasticity with respect to input price i (Š~i)
Based on (6.1.23)
BIn nŠ~i =S~ + (1- LS~)
BIn wi h=1
BS~ +! BS~
= S~ _ BIn w¡ h=2 BIn w¡
, 1- !S~
h=l
From (6.3.17) and (6.3.18), I establish
BS~ _ 8 iS~ + (8li / S~)J 8
- hI _ + hi'Blnwi 1-(811/SI)
Substituting (6.3.44) into (6.3.43) gives me
i=2,.....,n
8. + ~18 iS~ +(8li /S~)J+8 ,;li ~ hI 1 _ (8 / S - ) hij: -. = S:- _ h-2 11 ISqi 1 n
1- LS~
h=1
(6.3.42)
(6.3.43)
(6.3.44)
(6.3.45)
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6.3.6) The output (Supply) price elasticity (Š~q)
Similarly, based on (6.1.26), the Š~q can be calculated
n
8In(l- IS~)
Š ~q = i 8 In 1t . 8 In W i + i h=2 8 In W ii=1 8ln wi 8lnP i=1 8ln wi 8lnP
n
n n 8ln(l- IS~)
= I -s~ + I h=2 (-1)i=1 i=1 alnwi
n n 8S-
n II h
= " -S: _ i=1 h=1 8ln wiL. i ni=1 1- IS~
h=1
Substituting (6.3.44) into (6.3.46), I obtain,
(6.3.46)
8S~ ~ 8S~ ~ 8S~ ~~t8 (S~ +(8Ii /S~)J 8 J
+ L. + L. 1 + L. L. hI - + hi
_ _ ~ _ _ _ 8 In W i h=2 8 In W i i=2 8 In W i i=2 h=2 1- (811 / Si )Šqq - L. Si ni=1 1- IS~
h=1
(6.3.47)
n n n n t (S:-+(81'/S~)J J
811 + I8hi + I8li + II 8hi 1_ i _ +8hi
= i -S~ _ h=2 i=2 i=2 h=2n 1 (811 / SI)i=1 1- IS~
h=1
(6.3.48)
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It is well known that the net substitution effect of changes in factor prices
("cost minimisation elasticities") can be expressed in terms of the difference
between the total effect and the expansion effect.
¡: H _ ¡: _ t iq . t qh
':ih - ':ih ¡:
':qq
(6.3.49)
Note thatt~ measures the net substitution effect (Hicksian elasticities), whereas
t ih , t iq , t qi and t qq are all Marshallan elasticities which have already been derived
above equations (6.3.19), (6.3.23), (6.3.45) and (6.3.48).
6.3.7) The elasticity for a change in quantity of output with respect to a change in
fixed factor (i: ~k) .
Again, (I:~k) can be obtained by differentiating (6.1.22) with respect to lnFk.
The derivation is shown in (6.1.31) as follows:
_ alnqI: - =qk - alnFk alnn +
alnFk ~ (- t as; ).
1- Is; i=1 alnFk
i=1
(6.3.50)
Substituting (6.3.36) and (6.3.40) into (6.3.50), I get
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_ alnq aO¡k + b(S~ - 811)E k = =q alnFk S~(l-a)-8ii ~ r 8~I(bS~ +O¡k) +O¡kJ (6.3.51)1- LS~ lsi (l-a)-8ii
¡=I
6.3.8) The elasticities for a change in quantity of unregulated inputs i with respect
to a change in regulated input x~ (E ~ _ ) :
, IXi
Recall (6.3.24), I already have
lnx¡ = Inn - In w¡ + In( -S~),
alnn
where -S~ = ,
alnw¡
i=2,......,n.
I can differentiate (6.3.24) with respect to lni:(~ and obtain
_ alnx¡ aln n aln( -S~)E = = +¡xi alnx~ alnx~ alnx~ (6.3.52)
= aln n (aln w~ ) + aln(-S~) . aln w~
aln w~ alnx~ aln w~ alnx~ (6.3.53)
From (6.L.5) and aln(-S~) = a(-S~)/alnw¡ = 8Haln w¡ (-S~) S~ (6.3.54)
I can simplify (6.3.53) as
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=S_(ainwIJ+~' alnw~i (6.3.55)
alnx~ Si alnx~
= alnw~ (S~ +~) (6.3.56)
alnx~ Si
To find aln w~ , I may differentiate (6.3.3) with respect to lnx~, which allows me
alnx~
to get
alnw~
alnx~
= a In n + a In( -S~) _ 1
alnx~ alnx~ (6.3.57)
= alnn . alnw~ + ain(-S~). alnw~ -1
alnw~ alnx~ alnw~ aln?,~ (6.3.58)
S b" aln(-S~) - 811, (6358)u stituting - - into .. .
aln w~ S~
alnw~
alnx~
alnn . alnw~ + 811 . alnw~ 1
alnw~ alnx~ S~ alnx~ (6.3.59)
Rearranging (6.3.59),
alnw~ = alnw~ ( alnn + 811)_1
alnx~ alnx~ aln w~ S~ (6.3.60)
Referring to (6.1.5),
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Blnn = S~ .
Blnwi (6.3.61)
Substituting (6.3.61) into (6.3.60), I obtain
BIn w~ = BIn w~ (S- + 811) -1.
Blnx~ Blnx~ i S~ (6.3.62)
So, Blnw~ =
Blnx~
-1
1-S- _ 811I s-
I
=
1
811 +S- -1'
S- iI
(6.3.63)
Substituting (6.3.63) into (6.3.56), I get
S- 8i!+~i S:-
8~ _ = iIXI 8
.- + S- -1S- iI
(6.3.64)
6.1.9) The Marshallng elasticity for a change in the quantity of output with a
change in regulated input, i.e. 8 - _ :
qx¡
Consider (6.1.22), I can obtain the following relationships
~ Blnn
In q = In n + In(1- L. )
i=1 Blnw¡
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n= Inn + In(l- ¿S~)
;=1
(6.3.65)
_ alnq8 =qxj alnx~ =
alnn alnw~
+
aln w~ alnx~ : (-:t as~ _)1- ¿S~ ;=1 alnxi
;=1
(6.3.66)
From (6.3.66), I can further develop
=S-. alnw~ +i alnx~ : (-:t as~ _ . a In w~ )
1- ¿S~ ;=1 aln wi alnxi
;=1
(6.3.67)
alnw~
=
alnx~
S- + 1 (_ ~ as~ )I n LJ ai -
1- ¿S~ ;=1 nwi
;=1
(6.3.68)
Substituting (6.3.63) into (6.3.68), we finally have
_ 18 =qxj eii
-+S- -1s- iI
n
¿eil
s- _ ;=1I n
1- ¿S~
i=1
(6.3.69)
As mentioned in Squire (1994), the Marshallian demand for the rationed
inputs is invariant to the changes in the price of output or unregulated or regulated
inputs where the constraints is binding and this demand function is perfectly
inelastic and fixed, that is, Š~q = 0, Š;h = 0 and Š;I = o.
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To distinguish the price elasticities with rationing from those without
rationing, the differences depend on various parameter and variables, i.e., there is no
systematic relationship between these two types of elasticities. This conclusion is
quite different from that obtained by Samuelson and Pollak (1969) who argue that
the own price elasticities demand for commodity i with rationing is lower than those
without rationing.
6.4 Conclusion
In the first section of this chapter, I employ the standard approach to derive
the input demand functions and relevant elasticities from the tranlog profit equation.
However, this approach neglects the influence of rationing on the input demand
functions and price elasticities. Therefore, I developed a modification. To achieve
this task, I followed the concepts of virtual pricing 4eveloped by Neary and Roberts
(1980) and Squires(1994). This approach is better than the auxiliary constraint
approach because it allows the parameters of the constrained profit function to be
recovered from the unconstrained profit function. Thus, there is no need to know ex
ante whether there are input quantity restrictions upon output supply , factor
demand, and profitability for a profit maximising producer. I only need to estimate
the traditional tranlog profit function and then substitute the estimated parameters
into the formulae which are derived from the translog profit function that is
incorporated in the virtual prices for the rationed input.
By comparing the derived formulae of the elasticities with and without
rationing, I find that there is no systematic relationship between these two types of
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elasticities. This conclusion contrasts with the general assertion that the own price
elasticities of demand for commodity i with no rationing are larger than those with
rationing. As a fuher improvement, one can test which type of elasticity is more
appropriate for use with the Chinese data.
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Chapter 7: Empirical Findings
Having derived the elasticities with and without rationing in Chapter 6, this
chapter wil estimate them empirically and conduct energy policy analysis. In
section 7.1, the firm data set is outlined. Section 7.2 explains how the translog profit
equation is formulated and estimated with the firm data set. Then, the econometric
technique used in this par is discussed in section 7.3. Section 7.4 presents the
empirical findings. In this section, the estimated coefficients are substituted into the
formulae derived in Chapter 6, in order to obtain the elasticities with rationing and
without rationing. From the signs of the elasticities, the relationship between energy
and other inputs wil be examined, evaluating the effects of raising energy price
policy on the economy. Section 7.5 evaluates various policy options based on the
figures of energy forecasts obtained in Chapter 2 and 3 so as to acquire a more in-
depth understanding of the effect of high price policy on managing energy sector.
7.1 The Data Set
The data set comes from the survey administered by the State Statistical
Bureau. This is a joint project with the institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS), which is under a RSC grant co-ordinated by Prof. Y.Y
Kueh, Dean of Social Science, Hong Kong Lingnan College. The detailed
discussion on the data set can be found in Kueh et al. (1999).
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This data set is based on a medium-scale questionnaire survey of 300 large
and medium-size state-owned enterprises (SOEs) located in six major Chinese cities
(Beijing, Shenyang, Shanghai, Wuhan, Congqing and Guangzhou). The 300 sample
enterprises were chosen from the six major cities on a stratified random- sample
basis. They are representative of China's largest industrial conglomerates, which in
all, comprised some 2,006 so-called "large" and medium-scale" individual units
(1989). The 300 enterprises constitute a sample size of 15 percent of the six cities
combined. These cities were chosen not only for the regional variations which they
represented, but also for the different stages they represent in terms of the
implementation of economic reform.
The survey includes three sets of questionna,tes:
7.1.1) The Enterprise Balance Sheet Questionnaire
These questionnaires generate detailed statistical information relating to
output, sales, labour and material inputs, various factor prices (including profit
retention), taxes, losses, sources of capital supply, patterns of fund disbursement and
other financial aspects of the enterprises. Such information was used to examine the
changing degree of enterprise autonomy and to test the relative hardness of
enterprises' budget constraints under the impact of the reforms. The questionnaire
contained 114 items and was submitted to the 300 sample enterprises, to be filled by
the enterprise accountants. In response to each question, data were requested for
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every year from 1984 to 1988. In all, 205,200 observations were generated from the
Balance Sheet.
7.1.2) The Enterprise Director Questionnaire
This form contains 46 questions. It was designed to identifý and to assess the
goals, attitudes, motivation and behaviour of the directors or managers of the sample
enterprises. Questions relating to the administrative, environment and business
conditions surounding enterprises, as well as inter-enterprise co-operation, were
also included. The questionnaire was submitted to enterprise directors for their
personal attention: only one out of a total of 300 failed to respond. More than
13,754 observations were obtained from this survey.
7.1.3) The Enterprise Supervisory Bureau Questionnaire
The questions were administered to the heads of 64 industrial bureaux,
located in the six major cities: Beijing 11, Shanghai 10, Wuhan 11, Chongqing 13,
Guangzhou 8, and Shengyang 11. The Bureau survey provided basic information on
two important aspects of enterprise behaviour: first, the nature and degree of state
control, to which enterprise supervisory bureaux were subject; second, the means
whereby those bureaux sought to control the enterprises under their jurisdiction.
This questionnaire contained 11 questions and generated 704 observations.
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Incorporating the data from the three questionnaires, my data set covers 279
variables, including SOEs' incentives for reform policies, financial accounts and
information of prices, production and sales. It should, however, be noted that
complete figures are not available for all the data points. Since there were some
missing observations and miscoding in the surey, our finalised balanced data set
consists of only 225 firms over 1985-88.
7.2. Estimation of Translog Model
To estimate energy demand and to investigate the substitutability and the
complementarity among various inputs, the typical KLEM model developed by
Berndt and Wood (1975) is followed. Based on this model, it is assumed there exists
1in the Chinese manufacturing industry, a twice differentiable production fuction
relating the flow of gross output q to the services of four inputs: capital (K), labour
(L), energy(E), and all other intermediate materials(M). Corresponding to such a
production fuction there exists a profit function which reflects the underlying
production technology mentioned in Chapter Five.
As in many other related studies, capital is treated as fixed factor in this
modeL. On the other hand, to study the effect of labour input on output more
accurately, two components should be identified for it. One ofthem is the number of
labourer (named as 'labour') and the other one is the efforts of the labour input. In
this study, labour is also treated as fixed factor together with capital. This can be
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justified as follows. Since economic reform began in 1978, the Chinese authorities
have modified the management system of large and medium sized SOEs
continuously by introducing a series of management reforms, including the contract
management, the managerial responsibility system, the internal contract system and
the share-holding system for improving the performance of firms. Undeniably, these
reforms give the SOEs certain autonomy and working incentives, aimed at
improving their performance. However, there are stil some significant limits on
managerial authority. The managers of SOEs stil have to obtain approval for the
appointment and the discharge of key enterprise employees from factories, i.e., they
were not granted the right to fire and hire ordinary workersl. Therefore, labour is
viewed as a fixed factor of the SOE's. On the other hand, the 'efforts of labour
inputs' is obviously a variable factor. However, it cannot be measured, especially in
China, due to data availability. Therefore, this component is not included in my
model which may suffer from mispecification error.
U sing the data set mentioned in 7.1.1, this estimation is based on cross-
section study over four years.2 Therefore, it is not possible to introduce time trend
variables in the model and so technical progress is not captured in the estimation.
This problem is not overly serious, however, because the study covers only four
years. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that technical change over the
estimation period wil be insignificant.
i The labour contract system under which workers are hired for three years to five
years applies only to newly admitted workers. Indeed, almost 90% of workers in
Chinese state sectors are fixed workers with permanent job tenures(Keun Lee,1990).
2 The reasons for cross-sectional estimation wil be discussed in 7.3
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Following on the above discussion, the translog profit function (6.1.2) prior
to quantity constraints for the model becomes:
1 ( )2 1
lnn=uo +uE InwE +uM InwM +-8EE lnwE +-8EM lnwE lnwM2 21 1 ( )2
+-8MElnwMlnwE +-8MM lnwM +PLlnL+PKlnK2 2 .1 ( )2 1 ( )2 1 1
+ -PLL 1nL + -PKK InK + -PLK 1nL InK + -PKL InK 1nL2 2 2 2
+ 8EL In WE 1nL + 8ML In wM 1nL + 8EK In WE InK + 8MK Hi wM InK
(7.2.1 a)
where n is normalised profit defined as total revenue minus total costs of
variable inputs, WE and WM are prices of energy and material inputs normalised by
price of output. K and L are capital and labour which are treated as fixed factors. As
mentioned in chapter six, n, WE and WM are normali&ed by output price, P.
To ensure that the 'implicit' production function under the translog profit
model is well behaved, section (6.1.3) is followed, imposing 12 restrictions3 on the
coefficients of (7.2. la) i.e.,
8EM = 8ME, PLK = PKL' uE +uM = 1, 8EE +8ME = 0, 8EM +8MM = 0,
PK + PL = 1, PLL + PKK = 0, PLK + PKK = 0, 8 EL + 8 ML = 0, 8 EK + 8 MK = 0 ,
8EL +8EK = 0, 8ML +8MK = O.
3 As the three restrictions: 8EL + 8ML = 0, 8EK + 8MK = 0, 8EL + 8EK = 0, it
automatically imply 8ML + 8MK = O. Therefore, there are only 11 linearly
independent restrictions.
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The restricted version of (7.2 .1 a) thus becomes:
Inn = Uo + uE In WE + (1- uE)ln wM - ! SEM (In wEY + SEM In WE l~ wM2
-l.SEM(ln wMY + PL 1nL + (1- PL)lnK -l.PLK(lnLY2 2
1
- - PKL (In K) + PLK In L In K + 0EL In WE Ln L - 0EL In W M In L2
- 0EL In WE InK + 0EL In wM InK
(7.2.1b)
After rearranging, (7 .2.1 b) becomes,
L 1 2 1 2J(Inn - lnw M - InK) = u + u (Inw E - lnw M) + S EM lnw E lnw M - - (In WE) - - (In W M )o E 2 2
L li 2 1 2 J+ P (InL - InK) + P lnLlnK - -(InL) - -(InK)L LK 2 2
+ 0EL(In WE lnL- In wM 1nL - lnwE InK+ lnwM InK)
(7.2.lc)
In China, especially during the estimation period, 1985-88, material inputs
are more likely than energy to face quantity controls and rationing. It is because
China has been self-suffcient and even an exporter in energy (but not in materials)
in that 1985-884. As mentioned in Chapter One, the 'energy imbalance" problem
only started from 1992 and the data set for this model covers 85-88, before the
energy shortfall period. Hence, in this data set, the study ex-ante access quantity
4 During the estimation period 85-88 of the data set, total energy production exceeds
consumption and much more is exported than imported. For more information, refer
to China Statistical Year Book, 1990.
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constraints for material inputs, not for energy. However, the empirical findings can
also be projected to conduct energy policy analysis on energy imbalance.5
Following the process mentioned in Chapter six, a system of profit share
equations prior to quantity constraints derived from equation (7.2.1 a) subject to the
restrictions mentioned above are expressed as follows6:
-w E
SE = E =UE -8EMlnwE +8EMlnwM +oELlnL
1t
-w M
SM = il = (l-uE) + 8EM In WE -8EM lnwM -OEL 1nL
1t
(7.2.2a)
(7.2.2b)
To obtain the most efficient estimations, the normalised translog profit
equation (7.2.1c) and the system of variable factor demand (7.2.2a) and (7.2.2b) is
jointly estimated7 for E and M, by the seemingly unelated regression estimation
(SURE) technique (Zellner, 1962).8
5 This part wil be discussed in 7.25.
6 It is derived from equation (6.1.6)
7 One may directly estimate the translog profit function (7.1 c) but gains in efficiency
can be realised by estimating the restricted profit share equations which transform to
optimal, profit maximisation input demand equations. Similar arguments on the
translog cost function can be found in p.470 in Berndt (1991)
8 The joint estimation wil give more efficient parameters than sole estimation of the
share system. See Berndt (1991)
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7.3 Estimation of pooled data
This data set contains the pooling observations on 225 firms over 1985-88.
To estimate such a pooled data model, one may have to use the panel data method.
To construct a panel data regression, let us consider
Yit = x:tß + u¡t' i=I,2,......,N and t=I,2,......,T (7.3.1)
where N is the number of cross-section units (provinces) and T is the number of
time periods. ß is K x 1, Xit is a vector ofK explanatory variables. Modifying (7.3.1)
by introducing a time invariant term U¡ and an individual (firm) invariant effect Ât
into the equation, (7.3.1) becomes:
Y¡t = x:tß + U¡ + Ât + E¡t ; (7.3.2)
where U¡ accounts for any individual (firm) specific effect that is not
1
included in the regression, whereas Ât accounts for the time specific effect that is not
included in the regression. E¡t, as the remaining disturbance varying with individuals
and time, can be thought of as the usual stochastic disturbance in the regression. In
other words,
u¡t = U¡ + Ât + E¡t; E¡t -iid (0, 0';) (7.3.3)
There are two possible approaches to estimate (7.3.3). One of them is a
'random effects' model which occurs when each firm has its individual(firm) and
time specific disturbances; U¡ and Ât are treated as random disturbances i.e. U¡ - iid
(0, O'~) and Ât -iid (0, O'~), where u¡ are independent of the E¡t and Xit are
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independent of ai and Eit for all i and t. These assumptions are sufficient for OLS
to be asymptotically unbiased. OLS is not efficient, however, because the standard
errors associated with the OLS wil be understated (Johnston, 1997). Instead, the
Feasible Generalised Least-Squares (GLS) procedure is introduced to obtain
efficient estimation.
Alternatively, a 'fixed effects' model occurs when both the firm and time
specific effects are invariant, i.e., ai and Àt are now treated as constant. Under such
an assumption, (7.3.2) can be rewritten as:
Yit = alDli +.... + anDln + ÀiDTi +.... + ÀTDTT + X;tß + Eit (7.3.4)
where Dlj's are firm specific dummy variables which take a value of 1 for j
firm and 0 elsewhere and DTk's are time specific,'dummy variables which take a
value of 1 for k period and 0 elsewhere. This equation can be estimated by OLS.9
In comparing these two approaches, Mundlak (1978) argues that we should
always treat the individual effects as random. The fixed effects model is analysed
conditionally on the effects present in the observed sample. One can argue that
certain institutional factors or characteristics of the data argue for one or the other,
but unfortunately, this approach does not always provide much guidance. From a
practical standpoint, the dummy variable approach is costly in terms of degrees of
freedom lost. On the other hand, the fixed effects approach has one considerable
virtue. There is no justification for treating the individual effects as uncorrelated
9 This model is usually referred as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) modeL.
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with the other regressors, as is assumed in the random effects modeL. The random
effects treatment, therefore, may suffer from the inconsistency due to omitted
variables. 
10
Therefore, from the literature, there is no consensus as to which method is
preferred. i I Indeed, recent studies find that neither the fixed effects estimator nor the
random effects estimator is perfect. As revealed from the literature on union wage
effects, although the evidence suggests random effects estimators generally lead to
upward-biases, fixed effects procedures generally produce downward-biased
estimates. 
12
However, the model used here is not estimated by the above-mentioned
methods, because there may be continuous structure changes over the estimation
period. Since the Third Plenum of the 12th CCP C~ntral Committee held in 1984,
the governent has adopted sequential economic structure reform policies, which
involve modifying the relationship between the formulation of planning and the
power to operate production, the power to distribute profits, the power to allocate
funds, the power to assign labour and the power to manage personneL. These
continuously shifting industrial policies may induce changes in parameters from
time to time. Hence, our estimation should allow the slope parameters to vary over
timel3. Therefore, (7.3.2) should be modified as
10 See Hausman Taylor (1981) and Chamberlain (1978).
11 For more detailed on this argument, one may refer Johnston and Dirardo (1997)
and Greene (1997).
12 Johnston and Dinardo (1997)
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Yit = X¡t(ß +Õt) + U¡ + Ât + V¡/4
(7.3.5)
In comparing to (7.3.5), it is obvious that the use of the time-invariant parameters
method as given by (7.3.2) wil lead to a heteroscedastic regression i.e. 8it = XitÕt +
Vit, where õt is random and independent of X¡t and Ui. Therefore, the time varying
heteroscedasticity remains. This affects the efficiency and consist~ncy of parameters
although the typical time-invariant panel estimators (7.3.2) can remove the
individual heterogeneity by transforming data or by introducing time dummies.
Nevertheless, this problem can be solved by estimating the model year by
year. This method can measure time varying parameters. Under this method, model
(7.3.2) is modified into:
Yit = x¡t(ß +õt) + Ât+ Vit. (7.3.6)
Hence, this method wil give the correct estimate of the coeffcient vector (ß
+Õt). In comparison to (7.3.5), although this cross-section study can identify Ât15, it
cannot account for the effects of Ui.16 Nevertheless, this is not a serious problem,
because all the firms contained in our data set are SOEs, which have similar
structure and the problems they face are more or less the same. Thus, the individual
13 For detailed discussion on this issue, refer to Bell and Ritchie (1996).
14Note that Â.t only captures time-invariant individual differences. The mean
coeffcient vector stil is constant over time and individuals.
15 It is identified by the intercept of each cross-section study.
16 Of course, one may estimate more general model (7.3.5). However, I need to
estimate SURE modeL. Unfortunately, it seems to be non-existent for SURE in
applied work for (7.3.5).
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effect (Xi changes little across various enterprises. On the contrary, the continuous
reform policies imposed on them has been changing over time. Therefore, variation
over time is relatively more significant than variation over individual firms. As
mentioned in Bell and Ritchie (1996), cross section estimates under this situation
may be more efficient than panel estimates. Such a cross-section study has the
advantage that the changing structure of the model can be examined, despite the
inefficiency and estimation bias probably arising from the inabilty of cross-sections
to remove individual heterogeneity. In addition, this approach has yet another
advantage, in that even if poor estimates may occur in one year, the estimates for
other years are not necessarily affected. Thus, it is appropriate for us to use (7.3.6)
to estimate this data set.
7.4 Empirical Results
7.4.1) Estimation of Translog and Profit Share Equations
To obtain the estimates of the KLEM model over time- each of which
consists of one profit equation (7.2.1c) and two share equations (7.2.2a) and
(7.2.2b)- I group the four years model together as 4x3 (i.e.12) seemingly unrelated
equations (SURE). The resulting estimators are more effcient than OLS estimation
over four years, because this method makes use of the information from the cross-
equation correlation among regression residuals over time.
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In order to confirm whether the data set is appropriate for modellng
changing coefficients, a test for the stability of parameters was performed. The Chi-
square test statistic is 49.56 and the hypothesis of time varying parameters is not
rejected at one- percent significance level with 18 degrees of freedom. The
estimating results are reported in Table 7.1.
As presented in Table 7.1, the parameters are, in generaly correctly signed.
That is, the estimated shares for fixed inputs must be positive, while for the variable
inputs case (i.e. input prices) must be negative17. This fulfils one of the regularity
conditions for a normalised restricted profit function to reflect well-behaved
production structures. Besides, most of the parameters are significant and the R 2 of
the restricted translog profit equations are quite high for the period 1985-8818.
17 As the shares (Si) in the estimation are defined as -wixi17t, the estimated
coeffcients shown in table 7.1 are presented in opposite signs.
18 Normally, the R2 of the cross section data is much lower than that for the time
series.
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Table 7.1: Time Varing Parameters Of Translog and Profit Share Function
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistics
1985 ao .8330 .3479 2.3946**
aE .9800 .0482 20.3199**
aEM .0168 .0067 2.5145**
PL .6080 .1690 3.5984**
PLK -.0594 .0406 -1.4654
°EL .0176 .0124 1.4163
R2 -0.84
-2 -2RSE = 0.03 RSE = 0.03
1986 ao .8726 .4004 2.179**
aE 1.0224 .0481 21.2489**
aEM .0162 .0060 2.6890**
PL .6721 .1905 3.5287**
PLK -.0732 .0449 -1.6296
°EL .0267 .0120 2.2202**
-2 -2 -2Rn =0.86 RSE =0.03 RSM = 0.02
1987 ao .6921 .4548 1.5217
aE 1.0311 .0549 18.7963**
aEM .0128 .0064 1.9854
PL .6219 .2070 3.0042**
PLK -0.0664 .0469 -1.4161
°EL .0226 .0133 1.7035
-2 -2 -2Rn =0.88 RSE =0.04 ' RSM =0.01
1988 ao .3762 .5539 .6791
aE 1.1609 .0686 16.8303**
aEM .0195 .0083 2.3463**
PL .4846 .2450 1.9780**
PLK -.0370 .0534 -.69279
°EL .0568 .0159 3.5663**
-2 -2 -2Rn =0.90 RSE =0.06 RSM = 0.01
Notes:
(1): The R 2 of the equations of SE and SM are small because the dependent variables
are the ratios of two variables (i.e. SE and SM on this model).
(2): **/* denote that the parameter is statistically significant at the 1% / 5%
significance respectively.
(3): The estimation are based on the Young theorem and under the restrictions on
parameters as expressed by (6.1.3), i.e.,
8MB = 8EM PKL = PLK' aM = 1- aE, 8EE = -8 EM , 8MM = -8EM, PK = 1- PL
PLL = -PLK' PKK = -PLK' 0EK = -OEL' oMl = 0EL' 0ML = -OEL
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Table7.3 Tests for rationing versus for no-rationing
E,EE E,EM EEL EEK E,EQ E,QE E,QM E,QQ EQL EQK
1985 x2 5,8764 6403. 0.0287 11.89 6.3752 5.8764 5162 5.8764 2.6735 1.4232
Pv 0.0154 0.0000 0.8653 0.0007 0.0116 0.0153 0.0000 0.0154 0,1020 0.2329
1986 x2 6.8011 1083 0.0881 12.440 7.2860 6.8011 8852 6.8011 3.1440 2.0041
Pv 0.0091 0.0000 0.7667 0.0004 0.0070 0.0091 0.0000 0.0091 0.0762 0.1569
1987 x2 3.7562 9567. 0.2191 7.767 3.9650 3.7562 8278 3.7562 2.2849 1.791
Pv 0.0526 0.0000 0.6397 0.0053 0.0465 0.0526 0.0000 0.0526 0.1306 0.2089
1988 x.2 5.1119 5557. 0.2864 10.761 5.5545 5.1119 4984 5.1120 0.6573 0.2593
Pv 0.0238 0.0000 0.5926 0.0010 0.0184 0.0238 0.0000 0.0238 0.4175 0.6106
Note: X2 and Pv denote Chi square value and P-value respectively.
Table 7.4: Hicksian energy price elasticities and the ~xpansion effectsl9
Estimates Standard Error t-Statistics
1985 Scale Effect -.2670 .0036 -74.9745***
Hicksian Elasticities -.8201 .0456 -17.9779***
1986 Scale Effect -.2860 .0029 -98.0346***
Hicksian Elasticities -.831326 .0379 -21.9205***
1987 Scale Effect -.2818 .0031 -90.9362***
Hicksian Elaticities -.8539 .0405 -21.0917***
1988 Scale Effect -.2775 .0040 -69.5071 ***
Hicksian Elasticities -.8105 .0537 -15.0923***
Note: *** denotes that the expansion effect and Hicksian Elasticity are statistically
significant at the 1 % significance levels.
19 As capital and labour are treated as fixed factor whereas material input is chosen
as rationed factor, the Marshallian and Hicksian own price elasicities of variable
inputs and scale effect remain for energy only.
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7.4.2) The Elasticities
Substituting the estimates of table 7.1 and the formulae derived in section
(6.1) and (6.3), the elasticities of no rationing and under rationing can be obtained.20
The results are reported in Table 7.2A and 7.2B respectively.
Comparing the Table 7.2A and 7.2B, the signs of estimaten price elasticities
under rationing and no rationing are generally the same (except Emk in 1988). Hence,
it seems that there is no great difference in policy implication. All the magnitudes of
elasticities with rationing, however, are lower than without. Moreover, we have
tested whether the elasticities have been significantly altered by the imposition of a
quantity rationing for material inputs on the firms. Table 7.3 supports the hypothesis
that rationing should be taken into account in measuring the input prices elasticities.
In other words, if rationing is not considered in estimating price elasticities, the
1
effects of the changes in prices wil be exaggerated21.
Table 7.2A shows that the calculated elasticities of the input demand (energy
input) with respect to the changes in fixed factor (K & L) and in rationed inputs (M)
are correctly positive signed. Furhermore, as reported in Table 7.4, the net energy
price effect (Hicksian elasticity) and the scale effect are negatively signed, the sum
of the two effects (Marshallan elasticity) also is negative. This means that when
energy price increases, the profit maximising firm alters its input mix and technical
substitution wil force the firm to employ less energy to produce the same output
20 Since there are no time trends in our models, ST' SIT' SET' SMT' ~LT and ~KT are
treated as zero in calculating the elasticities.
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level i.e., along the same isoquant. On the other hand, higher energy prices wil lead
the SOEs to produce less output. Since energy is a normal input, energy use wil be
further reduced. This trend coincides with what was mentioned in section 5.3, that
the net substitution and expansion effects always move in the same direction.
7.5 Analyses of the Findings and Policy Implications
7.5.1) Complementarity/Substitutability Among Various Factors
As reported in Table 7.2, the empirical results seem to suggest that energy
and capital are complementary.22 There are three possible explanations for this
result. First, before economic reform in 1979, the depreciation rate was set by the
governent at a rather low level, averaging at 5% (lVang, 1991). This low rate leads
low levels of investment in replacing capital and so a huge amount of over-utilised
capital goods are accumulated. In addition, a low depreciation rate implies low cost
(opportunity cost) of using capitaL. As a result, SOEs are encouraged to employ the
'over-utilsed' capital to produce goods and services. This situation resulted in low
marginal product of capital (MPK)23 and high capital-output ratios that persisted,
even in the beginning of the reform. Therefore, when energy prices increased,
capital was not worth to keeping and so firms employed less capital i.e., K-E are
complementary. Second, in practice, it is not easy to change equipment and there is
21 Further discussion wil be presented later.
22 Although the K-E elasticities are not significant over 1985-87, but the elasticity is
significant in 1988.
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a relatively long adjustment period to replace the existing capitaL. That is, even if
energy prices increase, firms stil have to employ the energy-consuming machines,
because they can not be immediately replaced by the energy saving capitaL. Thus,
the firms are forced to reduce the use of energy and capital and so generate the
present E-K complementarity24. Third, in the past, industrial policy was to
emphasise the development of the heavy industry25. Most SOEs in China, therefore,
produced heavy industrial output which normally is energy intensive. Moreover, a
low energy price has encouraged SOEs to employ energy-consuming production
technology. As a result, the energy intensity (energy consumed per unit of output)
is high, especially for the low MPK products. Therefore, the more capital employed,
the more energy is consumed, implying capital-energy complementary.
On the other hand, our empirical findings show energy-labour elasticity is
not significant, i.e., they are neither complementary; nor substitutive. This finding is
different from what Wiliams & Laumas (1981) found in India. The authors found
energy-labour complementary, in a country, which also has a huge population. This
finding may reflect the low productivity of labour. China is a country with a large
population and one ofthe main objectives of the state-owned enterprises is to absorb
all the labour6. Therefore, labour is abundant and a large amount of repressed
unemployment occurs. Moreover, most of the workers are not well educated, or
23 This can also be revealed from Table 7.2A, which shows that elasticities of output
to capital are small and generally insignificant.
24 For more detail discussion on this issue, please refer to Norsworthy and Harer
(1981).25 In my data set, 31 % of SOEs produce consumer goods whereas 69% of the firms
produce producer goods.
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trained for their jobs (Gordan and Li, 1995). In addition, the Iron Rice Bowl System
(Permanent Employment System) in SOEs leads to poor performance, because
under this system, workers have job security which guarantees them the right to
share without having to put in additional work. In contrast, a working harder person
receives little additional benefit because of lack of additional remuneration when
one tries to work harder. Therefore, workers have no need to work hard (Chow,
1993), resulting in low motivation, poor labour quality and low labour
productivity.27 On the other hand, as mentioned above, heavy industrial output
comprises a large percentage of total industrial output. Therefore, to produce the
same output level, an increase in labour can not compensate for the reduction in
capital and energy in producing capital and energy intensive products. i.e., there is
no obvious relationship between energy and labour.
Moreover, energy-material inputs complementarity also is found in this
study. This finding can be explained similarly by the low productivity in first few
years of the economic reform. In view of the magnitudes, as revealed in Table 7.2A,
the elasticities of energy consumed response to capital, labour and material inputs
are smaller than 0.8. This may reflect that the underlying production technology is
inflexible for the substitution of one input into the other inputs over the estimation
period.
26 Most SOEs have three important goals: maximising profit, generating
employment, and increasing wage above the competitive (market-clearing) level in
the economy. For more details, please refer to Chan and Lee (1998).
27 Those problems stil occurred even at the beginning of the reforms.
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7.5.2) Policy Implications
The above findings of K-E, M-E complementarity imply that high energy
price wil not only reduce capital formation, but also reduce the uses of material
inputs. Therefore, raising the energy price wil generate contractionary effects on
economic growth,28 2gexplaining why the price elasticities of output in Table 7.1A is
negative. It is noteworthy to mention that if the governent enforces hiring, there
wil be no effect on labour employment, because the energy-labour elasticity is
statistically insignificant. As the energy price elasticity is about -1.1 and elasticity
of output to the change in energy price is close to -0.22, reducing energy demand by
higher prices may cause reductions in energy consumption and output by 1.1 % and
0.22% respectively. According to the forecast made in Chapters Two and Three, the
predicted demands in 2000 and 2010 are 1,420 and 2,010 Mtce, while supply is
forecasted to be 1,370 and 1,826 Mtce respectively. In order to balance the future
energy demand and supply in 2000 and 2010, China has to reduce energy demand
anually by 1.202% and 0.706% respectively30. If this reduction is to be achieved by
imposing higher energy prices, given that the energy price elasticity under rationing,
ç EE is -1.088, the energy price has to increase by 0.9463% and 0.649%
28 This implication of findings is similar to the explanation of world recession
especially in western economies arisen from energy crisis in 1970's.29 Note that Section 2.2 mentions that the increases in energy prices cause
consumption efficiency and helps reduce the energy shortfall. This finding neglects
the effects of high-energy prices to the output and this is the limitation of the
qualitative analysis.
30 Assuming that the official forecasts of energy supply remain unchanged and so, to
reduce the energy imbalance, the authority has to cut the demand.
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respectively31. On the other hand, since E, QE equals -2.029, the country wil need to
pay the cost of a fall in its economic growth rate of output by 0.192 and 0.132%
respectively.
Instead of increasing the energy prices, there are three other alternative
policies, as shown in Table 7.5 that could close the energy gap completely.32 First,
the authority can mitigate the energy sector in 2000 and 2010 by decreasing supply
in material inputs by 1.332% and 0.913% respectively. This approach may slow
down the output growth, however, by 0.998% and 0.685%. Second, the governent
may reduce output price in order to mitigate the shortfall by 0.237% and 0.162%.
respectively; but the country in turn wil suffer from a negative growth rate of
output by 0.753% and 0.516%, respectively. Third, the governent can reduce the
use of capital by 2.797% and 1.918%, which may also alleviate the excess demand
in 2000 and 2010. As the output-capital elasticity i1s insignificant, however, such a
change wil not have a deteriorating effect on output33. All of these results are
presented in Table 7.5.
In order to reduce the energy imbalance, it has been suggested that China
should implement a high energy pricing policy, so that the economy wil reduce the
use of capital goods and encourage firms to employ labour-intensive production
31 The calculations are based on the energy price elasticities of energy and output in
1988 and assuming that they remind unchanged over the forecast period.
32 Use the relevant elasticities of 1988 depicted in Table 7.2A and assume that the
elasticities remain the same in 2000 and 2010.
33 As mentioned above, a lot of capitals in SOEs are over utilised, which results in
very low marginal product. Therefore, in the short ru, a small reduction in capital
may not reduce output growth. However, over the long run, if capital inputs
decrease continuously, output growth wil fall eventually.
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techniques. This policy, therefore, wil allow the economy to absorb surplus labour
and also to reduce energy imbalance in the near future. Although this approach
seems sensible, our findings do not support this strategy, because higher energy
prices wil lead to a lower employment of both capital and material inputs. Thus the
growth rate of output wil be reduced although there is a stimulatory effect on labour
employment. Alternatively, the findings also can be explained by insignificant
energy-labour elasticities. Since China has a lot of redundant workers in state-
owned enterprises and their labour productivity inevitably is low, it is not easy to
use labour to substitute for energy use.
As mentioned above, in order to close the domestic energy imbalance
completely, one can increase energy prices. When price elasticities are negative,
however, output wil be reduced, because capital and material are complements of
energy and labour can not substitute for energy. As a result, output elasticity of
energy price also is negative. Alternatively, to avoid the trade off between output
and energy shortfall, the governent may implement energy price changes
concurrently with other exogenous policy changes, which are named as A, Band C.
For policy option A, the governent may change the level of employment of
material inputs and energy prices concurrently, so that the energy imbalance can be
closed completely by 2000. To do that, the energy consumption must be reduced by
1.2% annually. Under this requirement, we can write,
SEE * % !1we +EEM * % !1M=-1.2 (7.5.1a)
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In the above, (ç EE * % ß WE) is the percentage change in energy consumption
resulting from one percent change in energy prices. (8 EM * % ßM) is the percentage
change in energy consumption per one percent change in material inputs.
On the other hand, changes in energy prices and inputs of material wil influence
the level of output. If the target output growth rate is set at zero, the resulting
equation should be:
ÇQE * % ßWE + 8QM * % ßM=O, (7.5.1b)
where (ÇQE *%ßWE) is the percentage change in output resulting from one percent
change in energy prices and (8 EM *%ßM) is the percentage change in output per one
percent change in material inputs.
We can substitute the calculated elasticities under rationing for year 1988,
(7.4. la) and (7.4.lb); the resulting equations wil become:
-1.088*% ßWE + 0.7738* % ßM = -1.2
-0.2029* % ßWE + 0.7497* % ßM=O
(7.5.2a)
(7.5.2b)
After solving (7.4.2a) and (7.4.2b) simultaneously, the optimal rate of energy
price and material inputs changes can be calculated, which are 1.173 and 0.317
respectively. Similarly, the equations for policy option B, which combines the
changes in the input level of capital and energy prices are:
ÇEE * % ßWE +8EK * % ßK=-1.2 (7.5.3a)
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ÇQE * % b.WE+ EQK * % b.K=O (7.5.3b)
where ( E EK * % b.K) is the percentage change in energy consumption resulting
from one percent change in capital input. (E QK * % b.K) is the percentage change in
output per one percent change in capital input.
For policy option C, output prices are changed concurrently with energy price
changes, The corresponding equations should be:
ÇEE *% b.WE + ÇEQ * % b.P = -1.2 (7.5.4a)
ÇQE *% b.WE + çQQ * % b.P=O (7.5.4b)
where (s EQ * % b.P) is the percentage change in energy consumption resulting
from one percent change in output price. (s QQ * % b.P) is the percentage change in
output per one percent change in output price.
Under the assumption that domestic energy supply and demand must be
balanced in 2010, energy consumption should be reduced by 0.706% annually. The
optimal policy options also can be obtained by solving (7.5.la and b), (7.5.3a and b)
and (7.5.4a and b) individually. The only change is replacing -1.2 (%) by -0.706 (%)
in the three equation systems. The solutions of those equations of policy options A,
Band C for 2000 and 2010 are presented in Table 7.6.
As shown in Table 7.6, all three policy options seem to be feasible, because
they only require slight changes in the policy variables. If governent wants to
167
achieve domestic energy supply-demand balance and the output growth of 2.8%34,35
simultaneously, however, Table 7.736 suggests that firms wil have to decrease the
use of capital considerably.37 Indeed, output growth wil reduce inevitably if capital
Ìnputs keep increasing. It is impossible, therefore, to choose option A. Should firms
currently increase either the uses of material inputs or output prices as formulated in
Band C, however, the energy prices need to increase concurently by roughly 20%.
Table 7.5: The Effects of Changes in Policy Variables on Output (Single
Instruent)
Target: No Energy Imbalance in the Target Year
Target Year: 2000 Target Year: 2010
Policy Output Policy Output
Variable Effect Variable Effect
WE 0.9463 -0.192 0.649 -0.132
K -2.797 0 -1.918 0
M -1.332 -0.998 -0.913 -0.685
P -0.237 -0.753 1 -0.162 -0.516
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
'+' denotes ecrease', whereas '-' denotes ncrease'.
All figures in the Table are measured in % change.
Labour policy is not available here because E EL is not significant.
The output effect is zero because E QK is insignificant.
34 This figure, obtained by averaging output growth of the SOEs over 1985-88, is
much less than the average growth rate of national Ìncome which is around 10 %. It
is because as mentioned in Section 2.3, the efficiency of state own enterprises is
poor.
35 Note that as energy are complementary to the non-energy inputs in this study, an
increase in energy prices wil reduce the uses of energy as well as other non-energy
inputs, which wil result in a lower output. Therefore, to increase output, other
inputs must be raised by other policies concurrently with high energy prices.
36 The calculation procedures are basically the same as Table 7.6 except the right-
hand side value becomes '2.8' instead of'O' in 7.4.1b, 7.4.3b and 7.4.4b.
37Labour employment policy is not valid because L-E elasticity is not significant.
Moreover, 'Note 33' gives the explanation why output growth does not deteriorate
from a reduction in capital use.
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Table 7.6: Two Instruent Policy Options (No Trade-Off)
Target: Energy Balance and Zero Growth of Output
Policy Option Policy Variables Target Year: 2000 Target Year: 2010
A WE 1.173 0.804
M 0.317 0.218
.
B WE 0 0
K -2.797 -1.918
C WE 1.271 0.872
P 0.0811 0.056
Notes:
1. The notes are the same as the notes 1-3 in Table 7.5.
2. Since the target output growth rate is zero, given t EQ is insignificant, solely
reduce the use of capital input is enough to decrease energy consumption and so
energy prices (WE) need not change in policy option B. For further explanation,
please refer to 'Note 33'
Table 7.7: Two Instruent Policy Options (2.8% Output Growth)
Target: No Imbalance and 2.8% Growth
Policy Policy Variables Target Year: 2000 Target Year: 2010
Options
A WE 21.063 20.695
M 4.943 4.843
B WE 2.8 2.8
K -43.564 -42.685
C WE 22.598 22.599
P 1.263 1.263
Notes: thenotes are the same as the notes 1-3 in Table 7.5.
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In summary, since energy price elasticity of output is negative, whereas
material inputs and price elasticities of output are positive, if the governent
changes only one policy instrument at a time, irrespective as to whether we (i)
increase energy prices, (ii) decrease material inputs or (iii) decrease output prices to
achieve energy supply-demand balance, the economy may suffer from negative
output growth. Also, our findings show that the estimated energy price elasticities of
labour and labour elasticity of output are insignificant.
It is not surprising as we have mentioned above, that there are so many
redundant workers in Chinese state-owned enterprises, resulting in low labour
productivity. Therefore, the scope for labour to substitute for energy use is not large.
On the other hand, since the capital elasticity of output is insignificant, there wil be
no contractionar effect on output growth, if the governent wants to mitigate the
shortfall gap by reducing the use of capitaL. However, note that capital cannot
. 1
decrease persistently or else output growth wil fall ultimately. If the governent
wants to increase output by 2.8%38 annually and achieve energy balance by high
energy pricing policy, in the short run, it needs to either (i) increase the use of
material inpiits, (ii) reduce capital use, or (iii) raise output price.
After evaluating these three policy options, the second option found to be
not feasible, because the reduction in capital is too large. Alternatively, if either
material inputs or output prices are increased, the above targets can be achieved by
increasing energy prices by more than 20%. Under this situation, raising energy
prices becomes a desirable policy, especially, because energy in China stil is under-
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priced.39 It should be noted, however, that after the substantial rises in energy prices
in the early 1990s, there might be no room left for large increases, thus the positive
effects on output wil be limited.
Besides, as revealed in Table 7.7, policy option C wil induce annual
inflation. Although the magnitude is not very large (about 1.2 %), this side effect
should not be ignored, because it may cause spiral inflation,tspecially during
inflationary periods. For policy option A, to achieve the target of growth and energy
balance, material inputs have to increase more than 4.8 %. As there was a shortfall
of material inputs until recently, this policy wil induce an increase in imports and
so deteriorate the trade balance, resulting in negative effects on balance of payments
and foreign reserves. Therefore, as China is a developing country, the governent
should consider carefully the effects of increasing energy prices. Instead, if the
labour productivity can be improved, the labour out~ut signed and labour becomes a
substitute for energy, then the country is strongly recommended to introduce high
energy price policy. This is not only reduces future energy demand, but also
increase labour employment.
38 As depicted before, the average real growth rate of SOEs is only 2.8% over the
estimation period since the effciency of SOEs is generally poor.
39 However, the energy prices need to increase concurently with either exogenous
policy changes.
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7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the data set, estimation of the translog profit function and the
econometric technique in use were discussed. The empirical findings suggest that
time varing approach is more appropriate than the time invariant approach.
In general, the estimation results are satisfactory. Based on the estimated
coefficients and the formulae derived in Chapter 6, various elasticities can be
calculated. After testing, it was found that the elasticities with rationing is more
appropriate with China data set. Besides, the findings show that there are
complementar relationships between energy and capital as well as material inputs,
and no significant relationship between energy and labour, over the estimation
period.
Comparing the predicted future demand ancl supply obtained in Chapters 2
and 3 respectively, imbalances are likely to intensify in 2000 and in 2010. Our
findings show that except for decreasing the use of capital, increasing in energy
prices, reducing supply of materials and output price are not appropriate to narrow
the energy shortfall because these three policies wil deteriorate the rate of output
growth. Moreover, unless energy-labour are significant substitutes, encouraging
firms to employ labour intensive techniques stil canot alleviate energy imbalance.
To avoid the adverse effects on output growth, the governent has
suggested to implementing two instruments simultaneously, rather than exclusively
use single instrument. If the government not only aims at reducing energy shortfall,
but also wishes SOEs maintain a 2.8 percent of average growth rate over the
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estimation period, capital inputs has to be reduced by over 40 percent. This option
does not seem to be viable. Alternatively, firms may raise energy prices by over 20
percent if they concurrently increase either output price, or the use of material
inputs. However, the increase in energy prices may cause spiral and adverse effects
on balance of payments and foreign reserves. Therefore, the governent should take
all these factors into account prior to raising energy prices. Alternatively, the
improvement in productivity- not only in capital, but also in labour, energy and
material inputs-may be the most important task that the governent aims to achieve.
..
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
This chapter summarises the main conclusions of the thesis, which has concentrated on
exploring
1) China's ability to handle energy imbalance,
2) the predicted size of the energy deficit,
3) the role of government energy pricing policies in China.
I deal with each of these in turn.
8.1 Assessment of China's abilty to handle the energy Constraint.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, after the economic reform of 1979 China started
to experience high economic growth and so energy demand increased drastically. As a
result, China faces the challenge of an energy bottleneck, which must be overcome in
order to sustain continued economic growth and to improve fuher the living standards
of its people. In order to overcome this problem, the governent has initiated a number
of policies, such as the development of small coal mines, the rapid build up of
electricity generation capacity, adjusting prices, i.e., raising the planned prices to
international market levels and the improvement in energy consumption effciency.
These policies have been quite successful in mitigating a widening gap.
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As the country is expected to grow relentlessly over the next few decades, China
stil needs to confront a number of future problems, although the deficit has largely
been kept to a manageable level over the last few years. First, the oil deficit is growing.
Second, coal supply is uncertain, especially since importance of small coal mines is
expected to decline in the twenty-first century. Third, the shares of state investment in
both the energy sector and the coal industry have been declining 'drastically. Fourth,
there has been only little progress in reforming state-owned enterprises. Last, regional
imbalances are intensifying.
In view of the above, the growth rate of energy supply is unlikely to catch up
with demand; the shortfall gap, therefore, is expected to become bigger over time. In
order to manage the problem, China must initiate polices that address both the supply
and demand sides of the energy sector. On the supply 'side, efforts should be intensified
1
towards discovering new oil fields. In addition, the governent should strengthen its
role in the coal industry, by increasing its investment in state mines. To generate
enough funding for investment, the governent needs to reform its existing polices on
such sectors as state-owned enterprises, financial markets and foreign investment. On
the demand side, energy demand can be reduced by increasing the effciency of
consumption, particularly of heavy energy users, by rationalising the economic
structure and by raising the scale of production of small firms.
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8.2 Predicting the Size of the Deficit.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, China's energy production has
increased less than its consumption, the energy sector has changed from a situation
where production exceeds consumption to the one where consumption exceeds
production. Due to the availabilty of data related to energy supply~ this thesis focuses
mainly on issues relating to energy demand management. To accomplish this task, it is
necessar to forecast future energy demand. As a first step, the energy consumption
behaviour of China is analysed. In contrast to previous studies, this analysis is based on
cointegration and vector error-correction techniques because they can solve two
econometric problems that were frequently encountered in earlier econometric studies.
The first is spurious regression, which arises when variables that are driven by time
trends may appear to be correlated in finite sample regression, even though there is no
true relationship among them. The second concerns the fact that many explanatory
variables in energy demand equation, such as income and price, are likely to be
endogenous and so estimating energy demand by a single equation may produce
simultaneous bias, producing unreliable forecasts.
In formulating a model suitable to China, it is found that not only such
conventional variables as energy price and income are important but that also the share
of heavy industry output in the national income plays a significant role. On the basis of
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a vector error-correction model, it was predicted that China wil need approximately
1.42 bilion tons of standard coal equivalent by the end of this century, representing a
44 per cent increase, as compared to 1990.
China is very different from other developed countries in that coal is the major
energy source. Chapter 4, therefore, contains an analysis and forecast of the country's
demand for coal as it moves toward the next century. To accomplish this task, three
different methods have been applied to contrast their performances in fitting the
Chinese data: Engle-Granger's type error correction model, Hendry's type error
correction model and Hendry's general-to-specific approach. It was found that the
Engle-Granger outperforms the other two approaches in terms of having the smallest
ex-post forecast errors. By using the Engle-Granger methodology, the model predicts
that the Chinese economy wil experience a five per cent shortfall by the year 2000.
In sumary, Chapter 3 and 4 highlight the need for an effective management
policy in handling the country's largest energy sector, as China progresses toward the
new century. The relevant polices have been mentioned in Chapter 2. Here, the analyses
were mainly qualitative. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, however, energy pricing policies that
might be used to narrow the imbalance were evaluated by quantitative means.
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8.3 Evaluation of the Role of Government Energy Pricing Policies in China.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is believed that the low energy prices are one of
the main causes of energy deficits. Since economic reform began in 1979, the Chinese
governent has reformed the under-pricing system and gradually increased energy
prices. As revealed from western studies, however, the effects of higher pricing polices
on the economy hinge on the substitution possibilties among energy inputs and other
(non-energy) factors of production in response to price changes. A knowledge of the
substitution possibilities is of paramount importance in the management of the energy
sector. For instance, if capital and energy are substitute inputs, other factors being fixed,
rising energy prices wil encourage more rapid capital formation and induce more
labour productivity. 
i Alternatively, if energy and capital are complements, the higher
price for energy wil tend to reduce the future rates of capital formation and so labour
1
productivity wil decline, reducing output growth. Hence, the third part of this thesis is
to compute cross- and own- price elasticities of demand for all inputs.
In Chapter 5, after reviewing the literature on energy-capital relationships, it
was found that the relationship has proved to be controversial, resulting in opposing
energy pricing policies aimed at alleviating the imbalance. These controversies exist
mainly because different estimation techniques are employed in the studies, such as
functional forms and various dynamic specifications. It is believed, however, that the
i As mentioned in Chapter 5, this is only the short run effect. Over the long ru, output
wil decrease ultimately if the capital inputs increase persistently. This is because the
marginal product of capital wil diminish if other factor inputs remain constant.
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existence of rationing, a typical constraint in China, may provide an alternative
explanation for the controversies. It was decided, therefore, to incorporate rationing
behaviour in this study.
To examine the relationships among various factors, input demand functions
were derived. In order to derive the input demand equations and the,price elasticites, (i)
the dual approach provides an easier method than the primal approach, (ii) the profit
function has advantages over the cost function and (iii) the translog functional form is
more appropriate than other functional forms. Therefore, the translog profit function by
the dual approach has been employed to derive the input demand functions and the
relevant elasticities. This method is paricularly appropriate for use with China's data
set of firms.
As the traditional translog profit function approach neglects the influence of
rationing on the input demand functions and price elasticities, new formulae were
developed for use in Chapter 6. The concepts of virtual pricing developed by Neary and
Roberts(l980) and Squires(1994) were followed. This approach has the advantage over
the auxiliary constraint approach, in that it allows the parameters of the constrained
profit function to be recovered from the unconstrained profit fuction. Therefore, in this
approach, it is not necessary to know ex ante whether there are input quantity
restrictions upon output supply, factor demand, and profitability for a profit maximising
producer. It is necessary only to estimate the traditional translog profit fuction and
substitute the estimated parameters into the formulae derived from that function, which
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is incorporated into the virtual prices for the rationed input. Moreover, by comparing
the formulae of the elasticities under and with no rationing, one can test which type of
elasticities are more appropriate for use with the data.
In Chapter 7, I explained how to estimate the translog profit function and I
discussed the econometric technique. From the empirical findings, it was found that a
time varying approach is more appropriate than a time invariant approach. This finding
verifies the fact that China has implemented sequential industrial reforms with respect
to state owned enterprises and so caused continuous structural change over the
estimation period.
Generally, the results are satisfactory. By substituting the estimates of the
translog profit function into the formulae derived in Ghapter 6, various elasticities can
be calculated. By performing various tests, it was found that the elasticities under
rationing are more appropriate than those under no rationing and many of them are
significant at the 5 % significance leveL. Moreover, the empirical results suggest a
complementarity between energy and capital and no significant relationship between
energy and labour, over the estimation period.
When the future demand predicted in Chapter 3 is compared with the predicted
energy supply obtained in Chapter 2 for the years 2000 and 2010, it can be concluded
that energy deficits are likely to intensify. To remove the insufficiency, the governent
can balance future energy production with consumption by reducing energy demand.
Based on the magnitudes of the calculated elasticites under rationing in 1988 and the
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forecasts of energy demand obtained from Chapters 2 and Chapter 3, in the short run,
the governent can implement four different policies to remove the energy shortfall in
2000 and 2010, i.e., either i) increase energy prices by 0.9463% and 0.649% or ii)
decrease supply of materials by 1.332% and 0.013% or iii) reduce output price by
0.237% and 0.162% or iv) reduce the use of capital by 2.797% and 1.198%. Our
empirical findings, however, show that except for policy (iv) with nÓ effect on output in
the short run, the other three policies wil result in lower output growth rates.
Conversely, as the relationship of energy and labour is insignificant, encouraging firms
to employ labour intensive techniques wil not be appropriate to reduce the energy
deficits.
The governent has to implement two instruments simultaneously, rather than
use one instruent exclusively. If the governent 'not only aims at reducing energy
1
imbalance, but also wishes to maintain the average growth rate of SOEs at 2.8% and
higher over 1985-88, it has to decrease the use of capital by over 40% which seems
to be invalid. Alternatively, firms may increase energy prices by over 20% if they
concurently increase either output price, or the use of material inputs. As energy
prices were held arbitrarily low before the price reform, there was some room for
increasing prices at the outset. As reform has been continuous, however, the room
for further increases is small. On the other hand, as mentioned above, a high energy
pricing policy may no longer be effective, even if it is implemented with other policy
instruments. Besides, it may cause spiral inflation and negative effects on balance of
payments and foreign reserves.
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Unless labour is changed to be a substitute for energy and there is a positive
effect of labour on output. The adverse effects of increasing energy prices mentioned
above, are inevitably harmful to China's economy as well as to the continuity of
economic reform, especially when the country remains at the developing stage.
Therefore, to manage possible energy deficits in future, China should not solely
emphasise the adjustment of energy prices but also the implementation of various
policies on both the supply and the demand sides of the energy sector. Those
remedies have been stated in Chapter 2. Among them, the first priority may be the
focus on improving the productivity of various input factors. However, their real
effects on the energy sector is a subject that require fuher investigation.
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